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 Hawai’i holds a somewhat nebulous place in American History.  While it easily 
fits in the dominant narrative surrounding the Spanish American War of 1898 and World 
War II, Hawai’i rarely factors into other major historical fields, often making a brief 
cameo appearance when it does.  Because the state is geographically placed at the 
western extreme of America, one supposes that western historians would gladly accept 
the task of chronicling Hawaiian history; yet, even academics in this field hesitate to 
embrace the region.  In fact, some scholars who study the American West completely 
dismiss the notion of including the Hawaiian Islands.  General American history 
textbooks reflect academics’ uncertainty towards including the islands in the greater 
American narrative as they rarely mention Hawaiian events.  Comparing Hawai’i with 
the continental territories, Native American policy, American insular colonies, and U.S. 
imperialism, however, quickly dispels the notion that Hawai’i lies outside the American 
West.  In fact, it holds a very important role in American history as the transitional zone 
between the older expansionist American imperialism and a newer form of American 
colonialism. 
 Moreover, incorporating Hawaiian history into western regional studies forces 
scholars in the field to rethink existing paradigms.  At the present, western historians 
view the West as a place lying roughly between the Mississippi River and the Pacific 
coast.  Including the Hawaiian Islands, however, forces them to refine their rigid political 
definition of the West to allow for more fluid boundaries.  This dissertation argues that 
including Hawai’i forces scholars to redefine the region as those incorporated territories 
throughout western North America and the Pacific Ocean which the United States 
conquered, subdued, annexed, and admitted into the Union.  Moreover, it is a place in 
which American imperialism reshaped, and continues to shape, all facets of human life 
and the environment. 
  
Copyright 2008, Aaron Steven Wilson 
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
Before delving into the history, it is necessary to clarify certain terminology.  
There is a growing trend among Western historians to use indigenous names when 
referring to indigenous political, social, and economic institutions.  Thus, we refer to the 
Diné as opposed to the Navajo and the Lakota and Dakota instead of the Sioux.  Western 
historians do this not only for accuracy, but also as recognition of the fact that indigenous 
societies in the Americas developed their own institutions and cultures.  In other words, 
the use of indigenous terminology prevents repeating past mistakes of denigrating or 
incorrectly representing indigenous institutions by referring to elements of Native 
American society using European language, i.e., calling social leaders “chiefs” and their 
military leaders “braves.” 
 In keeping with this trend, this dissertation uses Native Hawaiian terms to refer to 
their people and land.  The terms “Kānaka” and “Kānaka Maoli” refer to Native 
Hawaiians.  “Kānaka” is the plural form of Kanaka, which indicates Native Hawaiians.  
When speaking of Native Hawaiians as a group, or when using the adjective form of the 
word, the author uses the term “Kānaka.”  The term “foreigners” indicates immigrants 
and non-Native Hawaiian residents in the islands prior to annexation.  After annexation, 
the author uses “Hawaiian” to refer to all citizens of the Territory of Hawai’i and State of 
Hawai’i, including Native Hawaiians, while still using “Kānaka” and “Kānaka Maoli” for 
Native Hawaiians.  It is recognized that islanders and Native Hawaiians refer to 
immigrants and new arrivals as “haole” or “malihini”; however, it was not deemed 
necessary to utilize Native Hawaiian terminology to refer social groups in the post-1893 
overthrow period.  When necessary, the text refers to ethnic groups as 
ix 
 
European/European American, Japanese/Japanese American, Filipino/Filipino American, 
and so forth.  Only in very few cases are “malihini” and “haole” used.  When discussing 
the masses of Native Hawaiian society prior to the overthrow of 1893, the term 
“maka’āinana” is used. 
Native Hawaiian terminology is also employed when discussing political 
institutions prior to 1893.  “Ali’i” refers to political leaders.  Although there is the 
temptation to refer to these individuals as “lords” or “chiefs,” the author considers these 
as poor translations.  The former connotes a feudal or aristocratic society found in 
European nations such as Medieval England or the Austria-Hungarian Empire.  While the 
status of ali’i was hereditary, there was also a spiritual element to this term in older 
Native Hawaiian society in which an ali’i’s mana gave instilled in him the right and 
ability to lead that was lacking in modern European political systems.  On the other hand, 
“chief” has a very derogatory connotation in Western history as older narratives used this 
term in a pejorative manner when referring to indigenous political leaders.  Finally, the 
term “mō’ī” is used interchangeably with for king and queen.  Since this term appears 
later in the Hawaiian monarchy, the author generally uses the term “ali’i nui” to indicate 
earlier sovereigns like Kamehameha I.   After 1893, the terminology uses basic American 
names to refer to political and social institutions and titles.   
Finally, the author recognizes that there exists some debate over the proper usage 
of Native Hawaiian terms.   For sources on Native Hawaiian language, the author referred 
to leading scholars on Native Hawaiian history who use indigenous terms in their 
manuscripts.  Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo’ole Osorio’s Dismembering Lāhui:  A History 
of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 was helpful in this aspect. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
 At six o’clock in the evening, on the day of Tuesday, January 17, 1893, 
Queen Lili’uokalani signed and dispatched a communication to Sanford B. Dole, chief 
executive of the provisional government of Hawai’i.  It was a relatively brief letter, but 
one that would greatly affect the islands and their inhabitants over a century.  It read: 
  I, Liliuokalani, by the Grace of God and under the Constitution of the  
Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done 
against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by 
certain persons claiming to have established a provisional government of and for 
this Kingdom. 
That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose 
minister plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United 
States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said 
provisional government. 
Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I 
do under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such 
time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented 
to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which 
I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian islands.1 
 
Clear and concise, the letter relayed the reluctant capitulation of Lili’uokalani, the last 
mō’ī of the Hawaiian Islands.  For Dole, Stevens, and members of the Committee of 
Safety,2 a pro-American annexation organization, the queen’s abdication signified the 
                                                 
The title of this dissertation was inspired by the debates over the American West presented in David M. 
Emmons, “Constructed Province:  History and the Making of the Last American West,” Western Historical 
Quarterly 25 (Winter 1994):  437-459, and  Walter Nugent, “Where Is the American West:  Report on a 
Survey, Montana:  The Magazine of Western History 42 (Summer 1992):  2-23. 
1 U.S., House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 1, Part 1, Appendix II,  Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Affairs in Hawaii, 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., 1894 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1895), 232-233.  Queen 
Lili’uokalani’s capitulation is also available in Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 3, 1874-
1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 603, as well as in 
Lili’uokalani, Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s Queen, introduction by Glen Grant (Honolulu:  Mutual 
Publishing, 1990), 387-388. 
2 H. E. Cooper, F. W. McChesney, T. F. Lansing, J. A. McCandless, W. O. Smith, Lorrin A. Thurston, W. 
R. Castle, A. S. Wilcox, W. C. Wilder, C. Bolte, Henry Waterhouse, Andrew Brown, H. F. Glade created 
the Committee of Safety, a.k.a. the Committee of Public Safety, on January 14, 1893 after receiving news 
that Queen Lili’uokalani attempted to persuade the legislature to ratify a new constitution.  According to 
Kuykendall, Edward Suhr and John Emmeluth replaced A. S. Wilcox and H. F. Glade after they resigned.  
1 
 
2 
 
success of their coup d’état and the ascendancy of the American settlers.  For decades, 
descendants of American missionaries in Hawai’i pursued political, legal, and other 
means to develop trade and foster a close relationship with the United States of America.  
Often, they attempted to achieve these ends through diplomacy, as in the case with the 
Reciprocity Treaty of 1876.  The number of treaties between the Kingdom of Hawai’i 
and the U.S.A. had increased throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century in order 
to strengthen the economic and diplomatic bonds between the two nations; however, 
plantation owners and businessmen quickly realized that diplomacy was not an effective 
tool to secure an open market for their agricultural products within the republic.  Always 
in their minds lay the idea of annexation as the only guarantee to gain access to the 
markets within the country that their ancestors called home.   
The European settlers’ approach ran contrary to the foreign affairs policies 
developed and pursued by Hawaiian monarchs.  Although Hawaiian monarchs approved 
of developing an intimate relationship with the United States of America, protecting their 
sovereignty remained at the heart of Hawaiian diplomacy.  Hawaiians understood that 
they needed to balance the various European powers to preserve their kingdom, and they 
achieved a large measure of success throughout the eighteenth century.  Granted, the 
threat of European conquest often loomed over the islands.  Twice, the Kingdom of 
Hawai’i faced the guns of European military vessels.  Angered by Hawaiian anti-Catholic 
measures and a tax aimed at stopping the sale of liquor within the kingdom, in 1839 
                                                                                                                                                 
Committee members were not Native Hawaiian.  Europeans, Americans, or naturalized westerners filled 
the ranks of this committee ostensibly established to protect American property in the islands.  These men, 
however, had ulterior motives.  They held deep pro-annexation convictions.  Though some of these men 
were Hawaiian citizens by birth or naturalization, and therefore owing allegiance to the queen, they 
maintained their loyalty to the United States of America.  Needless to say, this was not an organization on 
par with the Sons of Liberty or Committees of Correspondence from the Revolutionary War Era.  They 
were more akin to the filibustering enterprises of the mid 1800s.  For more information, see Kuykendall, 
The Kalakaua Dynasty, 582-605. 
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French Captain C. P. T. Laplace, commanding L’Artémise, threatened Hawaiian monarch 
Kamehameha III with bombardment and invasion if the tax and religious codes were not 
revoked.  Only four years later, British commander Lord George Paulet invaded Hawai’i, 
forcing the monarch to abdicate.  Fortunately for the Kānaka, Lord Paulet’s superior, 
Rear Admiral Richard Thomas, considered his actions as contrary to British policy and 
restored Kamehameha III to his throne, albeit with changes in Hawaiian policies 
regarding British subjects.3  In an era dominated by European nation-states and their lust 
for colonial territories, using diplomatic channels to balance the imperial powers one 
against the other was the most effective tool for smaller states.  Hawaiians had 
successfully navigated the waters of imperial conquest since the advent of Kamehameha I 
in 1810.  With the capitulation letter of Queen Lili’uokalani, the non-Native Hawaiian 
planters, businessmen, merchants, and a rogue U.S. diplomat succeeded where France, 
Russia, Britain, and the United States had failed.  They toppled the Hawaiian monarch, 
and in the process, won their ultimate goal:  a clear road to American annexation and 
unlimited possibilities for their own business interests. 
 The settlers’ victory over Native Hawaiian forces supplanted the legitimate ruling 
family with the Committee of Safety, thus ending the first phase of the path towards 
annexation.  Their victory, however, was only a partial one, at best.  The sugar planters 
supporting the coup d’état needed immediate annexation by the United States of 
America.  Such a union would provide plantation owners with a degree of protection 
against the protective tariffs that were so popular with mainland American businessmen 
and politicians.  Yet, they did not consider the possibility of a prolonged debate 
                                                 
3 Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time:  A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 
1968), 102-103; and Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, 1778-1854, Foundation and 
Transformation (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 133-147, 206-226. 
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concerning the nature of the relationship between Hawai’i and the United States federal 
government.  Moreover, they could not foresee the developments of 1898.  The 
conclusion of the Spanish-American War initiated a period of overseas, territorial 
expansion.  In the American mind, the idea of annexing the Hawaiian Islands was 
troubling since they were populated by Native Hawaiians, Chinese, and Europeans.  The 
Treaty of Paris of 1898 further complicated the issue.  Now there existed the possibility 
of a political union with islands populated by Puerto Ricans, Guamanians, and a myriad 
of Filipino ethnicities in addition to Hawaiian citizens.  Given the preponderance of 
eugenic theories and nativist sentiments, the question of empire became more complex.  
While expanding from sea to shining sea, Americans simply removed unwanted Native 
American and Latino communities from valuable lands, replacing them with settlers of 
European decent.  But this was a new colonial age, and the genocidal policies of the past 
no longer sufficed.  Whereas Americans relished the possibility of resettling old 
Cherokee lands in Georgia, Lakota prairies in the Dakotas, or Tejano ranges in south 
Texas, it was unlikely that masses of city dwelling Americans would leave their homes 
for the expensive trip to Luzon for the purpose of working on plantations.  Americans 
were lured to the West by the possibility of wealth and land in the past.  Forcibly 
removing Native Americans was acceptable throughout the 1800s.  But these factors 
were gone by 1898.  Now, statesmen needed new techniques to govern their insular 
acquisitions, as well as a new reason for holding them in the first place. 
In terms of Hawai’i, the questions regarding its relationship to the United States 
of America were legion.  Should it be a commonwealth relationship?  Did control over 
these islands strengthen the American position in the Pacific Ocean at the cost of 
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American anti-colonial and republican ideology?  Was this indicative of the formation of 
an imperial foreign policy in Washington, D.C.?  Or would Hawai’i follow the historical 
precedent set by continental territories by eventually gaining statehood?  While many 
questions concerning this political bond arose, only one received scant attention within 
the walls of Congress and on the streets of American cities:  would Native Hawaiians 
ever regain their sovereignty?  For Cubans, the Teller Amendment to the declaration of 
war against Spain answered this question by promising independence after the war.  Their 
people were guaranteed self-determination before the Spanish even capitulated.  Native 
Hawaiians were not so fortunate.  The issue of Kānaka rights to their ancestral lands and 
sovereignty would remain suppressed in the public’s mind until Kānaka activists began 
demanding recognition of their indigenous rights in the decades following statehood.  
After realizing the failure of statehood to solve the economic, cultural, and political 
damages caused to the Kānaka by the American conquest of Hawai’i, Native Hawaiians 
recommenced the fight for self-determination after the early 1900s. 
The absorption of the Hawaiian Islands into the American political system was 
novel to policy makers.  No national plan existed for gaining overseas territory prior to 
the 1890s.  While Americans believed it was their manifest destiny to conquer a 
continent, they never developed a master plan for creating an overseas empire.  The war 
against the Spanish Empire radically changed American foreign policy.  In the past, the 
nation interfered in South and Central American countries but never established colonial 
outposts there.  Businessmen made inroads into the Chinese market prior to 1898, yet the 
U.S. Navy lacked sufficient naval stations in the Pacific Ocean for a permanent American 
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presence.  The Spanish-American War sparked a sudden move by American 
expansionists to extend the scope of Manifest Destiny to overseas lands.   
The move towards overseas, territorial colonialism sprang from the atmosphere of 
the Gilded Age.  The closing of the frontier, so passionately advertised by Frederick 
Jackson Turner, in conjunction with the views of imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt, 
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, and others, spurred the nation into an amateurish attempt 
at establishing European-style colonies in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea.  
Expansionists and nationalists considered aggressive occupations necessary to the 
survival of American capitalism.  Successful expansion relied on establishing outposts in 
the Pacific, and Hawai’i fit the criteria for such a naval station.  Annexationists used the 
Spanish-American War as a new tactic in their fight for Hawaiian annexation, even 
though politicians in the halls of Congress had remained reluctant to develop a close 
relationship with the Hawaiian Islands until the very late 1800s.4   
The events of July of 1898 changed the urgency with which congressmen 
approached the national relationship with Hawai’i.  The House of Representatives passed 
a joint resolution, known as the Newlands Resolution, to annex the Republic of Hawai’i 
on July 15, 1898, which the Senate had endorsed on July 6.  The next day, President 
William McKinley signed the document, thus laying claim to the Hawaiian Islands as an 
insular territory of the United States of America and ending the debate over annexation.  
In the historical context, this process of acquisition was different from the Louisiana 
Purchase, the Adams-Onís Treaty, or the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  Americans did 
                                                 
4 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States:  1492-Present (New York:  Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2005), 297-320; Walter LaFeber, The American Age:  U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and 
Abroad, vol. 1, To 1920, 2nd ed. (New York:  W. W. Norton & Co., 1994), 178-239; and Stephen Kinzer, 
Overthrow:  America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York:  Times Books, 2006), 
31-34, 78-94. 
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not purchase this land, nor wrench it from another imperial power as the spoils of war.  
Instead, their citizens emigrated to the kingdom and integrated themselves into the 
politics and economy of the Hawaiian people.  After a period of approximately seventy-
three years they overthrew the government with the aid of the United States and 
established a hastily-constructed, temporary government with an eye toward immediate 
annexation.  In comparing it to other historical processes then, the annexation of the 
Republic of Hawai’i was not dissimilar to that creating the Republic of Texas.  Yet unlike 
Texas, Americans could not agree on the exact nature of the political bond between the 
United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands. 
It did not take long for academicians, journalists, private citizens, and even 
foreigners to voice their views on the Hawaiian question.  Shortly after news of the coup 
d’état reached the continental newspapers, articles appeared containing advice on how to 
proceed.  For example, in three months after the overthrow of the queen, The Social 
Economist published an article entitled, “Philosophy of Immigration and Annexation.”  In 
this piece, the author traced the development of the global economy, finally concluding 
that the American capitalist economy was the pinnacle of economic evolution.  Although 
the author claimed that the southern states continually retarded economic progress, he 
considered the United States of America as the heir to a movement towards economic 
liberalism that began in Europe.  Since certain factors prevented this progress from 
becoming fulfilled there, the goal of creating and spreading a purely capitalist economy 
fell to the United States.  The republic had the political and economic framework 
necessary to complete its mission, but certain elements and developments could halt any 
progress towards economic liberalism.  Within the southern states of the United States, 
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which he termed the “block of barbarism,” the institution of slavery and the treatment of 
African-Americans following Reconstruction had already slowed this progress.5  To 
admit Hawai’i to the United States would further block the process, since the Republic of 
Hawai’i would need to enter into the Union as either a state or a foreign dependency.  In 
either case, the author claimed that the addition of the islands filled with “coolies and 
kanakas” and “a few American capitalists . . . similar to the former slave-holders of the 
South” would add yet another economic and social burden to the American republic.6 
 Academic circles even took notice of the economic aspects of the Committee of 
Safety’s coup d’état and subsequent appeal for annexation.  In March of 1893, scholar 
Frederick R. Clow wrote an article, entitled “Our Commercial Relations,” in which he 
described at length the economic ties between the Republic (previously the Kingdom) of 
Hawai’i and the United States of America.  He observed that the reciprocity agreement 
formalized in 1876 stemmed from a desire of the American federal government to 
prevent Hawaiian markets from moving into the British economic sphere.  Moreover, the 
treaty brought much needed growth and wealth to Hawaiian plantation owners.  Yet, the 
loss of this agreement in 1891 gravely affected the Hawaiian economy, leading to 
plantation closures and increased unemployment.  To stall this downward economic 
spiral, the author concluded that Hawaiian political leaders sought annexation as a 
permanent form of reciprocity.  While Clow acknowledged the possibility of converting 
Pearl River into a naval base, his figures suggested to his readers that annexation would 
cost at least $5,000,000 per annum.  Instead of annexation he suggested a quick 
                                                 
5 “Philosophy of Immigration and Annexation,” The Social Economist (April 1893):  193 [database on-
line]; available from APS Online. 
6 Ibid. 
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expenditure of $25,000,000 on new armaments and battleships to save American 
taxpayers’ money while still increasing the naval presence in the Pacific Ocean.7 
 The academic question regarding annexation was not limited to the continental 
United States.  In an article in Forum, dated December of 1897, the Rt. Hon. James 
Bryce, M.P., presented his case against annexation.  In analyzing the situation, Bryce 
focused on two main topics:  military power and democratic institutions.  First, the author 
argued that annexing the Hawaiian Islands would have an adverse effect on American 
security within the Pacific Ocean.  Although the islands provided a superb location for a 
coaling station, their location 2,300 miles from the North American continent placed 
extra demands on the U.S. Navy.  Whereas Bryce considered the size of the United States 
as preventing any serious threat of invasion from another power, the annexation of Cuba, 
Hawai’i, and other insular possessions would require vast expenditures to construct a 
fleet.  In other words, American insular territories, like European colonies, would become 
“territories which lie at the mercy of a stronger hostile fleet.”8   
Bryce continued his argument by claiming the annexation of Hawai’i and the 
islands gained from Spain after the Spanish-American War would inevitably force 
America to adopt a European, colonial system.  His article was one of many written 
between 1893 and 1898 as part of a debate on whether or not the United States could 
successfully incorporate large populations of “non-white” citizens into the republic.  In 
Bryce’s opinion, the American democratic system required a well-educated European 
                                                 
7 Frederick R. Clow, “Our Commercial Relations,” Journal of Political Economy 1, no. 2 (March 1893):  
280-284 [database online]; available from JSTOR. 
8 James Bryce, “The Policy of Annexation for America,” Forum (December 1897):  385 [database online]; 
available from JSTOR. 
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stock “capable of working self-governing democratic institutions” to operate effectively.9  
His analysis of the population of the Hawaiian Islands led him to believe that such a 
population did not exist in Hawai’i.  Therefore the United States Congress would need to 
establish a colonial office, similar to the Colonial Office in London.   
Here, Bryce saw two problems.  First, the United States government lacked 
experience in colonial administration.  His historical description of the British system 
was one that developed over a long period of time, complete with a trained staff 
knowledgeable of the subtleties need to oversee colonial possessions.  Developing this 
system would require significant time and resources on the part of the Americans.  
Second, Bryce, as well as other scholars, politicians, and journalists, viewed such a 
colonial institution as incompatible with the American constitutional and legal system.  
His proof for this argument lay in American territorial history.  He wrote, “It is moreover 
to be noted that the status of a Territory has heretofore been deemed a transitory and 
provisional one, intended to lead up in due time, when the region becomes more densely 
populated by competent citizens, to the higher status of statehood.” 10  Bryce correctly 
observed that this was the general rule regarding the treatment of territories throughout 
American history.  But was his assumption correct?   
American historians have written numerous works on territorial history, many of 
which uphold Bryce’s position.  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established the 
procedure by which territories became states.  Once established, a territory moved 
through three processes on the path to statehood.  On the one hand, this document 
provided settlers in the region with the promise that they would not live permanently 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 385. 
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under a colonial system of government.  This was a form of colonization that eventually 
led to full equality.  Historians traditionally see this as the separating factor between 
American and European imperialism.  According to this view, Europeans never intended 
to grant equality to their subjected states.  They held territories for wealth, not to expand 
freedom or lofty goals of republicanism.  Americans, on the other hand, used a colonial 
framework to subjugate foreign lands so they could recreate their democratic institutions.  
This was to be expected.  After all, the United States of America emerged from their 
revolution against an imperial power only four years earlier.  To subject American 
citizens to colonial rule would thus run counter to their revolutionary ideals. 11  On the 
other hand, congressmen desired an orderly system of occupation in the territories.  
While Congress clearly desired the occupation of these lands for economic development, 
to expand their republic, provide land for citizens, and replenish a depleted treasury, they 
did not want to risk disunion and chaos within the territories.  As a preventative measure, 
Congress retained the right to intervene and closely observe political, legal, criminal, and 
economic developments during the statehood process.12 
Insofar as continental expansion and general territorial history was concerned, 
territorial status usually led to statehood.  Yet, in the overall historical context, the issue 
                                                 
11 On April 20, 1786, James Monroe wrote to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, regarding the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  In the letter, Monroe solicits advice from Jay concerning the governance of 
the territories.  He wrote, “The first question which arises with respect to the government is, Shall it be 
upon Colonial principles, under a governor, council, and judges of the U.S., removeable at a certain period 
of time and they admitted to a vote in Congress with the common rights of other States, or shall they be left 
to themselves until that event?”  Examining this document suggests that their recent experience as colonial 
subjects was fresh in the minds of the legislators responsible for this document.  Moreover, the language 
within Monroe’s letter clearly indicates that he, as well as others, realized that the territorial process 
threatened to introduce the spirit of imperialism into their republic of freedom.  James Monroe to John Jay, 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, New York, 20 April 1786, in Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of 
the Continental Congress, vol. 8, January 1, 1785, to July, 25, 1789 with supplement (Washington, D.C.:  
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1936), 342. 
12 Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union:  A History of the Northwest Ordinance, Midwestern History and 
Culture, eds. James H. Madison and Thomas J. Schlereth (Indianapolis:  Indiana University Press, 1987), 3-
19, 58-64.   
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contained more intricacies than acknowledged.  Historically, territorial status may have 
led to statehood, but it did not guarantee statehood.  While the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787 established a pattern for American expansion, it never became a constitutional 
element within the American legal system.  As Peter Onuf notes, Chief Justice Roger B. 
Taney declared the ordinance null and void in Strader et al. v. Graham (1850). 13  Prior to 
this ruling, the Northwest Ordinance “filled a constitutional void” surrounding 
congressional powers to admit new states to the Union.14  Onuf’s observation regarding 
this “void” is rather poignant.  When crafting the Constitution of the United States of 
America, the framers included a section giving Congress the authority to admit new 
states, provided the territory lay outside preexisting states.  Furthermore, to Congress 
went the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”15  When confronted with a 
surplus of lands following the American Revolutionary War and a deficit in the United 
States Treasury, congressional leader devised the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.   
  The warnings against the dangers of annexing a predominately Asian population, 
the unpreparedness of the American political system to administer non-continental 
colonial possessions, and the distance of the islands from the mainland deterred 
Congress.  After all, national response toward an expanded role in global affairs was 
greatly divided.  Americans opposing an imperial foreign policy managed to overcome 
their differences long enough to form the Anti-Imperialist League in 1898.  According to 
                                                 
13 Onuf, Statehood and Union:  A History of the Northwest Ordinance, xxi.  Onuf goes into much detail 
regarding the lasting effects of the Northwest Ordinance on the American statehood process.  He covers the 
relationship between the Northwest Ordinance and the Constitution, and how this played into relations 
between the various territories, as well as between territorial governments and congress.   
14 Ibid. 
15 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New 
York:  Mentor, 1999), 519. 
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Howard Zinn, this was an “odd group” representing different—and sometimes 
opposing—segments of society, “united in a common moral outrage at what was being 
done to the Filipinos in the name of freedom.”16  Yet, their efforts were insufficient to 
counteract the move by industrial leaders, politicians, and political theorists to introduce a 
new kind of American imperialism.  Stephen Kinzer attributed this failure to a lack of 
radical action on the part of the Anti-Imperialist League.  This “outspoken band of 
idealists,” as he termed them, could not counter the growing desire among the populace 
to expand trade and missionary policies across the Pacific and the globe.  Moreover, the 
increase in American productivity and transportation, as well as the perceived fulfillment 
of Manifest Destiny within their own borders forced Americans to look overseas for new 
frontiers of commerce and expansion.17   
 Drafting her letter of surrender to the United States government, Queen 
Lili’uokalani placed her trust in the honor of America’s elected representatives, hoping 
that they would uphold the anti-colonial and republican rhetoric inherited from the 
Revolutionary War generation.  During the reign of her ancestor, King Kamehameha III 
(1824-1854), the United States honored Hawaiian sovereignty, but significantly less so 
than did the British Empire.  She probably worried about the worst consequences.  And 
they came true.  The Kingdom of Hawai’i, the jewel of the Pacific Ocean, had been 
presented by the Committee of Safety as a gift to the American Empire, and the 
Americans intended to keep it. 
 Yet, Congress did not immediately accept Hawai’i.  American opinion divided 
over the issue of annexation.  Primarily anti-imperialist sentiment rejected the 
                                                 
16 Howard Zinn, 314-315. 
17 Stephen Kinzer, 80-85. 
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transformation of the nation into a colonial power.  This group simply opposed the idea 
of holding colonial possessions in the manner of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century European nations.  While this position on annexation served as a solidifying 
agent, anti-imperialist opinion split over other issues.  Southern anti-imperialists feared 
the integration of foreign, non-western races into the body politic, while others were wary 
of the impact the Hawaiian sugar industry and the administration of a new colonial 
government would have on the economy.  
 For those in favor of annexation, the place of Hawai’i in national politics caused a 
degree of discord over how to incorporate the region into the imperial republic.  
Politicians, intellectuals, and businessmen proposed plans that covered a broad spectrum.  
Some suggested turning the island into colonies administered in a fashion similar to 
British and French holdings in Africa, Southwest Asia, and India.  The Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 served as another possible solution.  Congress could authorize a 
territorial government that allowed for a large degree of self-government.  Unfortunately, 
this stoked anxiety among congressmen and Americans who, like their southern anti-
imperialist opponents, dreaded including Asians and Polynesians in the American 
political system.  Worse yet, establishing a territorial government historically served as 
the first step towards statehood, i.e., incorporation into the Union on an equal footing 
with the older states.  Throughout the course of the next 62 years, Americans continued 
this debate.   
 On August 21, 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ended the debate over 
Hawai’i’s status in the United States of America by signing PL 86-3, An Act to Provide 
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for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union.18  With the State of Hawai’i 
adding the fiftieth star to the American flag, citizens, statesmen, and scholars, alike, could 
finally stop debating on whether or not it was just, proper, economical, or advantageous 
to incorporate the Pacific atoll into the Union.  Hawaiians’ wartime sacrifices and 
relentless campaign for statehood had won them an official place in Congress and among 
the fellowship of the continental states. 
 Ironically, PL 86-3 initiated a new debate among historians.  After the tumult had 
subsided in the national press, U.S. Congress, and general public, historians were left the 
task of making sense of sixty-two years worth of discussion, law, colonialism, and social 
developments occurring throughout the continental states, as well as the island chain 
located 2,300 miles west of them.  Instead of the question, should the Territory of 
Hawai’i be given commonwealth status, historians ask how did Hawaiians avoid 
commonwealth status and win statehood?  Rather than asking, whether or not control 
over the islands would strengthen the American position in the Pacific Ocean at the cost 
of American anti-colonial and republican ideology, scholars consider the effect statehood 
had on American image in the Pacific Rim.  Sixty-nine years later, historians know the 
answer to the question:  would the Kānaka ever regain their sovereignty?   
 In other words, since 1959, historians have produced a significant body of 
literature on the role of Hawai’i in American history.  Historians focusing on issues in the 
Pacific Rim, indigenous history, and Hawaiian history have produced most of the written 
work, which is quite logical.  Yet, one discipline has largely ignored Hawaiian history, 
especially twentieth-century Hawaiian history.  Academics involved in the field of the 
                                                 
18 U.S. Congress, An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union, Public Law 
86-3, U.S. Statutes at Large 73 (1959):  4-13. 
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North American West have many reasons to engage in research topics covering these 
islands.  The West was the region in which over two hundred years of American colonial 
history occurred.  Laws passed regarding race relations, territorial government, land use, 
and homesteading set the precedent for the rest of the nation.  Cow towns and boomtowns 
set the scene for violence and lawlessness.  From this milieu of ruggedness emerged 
lawmen and pistoleers, represented by Billy the Kid, Wyatt Earp, and Wild Bill Hickok, 
who would blaze their way into American myth with their six-shooters.  More than this, 
the American West was the scene for campaigns of conquest and colonialism.  Here was 
the birthplace of American attitudes towards indigenous peoples that would later appear 
in the Philippines and Vietnam.  The coastlines of California, Alaska, Oregon, Hawai’i, 
and Washington served as points of departure for troops sailing to Guadalcanal, Saigon, 
and Inchon; manufactured goods reaching China and Japan; and atomic bombs delivering 
death and destruction to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and to a lesser extent, Eniwetok.  Just as 
the West was the setting for figures and events of the legendary Old West, it was also a 
theatre in the neo-colonialism of post-World War II America.  Yet, the field remained 
silent about Hawai’i and its role in the New West. 
 Pacific history is not new to western historians.  In 1951, as American troops 
fought against communist forces on the Korean peninsula, a preeminent western 
historian, Earl Pomeroy, introduced the field to the possibilities of incorporating Pacific 
territorial history with his history of Micronesia.  He first encountered Micronesian 
history before the Japanese bombs fell on Pearl Harbor.  His experience during World 
War II as an instructor of naval and diplomatic history rekindled his interest in the subject 
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by introducing him to military and world affairs in the region.19  Unfortunately, his book, 
Pacific Outpost:  American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia, failed to capture western 
historians’ interest in the relationship between colonialism in the American West and 
national interests in the Pacific Rim.  Turnerianism, the bane of most modern western 
historians, still reigned in the field.  Historians spent their energies producing work on 
cowboys and Indians.  Women, minorities, colonialism, sexuality, and town-building 
were ancillary to legitimate scholarship.  Moreover, the Pacific Ocean was irrelevant to 
their field.  Aside from being a place from which Chinese and Japanese immigrants 
magically appeared, it meant little to the West. 
 The advent of New Western History signaled an end to Turnerianism.  With the 
publication of books like “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” by Richard 
White, and Legacy of Conquest, by Patricia Nelson Limerick, western historians began to 
consider groups, persons, and themes that Turnerians marginalized.  Today, world-
systems theory, postmodernism, and environmental theories offer new approaches to the 
discipline.  And still, Hawai’i remains absent. 
 This dissertation seeks to rectify this oversight.  By building on recent scholarship 
from the fields of the American West, European colonial studies, and American foreign 
affairs, this narrative will prove that the history of the Territory of Hawai’i is integral to 
the study of imperialism in the Twentieth-Century American West and the Pacific Ocean.  
Examining modern Hawaiian history in the context of the Twentieth-Century American 
West, decolonization, colonialism, and the Cold War not only refines the definition of the 
                                                 
19 Earl Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost:  American Strategy in Guam and Micronsia, Stanford Books in World 
Politics, ed. Graham H. Stuart (Stanford, California:  Stanford University Press, 1951), xiii-xiv. 
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region west of the Mississippi River, but it also connects western studies to the wider 
field of American and European colonial history. 
 Accomplishing this rather large goal is no easy task.  To do so, the dissertation 
must move from events occurring at the global level to the regional level.  Chapter two 
begins by providing an overview of American colonialism in the context of global 
colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, thus connecting events in the 
American West to global colonial history.  This step is necessary to providing a new 
perspective on American Western History.  Traditionally, the American West has been 
depicted as a region separate from European imperialism and colonialism.  Europeans 
conquered Africans, Indians, and Asians; Americans defeated Native Americans.  
European adventurers, industrialists, and colonial administrators extended the British 
Empire as representatives of the Colonial Office by establishing colonial governments 
based on the principle of indirect rule.  Meanwhile, Americans expanded their republic of 
freedom and liberty by establishing new states in the West where Chinese, European, and 
Japanese immigrants lived next to Native Americans, African Americans, Mexican 
Americans, and European Americans.  In other words, European colonialism had nothing 
to do with American expansion. 
 But scholars must consider an alternative depiction of this narrative.  What if 
western historians viewed American expansion west of the Mississippi as part of a larger 
trend in world history?  Historians in the American West have already begun this process 
by writing comparative histories between Canada and Australia and the American West.  
Yet, what was Canada?  Colonial historians classify it as a Dominion, a settler society 
that displaced Native American populations and established a colony intrinsically linked 
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to the British Empire throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Canadians were 
not alone.  New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa were also classified under this term. 
 Chapter two seeks to connect the settlement of the American West to this event in 
world history, the expansion of white settler societies that recreated neo-Europes and 
neo-Americas throughout North America and the Pacific Ocean.  For the British Empire, 
the Dominion occupied territories in British North America, New Zealand, Australia, and 
South Africa.  For the United States, the creation of the “American Dominions,” i.e., 
settler societies, began with the opening of the Louisiana Purchase and extended across 
the continent into the Pacific Ocean to Hawai’i.  Like members of the British 
Commonwealth, these American settler societies developed advanced economies 
powered by European, Asian, and African laborers in lands depopulated of the native 
inhabitants and financed by money from metropolitan centers located on or near the 
North Atlantic Rim. 
 In addition to securing the American West to global colonial history, chapter two 
addresses the exclusion Hawai’i from histories of the American West.  Building on the 
work of John Whitehead and William Robbins, this chapter establishes the islands as part 
of the capitalist world-system developing in the American West, as well as other trends in 
the Twentieth-Century American West. 
 Having established Hawai’i as part of the American West, and the American West 
within global colonial studies, the present study turns to events tying Hawai’i into 
regional trends west of the Mississippi.  Chapter three begins this process by 
incorporating Hawaiian territorial government into western territorial history.  By 
studying the structures of colonial government in the islands and comparing it to 
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territorial governments in western continental territories, the study reveals that Hawaiian 
government from 1900 to 1959 was a direct continuation of the colonial government 
model as established by the Northwest Ordinance and modified by the Wisconsin 
Organic Act. 
 Moreover, this chapter makes a direct distinction between incorporated American 
colonialism and unincorporated American colonialism.  Although historians can compare 
American imperial history to that of European empires—more specifically the British 
Empire—one must account for the differences in the two systems.  European empires 
primarily conquered territories in Africa and Asia, though Britain had Dominions in the 
Pacific Ocean and southern Africa.  While American colonialism developed from its 
experiences as a possession of the seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century British 
Empire, as well as its “sub-imperial” actions prior to the Revolutionary War, it was never 
an exact replica of the British system. 
 The U.S. had two forms of colonialism.  Incorporated colonialism was 
characterized by white settler societies replicating their former communities and political 
organizations in conquered trans-Mississippi regions (as described above).  To ensure 
their continued allegiance to the eastern states, the federal government offered the 
possibility of full political association from the first territorial stages.  On the other hand, 
unincorporated colonialism occurred in U.S. territories in which the indigenous 
population remained the majority.  The federal government never extended them the offer 
of full association, and colonial administration mirrored the indirect rule British agents 
exercised over African and Asian possessions. 
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 Next, chapter four addresses issues arising from the noncontiguous geographical 
location of the Hawaiian Islands.  Noncontiguity caused administrative and policy 
problems for American administrators.  To Americans living in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, Hawaiian noncontiguity seemed unique.  Although 
the blue water thesis and Cold War threatened American control over the region, 
Hawaiian noncontiguity was not unique.  American armed forces, pioneers, and wagon 
trains experienced geographical separation as early as the first Oregon-bound wagon 
train.  This chapter not only analyzes American concerns towards the perceived Hawaiian 
geographical isolation, but it also examines the federal impulse to grant Hawai’i 
statehood as a means of seemingly observing international demands for decolonization. 
 Having examined issues pertaining to territorial government and noncontiguity, 
we next turn our attention to indigenous policy in Hawai’i, the Pacific possessions, and 
the continental territories.  For settler societies in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South 
Africa, and the U.S., indigenous issues played a larger role in colonial affairs.  This 
chapter seeks to examine the relationship between Native Hawaiians’ loss of sovereignty 
and conquest to overall American indigenous policy.  It reveals the similarities in the 
conquest of continental and insular indigenous peoples, as well as the federal 
government’s neglect of Native Hawaiians.  In essence, the federal government 
approached Native Hawaiians with a policy similar to that found forty years later on the 
mainland, called the Termination Program.  Finally, it connects experiences of Native 
Hawaiians, Native Americans, and South Pacific Islanders towards tourism and the Cold 
War arms race. 
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 Finally, white settler societies throughout the world eventually demanded equality 
with their larger political community.  For British Dominions, the Statute of Westminster 
(1931) began the political process of making British Dominions equal to the metropole.  
In Hawai’i, statehood granted Hawaiian equality with the mainland states.  Chapter six 
traces the techniques used in Hawai’i since 1903 to overcome opposition to their full 
inclusion into the Union.  By combining the political methods used in continental 
statehood movements with the boosterist techniques of the American West, Hawaiians 
successfully overcame the opposition, winning statehood in 1959. 
 Combining these topics with current literature on Hawai’i in the American West 
proves that it is not only part of the American West, but also a part of larger colonial 
events in world history.  Furthermore, it reveals the importance of including Hawai’i in 
the American West by placing American colonialism within the trends of colonial settler 
societies throughout western controlled territories.  This contributes to the growing body 
of knowledge in American Western History by further ridding the narrative of 
exceptionalism and revealing similarities between American and European colonial 
systems. 
CHAPTER 2   
 
THE TERRITORY OF HAWAI’I AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN A GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 
 
 Mirroring its geographical distance from the interior of the United States, 
Hawaiian history has always been on the periphery.  Located far from the immediate 
attention of American historians, its role in United States history often seems obscure, 
ambiguous, and difficult to place.  Native Hawaiians, after all, are not historically Native 
Americans, even though recent U.S. Congresses and Supreme Courts view them as 
legally compatible.  Native Hawaiians once lived under a constitutional monarchy that 
funded a budding school system.  Each mō’ī worked to forge closer ties with Eurasian 
nations, and Hawaiian art, religion, and language differs substantially from indigenous 
cultures on the North American continent.  Do they belong to the realm of indigenous 
history, or should historians treat them similar to the conquered communities that once 
belonged to the Republic of Mexico?  Urbanization, community development, and state 
development in the insular state did not follow the east-to-west orientation of the 
continental states, nor did its population have ties primarily to western Europe.  With its 
predominately Asian population, distance from the mainland, and Polynesian roots, can 
cultural historians link the island chain to the dominant American culture, or are 
Hawaiian culture and society unique?  Most importantly for this study, the islands lay 
west of the Mississippi river, yet Hawaiian history lacks a Wyatt Earp, transcontinental 
cattle drives, Little Big Horn, Wild Bill Hickok, transcontinental railroads, and gushing 
oil geysers.  If it is west of Western America, to what region does it belong?   
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 Already split over the precise regional boundaries of the American West, the 
Hawaiian Islands complicate the issue of what comprises the Old and New West when 
placing their history in contexts of economic, colonial, cultural, geographical, and 
political events and trends in the region.  According to John Whitehead, Hawai’i not only 
belongs in the region:  he claimed that it is “America’s first and last Far West.”1  
Contrary to his characterization, historians Michael P. Malone and Richard W. Etulain 
defined the West in such terms as to exclude the island chain absolutely, because it lacks 
the characteristics of aridity, resource-extractive industry, and a common history.2  
Malone and Etulain’s definition reflected older theories regarding the American West, 
such as Walter Prescott Webb’s environmental determinism found in the Great Plains and 
the Turnerian notion of a frontier.  With a healthy portion—though now a minority—of 
Turnerian-grounded western historians in the field, one cannot summarily dismiss the 
definition offered by Malone and Etulain, especially given their contributions.  Finally, 
other historians claim that Hawai’i’s role in Western historiography lies somewhere 
between the positions assumed by Whitehead, Malone, and Etulain.  For example, Walter 
Nugent stated that “by nineteenth-century criteria Hawaii might not qualify, but by 
twentieth-century ones it certainly does.”3   
 If one simply accepts the older definitions of the American West as a place 
populated by Euro-American pioneers, Native Americans, Chinese Americans, and South 
and Central Americans, all working to mine gold, grow crops, drive cattle, or pump oil in 
an arid or semi-arid region, then no, Hawai’i is not part of the western saga.  It becomes 
                                                 
1 John Whitehead, “Hawai’i:  The First and Last Far West?”  Western Historical Quarterly 23 (May 1992):  
156; Available on JSTOR. 
2 Michael P. Malone and Richard W. Etulain, The American West:  A Twentieth-Century History (Lincoln:  
University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 9. 
3 Walter Nugent, Into the West:  The Story of Its Peoples (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 11. 
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an anomaly, a state simply suspended in the Pacific Ocean.  If, on the other hand, one 
steps back from the geographically strict definition of the West as a place between the 
Pacific Ocean and the Mississippi River and instead places American continental 
expansion within the context of a larger, global trend of colonialism and imperialism, 
then Hawai’i not only belongs within the imperial tradition of the American West, but it 
also broadens the field of Western history by revealing that the process of expansion as 
outlined in the Northwest Ordinance did not stop at the West Coast.  Instead, it continued 
to Hawai’i while simultaneously mutating into a form of territorial acquisition more akin 
to European colonialism.  Given this transformation, territorial history, which is a crucial 
component of Western history, must now account for the appearance of unincorporated, 
i.e., colonial, territories in addition to the old narrative of incorporated, i.e., imperial, 
territories.  To accomplish this task Hawai’i must be placed in the framework of 
twentieth century American imperialism, American colonialism, and European 
colonialism. 
 With the increased historical interest in colonialism, imperialism, the Cold War, 
and twentieth century history in Western studies, the inclusion or exclusion of Hawai’i in 
the West has produced some degree of debate.  The debate began in the early 1990s when 
John Whitehead responded to Michael Malone and Richard Etulain’s argument for 
excluding Hawai’i in their work The American West:  A Twentieth-Century History, in 
which they dismissed the notion of including Hawai’i based on its supposed lack of 
aridity, a shared history, and extractive industry.  They asserted that the frontier heritage 
set the West apart from the rest of the nation.  Though west of other lands, the State of 
Hawai’i did not experience this phase lasting from 1803 to 1890 in which the federal 
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government retained control over all regional lands and eastern business interests 
dominated society in the region.  Moreover, the West shared a common literary history 
that popularized the image of the West as a rough-hewn place populated by 
individualistic men, representative of Frederick Jackson Turner’s imagined West.4 
 John Whitehead countered their definition in two essays, “Hawai’i:  The First and 
Last Far West?” (1992) and “Noncontiguous Wests:  Alaska and Hawai’i” (1997).  In his 
first attempt to establish Hawai’i firmly within regional studies of the American West, 
Whitehead examined Malone and Etulain’s claims that Hawai’i had neither an arid 
climate nor a shared history by noting that the Hawaiian climate shares common traits 
with the American West.  It, too, has pockets of aridity scattered throughout the islands.  
For an example, he noted that the region surrounding Kawaihae, Hawai’i, which is 
located on the island of Hawai’i, receives a scant 5.7 inches of precipitation per annum.  
When sugar planters sought to cultivate the lands surrounding Kawaihae in the late 
1800s, plantation owners compensated for arid conditions by constructing an irrigation 
system.  With an examination of one locale located on the biggest island, Whitehead 
demonstrated that the Hawaiian climate is as diverse as the American West and that 
extreme climatic patters required collective action to engage in extractive activities.5 
 Whitehead next turned his attention to highlighting historical commonalities 
between Western states and the islands.  By reviewing Hawaiian history from the 
migration of the first Polynesians to the islands to the late 1900s, he pointed out 
similarities between Hawaiian events and Western events.  For example, he suggested 
that the sandalwood trade from 1818-1821 created a valuable market for Americans 
                                                 
4 Malone and Etulain, The American West, 9-10. 
5 Whitehead, “Hawai’i:  The First and Last Far West?” 154. 
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comparable to the trade network established by the Santa Fe Trail following the Mexican 
Revolution of 1820.  He cited a landmark event in the Hawaiian cattle industry when 
King Kauikeaouli (Kamehameha III) brought Mexican cowboys to the islands to instruct 
Kānakas in the art of raising cattle.  He even linked Hawaiian missionary activities to the 
Oregon Country through Marcus and Narcissa Whitman, who began their missionary 
activities in what became Washington State in the 1830s which correlated with the arrival 
of New England missionaries in the Hawaiian monarchy in 1820.6  These are only a few 
examples of the various historic events that Whitehead used to show parallel 
developments in Hawai’i and the American West.  
 In terms of addressing Malone and Etulain’s charges of Hawai’i lacking historical 
and climatic characteristics with the West, Whitehead hit on some of the basic issues in 
his article without providing an in depth comparative analysis.  Later, in “Noncontiguous 
Wests:  Alaska and Hawai’i,” Whitehead built upon his previous effort to ground the 
islands firmly with regional studies, and this time he focused on Hawai’i and Alaska’s 
regional relationships with the American West.  He began by reexamining the 
exclusionist argument of aridity, and then he offered a regional analysis of Hawai’i and 
Alaska during which he placed them within the Maritime West of New England, the Gold 
Rush West of California, and the “Untransformed West.”7  Economic connections 
between Hawai’i and the West were forged initially by New England trading vessels 
originating with the arrival of the U.S.S. Columbia, Captain Robert Gray commanding, 
and continuing until roughly 1846 when events in California, the Oregon Country, and 
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northwest Mexico overshadowed this trade network.  He defined the “Maritime West of 
New England” as a “triangle from the Northwest Coast up to Russian America and over 
to Hawai’i,” a trade network through which missionaries, American settlers, and 
manufactured goods reached and changed Hawaiian society.8  The California Gold Rush 
of 1849 inaugurated the Gold Rush West as the Californian market opened to Hawaiian 
agricultural products.  With a new market for sugar and other goods, as well as a potential 
threat from Californian filibusters, this West further integrated Hawai’i into the American 
economic sphere.9   
 Whitehead ended his discussion by posing the possibility of an “Untransformed 
West,” created when the industrialization of major Western cities in the twentieth century 
and the popularization of the West in the media affected perceptions of Hawai’i.  The 
noncontiguous states became part of the “Untransformed West” as they lagged behind 
major Californian cities in industrial capacity and rates of urbanization.  Increased 
immigration to the newest states, the continuation of agricultural industries in the islands, 
and attempts to establish a rudimentary maritime industry in Alaska, however, lessened 
the gap caused by the rapid industrialization of the west coast during World War II.  
Oddly enough, his depiction of the tourist industry suggests that the industry prevented 
the islands from evolving beyond the “Untransformed West.”10  In this instance, his 
analysis suggests that Whitehead did not consider the tourist industry as a major form of 
modern business as depicted by Hal Rothman in Devil’s Bargains.  Granted, Rothman 
considered tourism as an industry capable of making massive profits at the cost of local 
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communities and the environment, but he never denigrated its major role in the modern 
American economy.11 
 Whitehead, however, did offer a caution about regional inclusion.  He observed 
that Alaskans and Hawaiians do not readily regard themselves as Westerners.  Instead, 
they consider themselves apart from the region as “Alaskans frequently refer to 
themselves as ‘Northerners’ (circumpolar rather than Yankee), and the peoples of 
Hawai’i seem happiest with the appellation of ‘islanders.’  ‘Western’ or ‘Westerner’ are 
not designations that are widely voiced in either state.”12  These debates over Hawai’i 
and the American West occurred throughout the 1990s.  Recent events in Hawai’i and the 
insular territories, however, have renewed the importance of this debate.  On April 30, 
2008, the Hawaiian Kingdom Government—a Native Hawaiian sovereignty 
organization—occupied Iolani Palace and closed its doors to the public.  The occupation 
only lasted a few hours, but Mahealani Kahau, leader of Hawaiian Kingdom 
Government, vowed that members would continue returning to the palace every weekday 
in protest of the 1893 coup by the Committee of Safety.13  Only two days earlier, a letter 
signed by Ikaika Hussey of the Movement for Aloha No ka Aina (MANA), Terrilee 
Keko’olani of Ohana Koa/Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific, Noelani Goodyear-
Kaopua of the University of Hawai’i—Manoa, Jon Osorio of the Center for Hawaiian 
                                                 
11 Hal Rothman, Devil’s Bargains:  Tourism in the Twentieth-Century West (Lawrence:  University Press of 
Kansas, 1998), 1-9. 
12 Whitehead, “Noncontiguous Wests:  Alaska and Hawai’i, 316.  Unfortunately, Whitehead does not 
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Studies at the University of Hawai’i—Manoa, Kekuni Blaisdell of Ka Pakaukau, 
Kai’opua Fyfe of the Koani Foundation, and Andre Perez and Kelii “Skippy” Ioane of 
Hui Pu appeared in The Nation asking Americans to support Kānaka efforts to regain 
their sovereignty and end the military presence in Hawai’i.  In their letter, they included a 
brief history of the military occupation of the islands since the 1893 coup d’état.  Their 
statistics show that the U.S. Navy and Army controlled over 150,000 acres of land for 
military bases and training sites.  From these areas, military men and women, munitions, 
armaments, and materiel are dispatched throughout the Pacific Ocean.  Since assuming 
hegemony over the lands starting in 1898, the federal government has subjected the 
islands and Native Hawaiians to environmental, political, and cultural degradation 
through tourism, militarism, and colonialism, they argued.14 
 Modern protests such as these are continuations of Native Hawaiian resistance to 
American control.  Sometimes, protest movements have been labeled or portrayed as 
terrorism.  For example, from 1977 to 1987, Hui ‘O He’e Nalu—a Native Hawaiian 
surfing club—protested surfing tournaments held by International Professional Surfing 
(IPS) that took up the entire surf along the North Shore.  The IPS and its founder, Fred 
Hemmings, secured permits from the Hawaiian state government that gave them 
exclusive rights to the surf during these tournaments.  For Hui ‘O He’e Nalu members, 
these restrictions were another means for haole colonization of Native Hawaiian culture.  
Surfing, after all, was a Native Hawaiian sport with deep cultural and historical meaning.  
Prohibiting Hui members from North Shore waters during surfing competitions was 
absolutely unacceptable to the club.  From 1977 to 1987, Hui ‘O He’e Nalu fought 
against this new, perceived form of colonialism, eventually winning concessions from the 
                                                 
14 Ikaika Hussey, et al., “Hawaii Needs You,” The Nation, April 28, 2008, 29-30. 
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IPS.  For example, IPS hired only Hui members to work as security guards and lifeguards 
until 1987.  The money earned from this concession allowed the Hui to promote 
community projects, hold surfing competitions, and expand the club.  By the 1990s, Hui 
members had survived the accusations of domestic terrorism, poor press from local 
newspapers, and negative imagery in mass media to continue their struggle against other 
American controls over the islands.15 
 Native Hawaiian resistance is only part of the reason why Western historians 
should take notice of American insular regions.  Increasingly, the Territory of Guam and 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico grow in importance to the United States politically 
and militarily.  In terms of the military, over 200,000 Puerto Ricans served in the armed 
forces since the Spanish American War.16  During the tight campaign for the Democratic 
National Party presidential candidacy in 2008, the Guam caucus and Puerto Rico primary 
made national headlines as Americans waited to see if they would have their first African 
American or female presidential candidate in the election of 2008.  With fifty-five voting 
delegates, Puerto Rico had a sizeable impact on the campaign.  Guam, on the other hand, 
only had four delegates; however, in such a close race every delegate had significant 
importance.17 
 Native protest movements, Democratic caucuses, North Korean nuclear weapons, 
growing Chinese economic power, and other international events serve only to remind 
                                                 
15 Isaiah Helekunihi Walker, “Terrorism or Native Protest?: The Hui ‘O He’e Nalu and Hawaiian 
Resistance to Colonialism,” Pacific Historical Review 74 (November 2005):  575-595. 
16 Efrén Rivera Ramos,  American Colonialism in Puerto Rico:  The Judicial and Social Legacy (Princeton:  
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 65. 
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Western historians of the need to continue placing Western historical events and trends, 
especially those of the twentieth century, in a global context.  As Richard White noted at 
the Western History Association’s Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference in Tacoma, 
Washington, in 1989, “[t]he current recognition of the strategic importance of the Pacific 
Rim . . . has placed the West at the physical center of events in the larger realm of 
national affairs.”18  With Hawai’i serving as a transitional zone between the older forms 
of American imperialism and the new American colonialism and post-World War II 
hegemony, the islands link imperial events in the North American continent with the 
Pacific Ocean and the rest of the world. 
 There are various means by which Western historians can incorporate the islands 
into the region.  One requires historians to repudiate all exclusionist arguments that 
Hawai’i lies outside the purview of Western history.  This task is quite possible.  For 
example, in Magic Lands:  Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940, John 
M. Findlay offered a definition of the West based on the U.S. Census and urbanization.  
Since federal workers within the  U.S. Census Bureau placed Hawai’i outside of the 
“eleven Mountain and Pacific states,” he did not consider Hawai’i as geographically 
connected to the region.  Also, he excluded Hawai’i because it lacks a regional 
experience of “moving to and living in its cities and suburbs.”19  To illustrate his point, 
Findlay provided statistics revealing that the greatest rate of urbanization for the 
American West excluding Hawai’i was in the twentieth century as the U.S. population 
experienced another east-to-west migration reminiscent of nineteenth-century overland 
                                                 
18 Quoted from William G. Robbins, Colony & Empire:  The Capitalist Transformation of the American 
West, Development of Western Resources, ed. John G. Clark (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 
1994), 20. 
19 John M. Findlay, Magic Lands:  Western Cityscapes and American Culture after 1940 (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1992), 10. 
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trails.  As proof, he noted that “In 1900 the region had barely 5 percent of the nation’s 
population; by 1970 it had almost 17 percent. . . .  By the time of the 1970 census the 
West had become the most highly urbanized of the four American sections, with 83 
percent of its population dwelling in urban places.  Ten years later, when the figure 
reached 84 percent, its closest competitor, the Northeast, was at only 74 percent.” 20   
 A swift counter to Findlay’s basis for exclusion requires little more than 
referencing census records (See Table 1). 
Table 1:  Population of the West 1990 
Western States Population 
Alaska 550,000 
Arizona 3,665,000 
California 29,760,000 
Colorado 3,294,000 
Hawai’i 1,108,000 
Idaho 1,007,000 
Kansas 2,478,000 
Montana 799,000 
Nevada 1,202,000 
New Mexico 1,515,000 
North Dakota 639,000 
Oklahoma 3,146,000 
Oregon 2,842,000 
South Dakota 696,000 
Texas 16,987,000 
Utah 1,723,000 
Washington 4,867,000 
Wyoming 454,000 
Statistics taken from U.S., Department of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:  1991, 
111th ed.  (Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1991), 20. 
 
 In 1900, Hawai’i only had 368,336 residents.  Following post-World War II, more 
Americans migrated to the islands, as veterans returned to the mainland with descriptions 
of paradise.  Once statehood tied the islands firmly to the United States, Americans were 
even less reluctant to relocate to the islands.  Between 1930 and 1960, the population 
nearly doubled to 632,772.21  Moreover, the population in the twentieth century was 
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largely urban-based.  By 1990, Hawai’i was the forty-first largest state in the United 
States with a population of 1,108,000, which was larger than that of such Western states 
as Alaska, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota.22  More 
importantly, out of 1,108,000 people, 836,000 (75.4% of the population) lived in the city 
of Honolulu making the Hawaiian Islands a very urban place.23  Considering the scarcity 
of available land in Hawai’i and the post-World War II industry dominated by tourism, 
Hawaiians required large urban centers to provide jobs, homes, education, and 
entertainment. 
 Historians who include Hawai’i in the West have countered such exclusionist 
definitions, but so far it has been a piecemeal approach that is at times cumbersome, 
clumsy, inaccurate, and inefficient.  Postmodern theory fragmented the older 
metanarratives and paradigms that attempted to simplify historians’ understanding of the 
West.  Instead of a homogenous region as depicted by Turner, western historians today 
envision the West as a region comprised of multiple cultures, borders, themes, processes, 
and images, sometimes leaving them with multiple Wests instead a singular American 
West.24  In such a fragmented area, historians could quibble ceaselessly over the 
authenticity of one region in comparison to another based on class, race, gender, 
urbanization, climate, geography, imagery, art, and literature.  To avoid the fragmentation 
of the field into a chaotic cluster of multiple Wests, historians attempt to provide 
paradigms with which they understand and analyze the region as a whole, and it is at this 
level that historians must examine the relationship of Hawai’i to the West. 
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 For this reason, Whitehead’s idea of adding new Maritime, Gold Rush, and 
Untransformed Wests as a means of understanding the relationship and effect of Hawai’i 
on the West may not be entirely feasible.  Reviewing his work in this area, it becomes 
readily apparent that these are not inclusive models for Hawai’i in the West.  For 
example, the Maritime West emphasizes the connectivity between Hawai’i and the 
Northeast through “the continual flow of people and products” across the Pacific 
Ocean.25  The Maritime West faded when the Gold Rush West redirected Hawaiian 
markets to the West Coast.  From 1846 to 1893, the constant threat of conquest shaped 
Hawaiian politics as the monarchs navigated through the complex atmosphere of foreign 
affairs.  American settlers in the kingdom and the close proximity of a large Californian 
population drew the Hawaiian monarchy, economy, and culture closer to the United 
States resulting in the 1898 overthrow.26  While these are important connections between 
the Hawaiian Islands and other territories, they do not necessitate the creation of yet 
another American West. 
 When Whitehead used significant events in America to anchor Hawai’i to the 
West, his model was also flawed.  For example, gold strikes near Sutter’s fort in 1848 
and the Yukon River in 1886 were part of a larger mining industry throughout the 
American West.  While mining drew settlers and industries to such regions as California, 
Colorado, Nevada, British Columbia, Alaska, and the Black Hills, Western historians 
now perceive nineteenth-century extractive industries as part of a larger imperial effort to 
control and settle Western lands.  Whitehead correctly noted that the California Gold 
Rush drew settlement to the West Coast; however, his analysis ignored other major 
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factors, such as agriculture and transportation.  Throughout the West, mining settlements 
were temporary, fluid affairs.  The get-rich-quick mentality prevalent in the camps 
eclipsed any thought of town building and community development.  Instead, middle 
class entrepreneurs, farmers, and ranchers were the core of urbanization in the West.  
Immigrating to the West with their families, these groups required schools, churches, 
banks, and other infrastructure.  Granted, miners required legal institutions, stores, and 
entertainment, but mining camp demographics revealed that transitory, single males 
dominated their numbers.27 
 Instead of adopting John Whitehead’s idea of adding new Wests based on 
Hawaiian history, Western historians may want to consider adding a new sub-region to 
existing paradigms.  By considering Hawai’i and Alaska within existing sub-regions of 
the American West or creating a new sub-region for the Pacific Ocean, historians can 
include noncontiguous territories within current models of the American West.  The 
problem is to what sub-region should Alaska and Hawai’i belong?  As chapters three, 
four, and six reveal, Hawai’i continued the traditions of the Northwest Ordinance in the 
settlement, conquest, and administration of the islands; however, their noncontiguous 
nature and changes in national attitudes and federal policy regarding colonialism and 
imperialism were altered with the Spanish American War.  In his article “The American 
View of Decolonization, 1776-1920:  an Ironic Legacy,” Walter LaFeber analyzed 
American expansionist and foreign policy from the Early Republic to the Cold War.  He 
correctly argued that the young republic inherited the colonial policies of the British 
Empire.  Although professing equality, liberty, freedom, and anti-colonialism, American 
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statesmen formulated foreign policy that appeared adverse to imperial ideology, yet was 
imperialist in practice.  For example, the Monroe Doctrine denounced colonialism in the 
Americas and vowed to prevent the acquisition of more territory by European empires in 
1823, yet U.S. officials later used it to ensure economic and political hegemony 
throughout South and Central America.28  Whereas congresses and presidents accepted 
foreign policy designed to guarantee American merchants access to foreign markets, they 
never approved of colonization as practiced by European empires.  American policy 
following 1898, on the other hand, permitted the accumulation of overseas territories.  It 
is within this milieu that the Hawaiian Islands were annexed by the United States.  This 
divergence from the standard pattern of settlement in the American West complicates the 
process of placing Hawai’i within existing sub-regions. 
 In the end, two factors prevent Western historians from accepting the role of 
Hawai’i in Western developments.  First, rigid adherence to regionalism prevents 
Western historians from placing the West within the larger context of global colonialism 
and imperialism.  If historians approached the American West as an area of American 
imperialism within larger events occurring simultaneously in world history, then the 
borders at the Pacific Ocean and Mississippi shrink in importance.  In other words, 
regionalism is important, however, overemphasis on regionalism at the expense of the 
American West in world history becomes counterproductive. 
 Second, Western historians have erred in their emphasis on a contiguous 
American West.  Cartographers, historians, geographers, and other academics once relied 
on continents for an easy compartmentalization of international boundaries, world 
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cultures, religion, and trade networks.  Placing cultures and nations within the tidy 
framework of continents sufficed for the modern era.  Postmodernism, however, 
revolutionized the study of geography.  Michel Foucault’s theories challenged the 
academic habit of writing metanarratives.  According to Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. 
Wigen, “postmodernism in geography emphasizes fluidity, contingency, movement, and 
multiplicity, questioning the rigid spatial frameworks that have limited and constrained 
our geographical imagination.”29  Western historians must consider geography’s use of 
postmodern theory.  Instead of clear, contiguous borders based on political and economic 
systems, postmodern geographers have moved toward viewing a world composed of 
superregions characterized by similarities in culture, religion, economics, and other social 
forces.  Superregions are then broken into subregions that serve as borderlands between 
the two in which social elements from the two sides intermix in a manner reminiscent of 
Richard White’s middle ground.30  Furthermore, these new borders are not always 
impermeable or contiguous.  Instead, they are characterized by fluidity.31  Including 
Hawai’i and other insular territories in the West forces Western historians to consider 
these issues. 
 Thus, the present definition of the American West as a place, or superregion, 
bounded by the Mississippi River, Canada, Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean must be 
modified before continuing on to Hawai’i as part of a subregion.  Geography is an 
important characteristic of the West that helped determine the types of industry settlers 
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could develop in the region.  After all, one would not expect to see a field of banana trees 
in the middle of Death Valley.  Political boundaries were also important.  State 
governments forged out of Kansas and Nebraska territories experienced much different 
processes of evolution and forms of government control than did those of the Northwest 
Territory and Missouri Territory (see chapter three); yet, culture, politics, religion, 
ethnicity, and economics played an equally important role.  Instead of arbitrarily selecting 
geographical boundaries or state borders as the leading characteristics in the definition of 
the American West, historians should rely on the one constant that included geography, 
politics, culture, gender, indigenous policy, economics, and ethnicity . . . imperialism. 
Perhaps the American West is not so much a legacy of conquest as it is the continuing 
effects of American imperialism that began in the nineteenth century and continued into 
the twentieth. 
 Prior to engaging in this topic, however, it is necessary to clarify key terminology.  
Imperialism, colonialism, empire, informal empire, and economic imperialism are words 
used to describe subtle variations in a global phenomenon that began in the 1500s, 
accelerated in the late 1800s, and declined during the 1900s.  Prior to the scramble for 
Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, European nations had extended their power, economy, 
environment, and cultures to regions in Asia, Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific; 
however, from approximately 1876 to 1915, European expansion greatly accelerated.  As 
noted by Eric Hobsbawm, western empires conquered and colonized one-quarter of the 
world’s surface in order to tie peripheral economies, markets, and resources to the 
growing European industrial machine.32  As empires expanded across the far reaches of 
time, their policies of control transformed to accommodate different subjugated 
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populations, white settler populations, technological innovations, and international 
concerns.  Needless to say, the British and French empires of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries differed greatly from those in the twentieth century administered by 
Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle.   
 Since the advent of European imperialism, scholars have worked to gain an 
intimate knowledge of this phenomenon.  Their studies contain an entire lexicon of 
terminology specifically applicable to this field.  Of the various terms developed, 
colonialism and imperialism create a good deal of confusion as they are often used 
interchangeably and, thus, incorrectly.  Colonialism and imperialism describe two 
different processes that often occur simultaneously.  In cases such as the British Empire 
and the United States, a western power could engage in both processes simultaneously in 
different regions in order to more efficiently administer or exploit conquered territories.  
In Europe Overseas:  Phases of Imperialism, Raymond F. Betts offered very basic, yet 
accurate, definitions of colonialism and imperialism, both of which provide a good 
starting point on which to develop a dialogue over the subtleties of empire.  He defined 
imperialism as a “consciously undertaken state activity in which force, intrigue, or even 
negotiation is employed to secure the long-range political or economic domination by the 
state of foreign territory or foreign peoples it wishes for some reason to control.” 33  
Furthermore, imperialism may be transoceanic or transcontinental, thus allowing for 
nations such as Russia and the U.S to embrace it.  The key element in the definition of 
imperialism is longevity and integration.  Empires accumulated colonies without the 
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intent to integrate them into the political system of the metropole, whereas imperial 
nations conquered territory with the full intention of future incorporation at some level.34 
 Scholars can further narrow the definition of imperialism to account for the 
hegemony of a nation in a subjugated territory solely for economic purposes.   
  Economic imperialism may be defined as the use of power to determine 
relations between actors who are bound together mainly by political or economic 
institutions that have been imposed from outside, and who lack a common, 
internally generated sense of moral or cultural solidarity.  The result may be to 
divert the economic choice of local people away from their perceived self-interest 
in a process of informal imperialism.  Alternatively, by the exercise of formal 
control it may determine the economic institutions and policy of a colony, 
securing the interests of the metropolis, or providing favourable access to public 
goods for particular groups within local society who have an affinity with the 
Imperial power, such as settlers, expatriate businessmen and colonial officials, 
and their indigenous allies.  The effect of such actions within the subordinate or 
colonized economy makes it easier to extract resources without providing 
payment for them in the form of social investment.  The opportunity to do this is 
often given to favoured groups of nationals and outsiders, selected on the basis of 
their ethnic composition or political significance rather than their social need or 
economic potential.35   
 
The United States also exhibited patterns of economic imperialism throughout the West 
and Hawai’i in the nineteenth century and twentieth century.  Although the federal 
government never exercised a form of control equivalent to that of King Leopold II of 
Belgium in the Congo, policymakers insisted on retaining the right to legislate for the 
territories while the executive branch guaranteed compliance with congressional will.  At 
times, power struggles erupted between settler societies in the West and Washington, 
D.C., as in the case of the Mormon War.36   
                                                 
34 For more on the “politics of difference” in empires, see Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question:  
Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2005), 3-32, 172-174. 
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 Colonialism, on the other hand, was very different from imperialism.  Historians 
may place colonialism historically within the bounds of imperial expansion; however, 
colonialism refers to a specific form of overseas conquest in which “a dominating 
society, basing its rule on superior force, exploits the indigenous population and the land 
now under its control.”37  The governing structures within the colonies relied on the 
“politics of difference” in which the colonizer excludes the colonized masses from 
politics and society in order to exercise more control over the territory.  In other words, 
politics of difference created a binary hierarchy in which the colonizers assumed 
positions of superiority over the indigenous masses.  They justified this system through 
public ceremonial displays, claiming superior morality, and imagined racial hierarchies.38  
In an empire there existed a “distinction between subject and citizen, the former 
involuntarily incorporated but [having] no rights and no voice, the latter a participating 
member of a polity.”39  According to these criteria, Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain clearly fit into the category of a colonial nation, because their 
colonial governments in areas such as Africa relied on the subjugation of indigenous 
peoples by a handful of colonial administrators.  Political institutions formed by the 
colonial power sought to rule, not incorporate.  Prior to granting citizenship to Native 
Americans, the United States may have fit this definition, but Frederick Cooper argued 
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43 
 
that the nation evolved out of this stage by the twentieth century. 40  Raymond F. Betts 
concurred with the exclusion of the U.S. from the category of a colonial power by citing 
the American motto of E Pluribus Unum as indicative of the political and cultural 
absorption of new territories into the nation, an event that did not occur in other colonial 
empires.41  While they present interesting and well-conceived cases, Betts and Cooper 
did not consider American policy in the Pacific Ocean during the Cold War.  Later, 
chapters three, four, and five will provide an in depth discussion on this issue. 
                                                
 The United States of America participated in both colonialism and imperialism in 
modified forms.  With the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, historical events in the 
trans-Mississippi settlements, the Supreme Court ruling in the Insular Cases, and 
territorial expansion in the Pacific Ocean, policymakers developed a system of 
imperialism and colonialism that separated holdings into two forms of administration and 
control.  The federal government engaged in imperialism, more specifically in a form of 
economic imperialism, in its incorporated territories.  Incorporated territories had the 
possibility of full incorporation into the American political system, and American settlers 
living within them retained their basic constitutional rights.  Unlike in incorporated 
territories, colonial ideology determined political, economic, and social policies for the 
unincorporated territories. There, the politics of difference governed and admission to the 
American Union was not a viable possibility.  A comparison of nineteenth-century and 
twentieth century American, British, and French imperial and colonial policies and 
administration in the Pacific Ocean will further place American imperialism and 
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colonialism within the larger framework of the expansion of European cultures and 
nations throughout the world. 
 Britain, America, and France expanded into foreign territories throughout the 
1800s and 1900s to acquire raw materials and new markets.  Expanding into the 
Americas, Africa, Asia, and Pacific Ocean, imperial powers transformed the land and 
indigenous cultures to meet their needs.  In the early 1900s, the British Empire focused 
its energies in India and British North America following the loss of its most valuable 
colonies to American revolutionaries.  Unlike Spain and France, the British Empire was 
decentralized.  The Crown and Parliament divided administrative functions among the 
Foreign Office, the India Office, the Admiralty, and the War Office, each holding 
responsibility over select aspects of colonial security, policy, and international 
r s.elation
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 During the Edwardian Era, the British government made efforts to reform its 
colonial apparatus.  The Colonial Office reined in embarrassing administrators in the 
colonies.  Administrators redrew borders throughout Africa to control populations and 
rationalize government.  Colonies received funds from London for the improvement o
transportation and infrastructure in order to facilitate the flow of raw materials to the 
metropole.  Finally, the Colonial Office took steps to professionalize colonial staff.  In 
the process, they passed measures designed to monitor sexual relations between over
citizens and colonial populations.  Ronald Hyam borrowed the term Leviathan from 
Thomas Hobbes to describe the new colonial apparatus that emerged under the reign of 
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Edward VII, in which the reformed Colonial Office, British administrators, bureaucra
and employees assumed more direct control over colonial life.  They monitored and 
controlled most aspects of indigenous labor, farm production, and resource development.  
Science and professionalism governed the new Leviathan as technological innovation
transportation and communication linked the periphery to the metropole.  Unlike the 
scattered colonial apparatus of the nineteenth century, railroads, transoceanic cables, and
wireless radio faci
ts, 
s in 
 
litated the delivery of goods, people, and communication throughout 
heir 
ich entailed 
approved 
enth 
                                                
global empires.43 
 Given the long distances between the metropole and the periphery, local 
administrators, missionaries, and settlers greatly influenced colonial policy through t
actions.  As noted by Peter Burroughs, the decentralized British Empire was not the 
monolithic entity consisting of an all-powerful Colonial Office and professional field 
administrators as often depicted in the movies.  “At the core of Imperial administration, 
therefore, lay a continuous interplay between mother country and colonial communities, 
between centre and periphery, a series of essentially bilateral relationships wh
constant negotiation rather than the imposition of rule and the acceptance of 
subjection.”44  In the case of the Pacific Ocean, statesmen in London may have 
the acquisition of Australia and New Zealand; however, British expansion into 
surrounding islands such as Fiji was the result of sub-imperialism.  By the late ninete
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century, Australians’ trade with surrounding islands made Fiji, British New Guinea 
(Papua), the Solomon Islands, and other small islands essential to business and light 
industry in the Dominion.45  Once the Dominion settlers forced the British to assume 
control over smaller Pacific Islands, London dispatched an administrator to oversee the 
islands, their resources, and indigenous residents.  By the twentieth century, the Colonial
Office administered non-Dominion territories in the Pacific Ocean following the policy 
of indirect rule as local ministers and bureaucrats worked with select indigenous leaders.  
Eventually, the Colonial Office consolidated the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the Solomon 
Islands, New Hebrides, Tonga, and other British-controlled islands under the Seat of t
High Commissioner of the Western Pacific.
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46  After the close of World War II, these 
islands became trust territories o
which received independence.   
 France began colonizing islands in the early 1800s in an attempt to prevent B
hegemony in the Pacific Ocean.  The French conquered their first cluster of insular 
territories in 1842 when they took the Society Islands (including Tahiti), Tuamotus, the 
Marquesas, and the Austral Islands.  By 1853, they added the Loyalty Islands and 
Caledonia.  In the 1880s, French expansion in the Pacific Ocean ended after they 
established a protectorate over Wallis and Futuna.  For the nineteenth century, French 
Pacific holdings were peripheral to imperial policy.  While New Caledonia and Tahiti 
held promise as potential sites for future colonization, Paris did not make any serious
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effort at establishing settlements in the South Pacific.  The Etablissements Français 
d’Océanie (EFO) produced modest amounts of copra, gold, pearls, and phosphates during
the 1800s and 1900s, but th
 
e colonies primarily served as transportation hubs for French 
 
 
 
 
rivate 
 
 of 
m 
s, local hotels 
d 
                                                
commerce in the Pacific.47 
 Following World War II, French interest in the EFO revived.  The EFO was part
of the massive colonial reorganization under the Fourth Republic (1946-1952).  French 
colonial administrators placed the EFO under the territories d’outre-mer (TOMs), while
Guadeloupe, Guyane, Réunion, and Martinique fell under the departments d’outre mer
(DOMs), together referred to as the DOM-TOMs.  Yet, the government did little else 
with its Pacific colonies since it faced greater problems in Africa, Algeria, Indochina, and
at home.  Instead of using the islands as refueling stations, French politicians and p
investors considered other possibilities for insular economic, political, and social 
developments.  In Tahiti and New Caledonia, administrators encouraged immigration and
tourism.  French sailors and soldiers returning from World War II spoke of the beauty
the islands and their women.  Early tourists prized the islands as exotic places of rest 
where one could enjoy all of the pleasures the South Pacific offered.  The tourist industry 
in the French islands changed insular economies and environments.  Under the older for
of French colonialism, islanders produced goods for export.  By the 1960
generated a market for copra, fish, pandanus leaves, and other staples.48 
 Finally, Cold War concerns affected French insular colonies.  Decolonization 
weakened France’s place as a dominant, global power as nationalist movements denie
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the empire access to cheap materials and indigenous labor.  Recognizing the need to
revise military strategy to meet Cold War threats, Charles de Gaulle shifted French 
military policy away from conventional forces to nuclear weaponry.  In late 1958, h
authorized research on the production of nuclear weapons, and in 1960, the French 
Republic produced its first weapon of mass destruction.  Of course, producing nuclear 
weapons required nuclear tests.  Starting in 1960, the French military used the Algerian 
desert for its experiments; however, the loss of the colony in 1962 forced France to look 
elsewhere.  From 1966 to 1972, France joined the United States in the polluting the 
 
e 
South 
acific
to 
ment 
d the 
P  maritime environment with nuclear fallout and island-erasing explosions.49 
 The United States was a colonial power, but colonialism was not an emphasis of 
American expansion nor was it an extreme form of control exercised in Hawai’i.  Prior 
the Cold War, Americans’ interests in their four “colonies” of Guam, Puerto Rico, the 
Philippines, and American Samoa rested primarily on raw materials and transportation.  
Having secured the strategic locations occupied by the colonies, the federal govern
ceased its bid for colonial possessions after 1899.  One could say that the Spanish 
American War was an anomaly in U.S. history.  Congresses and presidents historically 
sought access to foreign markets.  They also denounced attempts by European powers to 
prohibit or obstruct American commerce, but they did not condemn colonial policies that 
transformed indigenous societies into participants in the capitalist world-system.  
Although often mislabeled as colonial, the Open Door policy, dollar diplomacy, an
Roosevelt Corollary were displays of American power.  Colonialism required the 
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colonizing power to control and reshape the colonized territory and population.50  Sti
the U.S. never assum
ll, 
ed direct control over China, South America, or Central America 
uam, 
ent 
in 
d a veto as opposed to the General Assembly.  In the atmosphere of 
he 
inistrating 
(outside of the Panama Canal Zone), and its interventions in the Caribbean were not 
permanent affairs.   
 Ironically, American commitment to containment strategy in Asia fostered an 
atmosphere in Washington, D.C., more receptive to a military strategy in the Pacific 
Ocean that embraced colonialism.  As Chapters three and four reveal, the United States 
opposed granting self-government and full democratic participation to residents of G
Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).  The American governm
accepted the U.N. mandate to administer the TTPI in 1946 with special conditions.  
President Harry S Truman and other policy makers wanted the TTPI classified as a 
strategic trusteeship allowing the U.S. military to plant permanent naval and air bases 
the islands.  Moreover, the strategic trusteeship answered to the U.N. Security Council in 
which the U.S. ha
decolonization, the American government did not want islanders to harbor future ideas of 
independence.51 
 Although the Security Council handled issues regarding the Trust Territory of t
Pacific Islands, the U.N. Charter and Trusteeship Council still required the adm
authority to help the indigenous people of the islands move toward self-government.  
Shortly after assuming control, the Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier initiated a campaign to replace naval control 
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over the islands with the Department of the Interior.  They argued that the US Nav
would not educate the South Pacific Islanders properly in the principles of democrac
y 
y.  In 
 they 
der to 
rganized yet again into the 
est 
ical 
                                                
the end, the Department of the Interior won the battle.  On July 1, 1951, the US Navy 
relinquished control over all TTPI islands, except for Saipan and Tinian where it 
allegedly constructed CIA bases to train Chinese, and later Vietnamese, nationals.   
 Regardless of which department administered the islands, federal policy outlined 
a plan to educate the islanders and develop the islands’ economy in such a way that
would remain associated with the United States in the unlikely event that they gain 
independence.52  In its decolonization of Pacific colonies, U.S. policy followed the same 
technique as the French in Indo-China and elsewhere.  From 1946 to 1952, France 
restructured its empire into the Fourth Republic, a convoluted system in which associated 
states and associated territories became part of a federation.  While the associated states 
sent delegates to the National Assembly and the associated territories had representation 
on the High Council of the French Union, France continued to make policy decisions and 
dictate foreign policy.  By 1954, the failures in this system became apparent.  In or
prevent further nationalist outbreaks in its colonies, France reo
Fifth Republic which assumed the form of a commonwealth.  Algeria, Vietnam, and W
African nations successfully severed their ties to France during these two periods; 
however, its Pacific colonies remained territories of France.53 
 Likewise, the United States accepted decolonization of its insular colonies on 
paper but not in fact.  The Philippine Islands received independence in 1946, an event 
often flaunted as evidence of American anti-colonialism.  Yet the price for their polit
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independence was high.  They had to accept the Bell Act which established free trade
eight years between the U.S. and the islands with Congress reserving the right to increase 
tariffs on imported Filipino goods over the course of twenty years.  This act tied the 
Filipino economy to the U.S. with favorable conditions set for American produce
 for 
rs.  
a 
as, the 
u.  
y 
us 
o 
 
statehood.  During the plebiscite of 1998, the majority of voting Puerto Ricans rejected 
the options of remaining a commonwealth or becoming a state preferring independence, 
Moreover, the Bell Act and independence were conditional on the Filipino acceptance of 
a continued American military presence in their islands, which remained for nearly half 
century until the closing of Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in 1992.54 
 Whereas the Philippines became self-governing in 1946, Guam, American Samoa, 
the TTPI, and Puerto Rico remained within American control.  From 1976 to 1986, the 
Micronesian islands separated into the Commonwealth of the Northern Marian
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshalls, and the Republic of Pala
The Republic of the Marshalls and the Republic of Palau became self-governing, yet the
exercised their sovereignty under a free association compact with its previo
administering authority.55  The two colonies won from Spain in the Spanish American 
War have remained under U.S. control for over one hundred years after their conquest, 
with Guam remaining an unincorporated territory and Puerto Rico gaining 
commonwealth status.  However, Puerto Rico may not remain the Estado Libre Asociad
de Puerto Rico for much longer.  In 1967, 60% of Puerto Ricans accepted commonwealth
status.  By 1993, only 48.7% desired association with the U.S., while 46.2% yearned for 
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while large groups of eligible voters boycotted the election altogether.56  This resurgence
in Puerto Rican independence makes o
 
ne wonder whether Puerto Rico will remain with 
retary, 
tices 
d of 
ile 
the U.S. into the twenty first century. 
 When placed in the context of on-going American colonialism, the Territory of 
Hawai’i did not fit the colonial definition.  The president appointed a governor, sec
and three justices to enforce federal will in the islands, but Hawaiians chose their 
territorial legislature and sent delegates to Congress.  From 1898 to 1959, Hawai’i 
remained a territory of the United States, but it was an incorporated territory, a status 
indicating the possibility of statehood.  Moreover, the governor, secretary, and jus
administered a settler society composed of a population predominately European 
American and Japanese American with a small group of Native Hawaiians.  Colonial 
populations, on the other hand, had a small group of European bureaucrats governing a 
larger body of indigenous peoples.  For example, Indian Civil Service (ICS) consiste
only 1,250 men.  To them, the British government entrusted control over an Indian 
population of millions.57  Finally, racism may have permeated Hawaiian society as 
European Americans excluded other ethnicities from high society and white-collar 
professions, but these were not rigid, legally enforced structures of difference.  Under 
American administration, there never existed a code de l’indigénant that restricted the 
movement and job possibilities of the population.  While racial barriers were daunting, 
non-European American immigrants and Native Hawaiians could negotiate them.  Wh
the first generation of Chinese in Hawai’i had limited economic opportunities and no 
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political voice, small portions of the community successfully negotiated Hawaiian so
and established a niche for themselves by the 1920s and 1930s.  By assimilating 
American culture, learning English, accepting Christianity, and forming community 
organizations, they established themselves as loyal Chinese-Ameri
ciety 
cans.  As Lawrence 
 was 
guage 
ed 
s 
ce 
advances were small, they reveal the permeability of American politics of 
Fuchs noted, the election of Republican Hiram L. Fong to the U.S. Senate in 1959
indicative of their ability to negotiate American racial barriers.58   
 The above example of the ability of the Chinese community to negotiate 
American social structures was also evident in the continental American West.  
Throughout western states and territories, first generation immigrants established a 
community base upon which the second and third generations built.  Whereas lan
and cultural barriers excluded the first generation from grasping the opportunities offer
by the American economy, the second and third generations assimilated parts of 
American culture, thus allowing them to function within the capitalist economy.59  A
Judy Yung’s study on Chinese women in San Francisco revealed, the second generation 
of Chinese women broke from their parents’ loyalty to Chinese culture.  They, too, 
discarded older fashions of dress for American styles, challenged the notion of obedien
to one’s parents, and, in some cases, adopted the social behavior of the flapper.60  While 
their social 
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difference, which, according to Frederick Cooper, set the U.S. apart from other colonia
powers.61   
 Although American settler societies in the trans-Mississippi region, Alaska, a
Hawai’i had little in common with European and American colonies in the South Pacifi
Ocean, they shared many similarities with Dominions of the English Empire.  In New 
Zealand, Canada, and Australia, historians detect similar patterns of settlement to 
territories in the American West.  The English Parliament legislated for their settl
l 
nd 
c 
er 
 
50 
 a more 
ther 
inions.  
izing the right of the Dominions to determine their own domestic and 
foreign policy.  And throughout the course of World War II and the ensuing Cold War, 
 
societies until the local population developed the necessary legal infrastructure.  In the
case of Australia and New Zealand, London gave the settlers self-government in 18
and 1846, respectively.  As dominions of the English government, New Zealand, 
Australia, South Africa, and Canada had jurisdiction over all domestic matters.   
 Following World War I, English Dominions agitated for control over foreign 
affairs, as well.  Having suffered severe losses in campaigns such as Gallipoli and 
experienced the hardship of war for the interests of the metropole, settlers desired
equal voice in the Commonwealth and greater control over trade agreements with o
states.  Also, Wilsonian ideology of national self-determination affected the Dom
When fighting between Greece, Turkey, and Britain erupted in 1922 over Turkish 
refusals to abide by its post-World War I treaty responsibilities, Dominion states 
reluctantly dispatched reinforcements.  The Chanak Crisis revealed the need for a 
restructuring of the Commonwealth.  In 1931, Parliament passed the Statute of 
Westminster recogn
the Dominions would determine their own course in world affairs.  Cultural ties to the
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m ole, however, remained strong enough to prevent a complete break with the
Commonwealth.62 
 Although not exactly alike, American incorporated territories had similar 
experiences in settling new lands.  Like English Dominions, incorporated territories 
exercised control over local affairs.  White settlers developed economic, political, 
educational, and religious institutions that mirrored those in the metropole.  Since th
etrop  
e 
 
 
85 as 
1990s, comparative historical studies between the Canadian West, American West, and
Australia have revealed these similarities in European and American imperialism.   
 Indigenous studies produce interesting links between these regions of imperial 
expansion.  Throughout the twentieth century, indigenous peoples of New Zealand,
Australia, Canada, and the United States struggled to reclaim their right to their 
homelands and natural resources.  John Wunder’s study on the recent inclusion of 
indigenous peoples in the Australian Northern Territory and American Northwest 
revealed “two different approaches to incorporating Native peoples into national park 
ownership and management.”63  Australians relinquished their claim to the Uluru-Kata 
Tjuta National Park and returned the ancient landmarks to the Pitjantjatjara in 19
part of an effort to establish a cooperative relationship between the aboriginal population 
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and Parliament.  In the 1990s, the American federal government tried a similar 
cooperative management plan with the Nez Perce; yet, their aversion to returning land
indigenous peoples precluded a fully cooperative relationship. Instead, the Nationa
Service simply included the Nez Perce into the decision-making process over the Nez 
Perce National Historical Park.  While the solution differed, the struggle over control of
national parks in Australia and the United States originated f
 to 
l Park 
 
rom historical events in 
ent and American Congress protecting 
als, b he 
merican 
ns 
                                                
which a settler society displaced an indigenous population, claimed historical and 
spiritual landmarks, and invented its own settler historical connection between the land 
and their national history.  In other words, the settler populations redefined indigenous 
landmarks to celebrate the non-indigenous imperial past.64   
 Other studies have proven similarly successful in examining similarities and 
differences between these imperial regions.  Margaret D. Jacobs study on the removal of 
indigenous children from their homes as a means of forced assimilation in Australia and 
America uncovered the use of race and gender in assimilation policies.65 Kurk Dorsey 
revealed a trans-national effort by American and Canadian conservationists to secure a 
bilateral agreement between the Canadian Parliam
se irds, and fish.66  Finally, Andrew Graybill has produced a remarkable study on t
use of the Texas Rangers and Canadian Mounties to prevent labor stoppages in A
and Canadian coal mines.  Needless to say, historians today recognize the connectio
between American and European imperialism.67 
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 Historians using world-systems theory to analyze of the American West reveal 
that the American West was also a place of economic imperialism.  While local 
entrepreneurs made some investments into the western economy, eastern business 
interests and European financers funded the commercial development of the region, 
which in turn gave them control over westerners’ lives.  Their wealth and power gave 
them influence over the media and legislatures which they used to further their own 
interests and quash threats to their hegemony.68  In the twentieth century, the federal 
government supplanted private investors as the chief patron of enterprise as western 
states became dependent on military and federal contracts.69  In the case of Hawai’i, 
 
ks added 
 they 
 
                                                
Pearl Harbor and Hickam AFB drew money and immigrants to the islands.  Of course,
one cannot forget modern tourism which generated money for Western states.  While the 
service industry relied on private enterprise, federal projects such as national par
to the lure of exotic travel destinations.70 
 If the present definition of the American West limits Western historians when 
accounting for American imperial policy in the Pacific Ocean and Hawai’i, how can
modify existing paradigms to account for twentieth century developments in all 
American territories west of the Mississippi?  In 1987, Patricia Nelson Limerick 
published her ground-breaking book, The Legacy of Conquest:  The Unbroken Past of the 
American West.  At the time of its publication, a group of Western historians were 
working to end the hegemony of Turnerianism in the discipline.  As cultural studies
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uncovered the histories of previously marginalized groups, they brought into question 
Turner’s idea of a simple process of frontier settlement that slowly progressed westward.  
Discounting Turnerianism as flawed and outdated, Limerick suggested a new model f
understanding the American West.  She argued that historians needed to approach 
Western history as “the study of 
or 
a place undergoing conquest and never fully escaping its 
er 
he 
n 
ct 
s 
g “the 
ians should consider the American West as those incorporated territories 
 
                                                
consequences.”71  Since the publication of The Legacy of Conquest, the West as place has 
permeated every facet of scholarship in the field.  Breaking from the limited fronti
thesis, Western historians have engaged in decades of scholarship that documents t
history of marginalized groups. 
 Debates over including Hawai’i into the American West have shown that wester
historians’ current definition of the American West has become too rigidly place-
centered, a development that Limerick may not have intended with The Legacy of 
Conquest.  She wrote, “In choosing to stress place more than process, we cannot fix exa
boundaries of the region, any more than we can draw precise lines around ‘the South,’ 
‘the Midwest,’ or that most elusive of regions, ‘the East.’” 72  [emphasis mine]  Thi
study suggests refining the definition of the West.  Instead of Western history bein
study of a place undergoing conquest and never fully escaping its consequences,”73  
Western histor
throughout western North America and the Pacific Ocean which the United States 
conquered, subdued, annexed, and admitted into the Union.  Moreover, it is a place in
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which American imperialism reshaped, and continues to shape, all facets of human life 
and the environment. 
 By stressing imperialism as opposed to continental conquest, the definitio
American West no longer requires territorial or state contiguity with the continental 
territories and states.  Since empires are transoceanic and transcontinental, boundaries 
become more fluid.  Moreover, examining American imperialism in incorporated 
territories would auto
n of the 
matically include cultural, economic, political, indigenous, and 
e regions, 
into 
rnia, plus 
uam a
environmental topics.  Furthermore, redefining the American West as a place of 
American imperialism situates the discipline within the larger, global context of colonial 
studies.  Western historians have already begun this process using comparative studies.  
Now it is time to adjust the present models of the American West to account for the 
paradigmatic shift.    
 Finally, the question of Hawai’i as a subregion has two possible solutions.  First, 
historians could simply place Hawai’i within the present subregion of the Pacific West.  
As Whitehead has already proven, Hawai’i is intricately linked to Oregon, Washington, 
California, and Alaska.  Since it shares so many historical continuities with thes
they should be classified together.  Indeed, when the National Endowment for the 
Humanities launched its regional humanities centers initiative, it divided the nation 
ten regions.  The Pacific included Hawai’i, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Califo
G nd American Samoa.  Second, historians could create a new subregion called the 
Pacific Borderlands that includes Hawai’i, Alaska, and those littoral regions of 
California, Oregon, and Washington that connect the West to the Pacific Rim.  Since 
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 studies and Western history.  Accepting its proper role as a 
part of U.S. imperialism in the West requires historians to reconsider their definition of 
the West as place to the West as a place of American imperialism connected to American 
colonial activities in unincorporated territories.  In doing so, the refined definition of the 
American West enhances the process initiated by Patricia Nelson Limerick and other 
Western historians by welding the field to colonial and imperial studies beyond the North 
American mid-continent. 
more studies of Hawai’i and Hawaiians in the West are needed, however, Western 
historians may want to wait before narrowing its role to the subregional level.   
 Clearly, placing Hawai’i within the American West enhances Western historia
present understanding of the region.  Since Hawai’i has ties to American policy in the 
Pacific, yet was settled, conquered, governed, annexed, and admitted in a manner more 
akin to other western incorporated territories, the islands act as a portal to imperial and 
colonial studies along the Pacific Rim.  In a sense, it has a role similar to Texas history.  
Although Texas fought in the Civil War and had southern institutions, it also lies with
the American West.  Thus, in historical studies it has a dual role.  Likewise, Hawai’i 
belongs to both Pacific Rim
CHAPTER 3  
 MODELS FOR HAWAIIAN COLONIALISM 
Developing a policy to administer new kinds of territories was not easily devised 
by Americans.  Countless pro- and anti-imperialists realized at the turn of the century that 
the legacy of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided few answers for the new 
problems of empire facing the United States of America.  These problems posed 
questions of lasting importance.  How should their republic, born of anti-colonial 
ideologies and forged in the fires of expansion, proceed when presented with a new path 
demanding an aggressive, imperial foreign policy?  Moreover, what role would recent 
territorial acquisitions have within the American political system?  Did conquest and 
limited incorporation of overseas colonies equal a promise of statehood?  Or had this 
young republic finally abandoned its anti-colonial ideologies and fully embraced a future 
constructed on a past dominated by conquest, racism, and a desire for power?  Regardless 
of their uncertainties, the colonialist leaders of America pushed onward in their quest to 
absorb Hawai’i.  By basing their policies on past experiences of conquering and 
incorporating western American lands, yet adjusting them to exigencies encountered in 
the Hawaiian Islands, the relationship between the islands and the U.S. from 1898-1959 
would be quite unique.  Treated as neither an insular colony like Puerto Rico nor a 
continental territory like Nebraska, Hawai’i occupied a unique position in the American 
federal framework between the old colonial system and the new. 
 Scholars have already explored the relationship between Hawai’i and the 
American West.  Either they conclude that the islands were a part of the West, or their 
history, geology, environment, and cultures precluded them from the region.  Two 
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scholars, Lanny Thompson and John Whitehead, have provided well-conceived ideas that 
advance the proposition that the Hawaiian Islands had a direct correlation with the 
American West.  For Thompson, the way in which “Congress adopted for Hawai’i the 
standard territorial government” made its territorial phase more akin to the other 
continental territories than to Puerto Rico and the Philippines.1  His essay, “The Imperial 
Republic:  A Comparison of the Insular Territories under U.S. Dominion after 1898,” 
compared the political and cultural forms of American imperialism in U.S. insular 
possessions following the Spanish-American War.  In his analysis, he suggested that 
“Hawai’i was . . . one of the final frontiers of European American settlement,” whereas 
the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico provided Americans with their first European-
style colonies in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean.2 
 Likewise, Whitehead considered the islands as a part of the American West, 
sharing more similarities than dissimilarities with continental territories.  In his article, 
this expert on Alaska dismisses the arguments that Hawai’i failed to meet the necessary 
criteria for admittance into the field of Western History.  While some authors cling to the 
belief that aridity is one criterion, Whitehead notes that portions of Hawai’i receive scant 
rainfall.  Other authors consider Hawai’i outside of the American West because it lacks a 
common history with the other contiguous states.  Again, the author claims the opposite.  
He refers to literature written by eminent Hawaiian historians Ralph Kuykendall, Gavan 
Daws, and Edward Joesting to prove otherwise.  In essence, Whitehead not only argues 
that the islands are part of the American West, but he also goes so far as to suggest that 
                                                 
1 Lanny Thompson, “The Imperial Republic:  A Comparison of the Insular Territories under U.S. 
Dominion after 1898,” Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 4 (November 2002), 573. 
2 Ibid. 
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they were “America’s first and last Far West.” 3  To prove his point, Whitehead revisits 
the historical narrative tracing the development of Hawaiian society, politics, and 
economics during the nineteenth century.  At times, he notes the contribution of 
Hawaiians in the western continental territories to solidify further the link between the 
islands and the American West. 
 Are Whitehead and Thompson correct in lumping Hawai’i in with territories like 
New Mexico, Colorado, Nebraska, and Oregon?  Yes, there are some irrefutable 
similarities in the histories, economies, and cultures present in the regions.  There are, 
however, some differences, as well.  After all, the political process towards Hawaiian 
statehood and the debates surrounding the issue would have novel elements.  
 In understanding the role of Hawai’i in American History, one must consider it as 
a transitional area between the older, expansionistic form of American imperialism, and 
the neo-colonialism that sprang out of post-World War II politics.  In his work, The First 
and Second United States Empires:  Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912, 
Jack Ericson Eblen places this period in the Third American Empire, a period in which 
the United States of America expanded into Alaska, the Pacific Ocean, and the 
Caribbean.  This empire was followed by the Fourth Empire, which consisted of post-
1920s America.  This study disagrees with Eblen’s categorization of phases in American 
Empire, but agrees that there were changes in the form of imperialism.  The Hawaiian 
Islands were part of a transitional period between the older form of continental expansion 
and the neo-imperialism of post-World War II history.  To fully understand its place, one 
must begin with the relationship between the Hawaiian Islands and the federal 
                                                 
3 John Whitehead, “Hawai’i:  The First and Last Far West?” Western Historical Quarterly 23, no. 2 (May 
1992):  156; Available from JSTOR. 
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government in comparison with those of the continental territories and insular 
possessions.4 
To begin with the comparison of territorial governments, one must first answer 
the basic question, what is the American West?  Since the rejection of Turnerianism by 
modern scholars, this terminology has come under increasing scrutiny.  In popular 
mythology, the American West is a place where gunslingers saunter calmly down the 
dusty lane at high noon, stoically facing their unknown fate.  It is a region in which noble 
Native Americans live at one with nature, all the while facing the onslaught of settlers.  It 
is a place of lawlessness, yet it remains noble.  The dregs of society live there next to men 
of honor and character.  For Hollywood, these images, these means of depicting the Euro-
American settler society, located somewhere west of everywhere else, works.  But for 
many, a more precise definition is needed. 
 One concise definition of the American West is postulated by Richard White in 
his text, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”:  A New History of the American 
West.  According to White, the American West is first and foremost a political entity.  It 
is a region comprised of the lands gained by the Louisiana Purchase, Texas Revolution, 
settlement of Oregon Country, the Bear Flag Revolt, and the U.S.-Mexican War of 1846.  
In other words, it is a region west of the Mississippi River that American settlers, armies, 
and diplomats conquered during the nineteenth century.  Its borders were the product of 
political choice and historical development.  Finally, while certain geographical 
characteristics dominate the region—aridity, flat surface elevation, and sparse 
vegetation—they do not necessarily act as requisites for inclusion into the region.  
                                                 
4Note that insular possession indicates not only Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, but also American 
Samoa and the Pacific Island Trust Territories. 
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Throughout his book, White examines the specific cultural, economic, political, and 
environmental characteristics and developments of this region.5 
 From day-to-day operations to the fundamental framework of government, 
Hawaiian politics shared similarities with western continental territories.  To suggest that 
Hawai’i was somehow different or inferior to continental territories insulted some 
Hawaiians.  For example, on January 23, 1939, John Snell, Executive Secretary of the 
Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, sent a letter to Rand McNally & Company protesting 
the labeling of Hawai’i as an American possession in the Rand McNally International 
Edition  World Atlas—1937.  To add further insult, the editors of the volume placed a 
map of the Territory of Alaska directly after the State of Washington, yet the Territory of 
Hawai’i fell after the Dominion of Canada along with various South Pacific Islands.  
According to Snell, Hawaiians were “inclined to resent” the inclusion of Hawai’i with “a 
lot of miscellaneous South Sea Islands.” 6  Of course, one must wonder whether or not 
Native Hawaiians would have agreed with him!  
This letter provides a solid example of the perceptions many Hawaiians had of 
their homeland.  The average Hawaiian felt a strong degree of pride.  In order to combat 
the growing image of the Hawaiian Islands as just another group of underdeveloped, 
unincorporated atolls in the Pacific Ocean, the Hawaiian Territorial Legislature created 
the Hawaii Statehood Commission in 1947.7  The territorial legislature charged this body 
                                                 
5 Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”:  A New History of the American West, 
(Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1991; Red River Books, 1993), 3-4. 
6 John Snell, Executive Secretary of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, to Rand McNally & Company, 
January 23, 1939, in Samuel Wilder King Papers, M-472, Box 20, Folder 886 “1936-1942,” Hawai’i State 
Archives.  In his letter, Snell directly compares the Territory of Hawai’i to the State of Texas.  Although 
Texas never experienced the territorial phase, it was a republic prior to joining the Union.  For Snell, this is 
the common experience that links Texas to Hawai’i.  
7 The Citizens’ Statehood Committee and the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission preceded the Hawaii 
Statehood Commission.  All three organizations worked for the same goal, Hawaiian statehood. 
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with the responsibility of promoting Hawaiian statehood, working with congressional 
members in Washington, D.C., and disabusing Americans of the idea that granting the 
territory statehood would harm national interests.  To accomplish this task, the Hawaii 
Statehood Commission would publish reports, books, and leaflets, write newspaper 
articles and editorials, and even attend congressional hearings.   
 In his study of the Dakota Territory, Howard Lamar offers an overview of 
territorial history.  As most texts show, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 initiated the 
territorial process.  During the settlement of lands west of the Appalachians and east of 
the Mississippi River in the early nineteenth century, congressmen and territorial officials 
adhered to the administrative structure of the Northwest Ordinance.  Although Tennessee 
and New Orleans deviated slightly from the letter of the law, a three-stage territorial 
process was the pattern for settlement.  Beginning with the incorporation of trans-
Mississippian lands, the Northwest Ordinance served as a historical template; however, 
the territorial process had to be adjusted.  Whereas ensuring the loyalty of settlers to the 
national government was a primary concern in the trans-Appalachian region, slavery and 
political patronage dominated the question of American expansion in the trans-
Mississippi region once the threat of England, France, and Spain lessened.  Finally, the 
Civil War inaugurated a final phase of territorial politics, according to Lamar.  From 
1861 onward, congressmen and presidents used the territories to reward their allies, and 
the needs of settlers remained low on any lists of territorial priorities.8 
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided the nation with a template for 
territorial governments as well as a process leading toward statehood.  Congress 
                                                 
8 See Howard Roberts Lamar, Dakota Territory 1861-1889:  A Study of Frontier Politics (New Haven:  
Yale University Press, 1956), 1-27. 
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organized territorial boundaries for a given region and then established a nascent 
territorial government.  The President appointed a governor, a secretary, and three judges.  
These propertied gentlemen had the responsibility of ensuring good government in the 
region.  Evidence suggests that the territorial phase was intended to guarantee the 
replication of American politics, culture, commerce, and industry in the region; then 
these men were responsible for the transmission of American society into the lands 
recently wrested from Native Americans and imperial Europeans.  In essence, these men 
performed the tasks of colonial agents.  Once the population reached 5,000, territorial 
citizens could elect representatives to a legislative assembly.  At this point, the area began 
moving from a colony toward statehood.  Territorial inhabitants now assisted the 
governor in establishing laws and managing public funds.  Furthermore, the population 
elected a territorial delegate to Congress.  Because this delegate had no official vote, the 
territory remained on the periphery of the American political system.  This individual 
could influence representatives and senators to enact or alter legislation in a way 
favorable to the territory.   Finally, the territorial legislature could apply for admission 
once its population reached 60,000.  This step indicated the close of colonial status.  
From this point on, the territory became a part of the metropole.   
By the time the Organic Act for the state of Hawai’i came before the U.S. Senate 
for final approval in 1900, Congress had passed organic acts for many other territories, 
each slightly modified to meet the needs of local populations.  Congress abandoned its 
initial stage of territorial government—the district—with the Wisconsin Organic Act of 
1836.  Howard R. Lamar’s work on territorial government revealed four adjustments to 
the process initiated under the Northwest Ordinance.  These evolutions in congressional 
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territorial policy directly correlated with problems arising from the variety of colonial 
regions.  For example, the collapse of Native American resistance in the Trans-
Appalachian West created conditions favorable for the passage of the Wisconsin Organic 
Act that increased the likelihood of incorporation of these lands.  While this development 
clearly benefitted regional inhabitants, changes in congressional governance following 
the Civil War did not.  With the collapse of Democratic opposition and the ascension of 
the Republican Party, congressional leaders viewed territorial governmental offices as 
perfect pawns in the spoils system.  Instead of seeking men of ability, they sought men of 
loyalty.  According to Lamar, the final evolutions in territorial policy occurred from 1861 
to 1912.  Within this period, controversial issues such as polygamy in Utah, corruption in 
Santa Fe, gold in Denver, and non-arable deserts, Apaches, and Mexican-Americans in 
Arizona caused the final alterations to territorial policy.  In his assessment, Lamar briefly 
mentions the results of the Spanish American War, the Hawaiian coup, and their effect on 
the territorial process.9   
The traditional form of territorial government sufficed for places like the 
territories of Colorado, Arkansas, Washington, and Wyoming.  Congress established a 
government and permitted the residents to elect delegates to a territorial legislature.  
Popular perception led people to believe that presidential gubernatorial appointees were 
always outsiders with little ties to the region.  Richard White, however, pointed out that 
while most governors were not native to the region, neither were the settlers.  During 
                                                 
9 White, 155-156; and Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912:  A Territorial History, rev. ed.  
(Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 6-14. 
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their tenure, territorial governors often established connections to the people and region 
and often chose to remain there after their term ended.10   
Sometimes the process of installing a territorial government lagged behind 
settlement.  As Elliott West illustrated in The Contested Plains:  Indians, Goldseekers, 
and the Rush to Colorado, H.P.A. Smith, Edward “Ned” Wynkoop, Hickory Rogers, Joe 
McCubbin, and William Larimer swiftly moved to establish a township near Cherry 
Creek, the location where William Green Russell discovered gold.  By early 1859, the 
group had Denver City secured from their competitors and ready to receive a stream of 
emigrant Americans yearning for their chance of gold.  For the Arapahoes and 
Cheyennes, a great transformation began during the years following 1858.  As migrants 
rushed to Colorado, their wagons crushed the vegetation next to the Arkansas, Smoky 
Hill, Republican, and Platte Rivers.  They left detritus strewn about the Plains, and their 
beasts of burden devoured the grasses needed for Native American herds.  Meanwhile, 
congressmen worked to establish some form of colonial government.  Although the gold 
rush was well under way, it took the federal government three years to establish Colorado 
Territory, permitting President Abraham Lincoln to send its first governor, William 
Gilpin, to his new seat of government.  As this example illustrates, settlements in the 
American West sometimes went years before establishing a direct relationship with the 
federal government.11 
For all practical purposes, politics in the Territory of Hawai’i were not so 
remarkably different from politics in other western territories.  Granted, slavery never 
plagued Hawaiians in their territorial phase, although some congressmen accused white 
                                                 
10 White, 172. 
11 Elliott West, The Contested Plains:  Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence:  
University Press of Kansas, 1998), 110-238. 
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settlers of using imported contract laborers as a form of slave labor.  At the time of 
annexation, political patronage still existed in the United States of America, but the 
progressive reforms of the late 1800s and early 1900s curbed the rampant corruption 
inherent in this system.  Starting with the Pendleton Act of 1883, civil service reform 
slowly removed government jobs from control of the dominant party to a more 
rationalized system.  This process inevitably affected the governorship of Hawai’i. 
Following annexation, Hawaiian governors relied on presidential appointment for 
their jobs, but the element of patronage had changed from that experienced in the Dakota, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado Territories.  Before, presidents nominated partisan 
allies, regardless of their qualifications or state citizenship.  The Hawaiian Organic Act 
protected the populace from the rule of strangers by stipulating that territorial governors 
hold citizenship in the territory.  This provided islanders a degree of security, since they 
possessed a modicum of familiarity with the nominee.  Moreover, political groups in 
Hawai’i exerted some influence over the selection of the governor.  When searching for a 
new governor during Eisenhower’s election campaign in 1953, Senator Hugh Alfred 
Butler of Nebraska, Chairman of the Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs, received 
letters from various Hawaiian residents in favor of Samuel Wilder King.  These 
recommendations justified the nomination of King because of party affiliation, family 
ties, or personal integrity.  William H. Soper claimed ancestry from John H. Soper, 
Marshal of the Kingdom under King Kalakaua.  His letter traced both his and King’s 
ancestry back to pre-annexation figures as a way to enhance the nominee’s pedigree 
further.12  Another recommendation came from Arthur K. Trask, a leading Native 
                                                 
12 William H. Soper to Hugh Alfred Butler, 29 December 1952, Hugh Alfred Butler Papers, MS2331, Box 
51, Folder 61 “Hawaii,” Nebraska State Archives. 
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Hawaiian Democrat.  In a letter to President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower, Trask clearly 
broke party ranks to support King.  He praised the nominee not only for his performance 
at the 1950 Constitutional Convention, but also for representing “the best historical 
tradition of the Polynesian and American cultures.”13  This presidential election was 
particularly significant in Hawaiian history.  For members of the Republican Party, the 
division between supporters of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Robert Taft extended into 
Hawaiian politics.  Here, Republicans split between Randolf Crossley and Samuel W. 
King.14  In the end, King’s political career and Hawaiian ancestry gave him the decisive 
edge over Crossley, thus securing him the governorship. 
The King nomination is anecdotal evidence of the nature of Hawaiian politics 
during statehood.  On the one hand, twentieth-century progressive reforms and the long 
history of representative government in Hawai’i saved the residents from the rampant 
patronage present in continental territories.  Long before annexation, Hawaiian politicians 
had formed political parties and traditions.  Leading settlers, moreover, knew how to 
maneuver in through the American political system, while mustering support at home.  In 
other words, they were hybrid politicians, having been raised to operate in the Hawaiian 
Legislature while venerating the American Congress.  When nominating federal office 
holders, presidents would inevitably select men from their party, but the list of potential 
candidates came from the Republican and Democratic Parties of Hawai’i. 
 On the other hand, Hawaiian democracy, like western democracy, existed only so 
far as the leading businessmen and territorial politicians allowed.  In the islands, five 
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major businesses ruled Hawai’i throughout the territorial period.  They were American 
Factors, Theo. H. Davies, Alexander & Baldwin, Castle & Cooke, and C. Brewer.  The 
Big Five were agencies that had slowly amassed power throughout the nineteenth 
century.  As the demand for Hawaiian sugar grew, agencies aided plantation owners by 
managing their affairs, procuring labor from Asia and the Philippines, supplying 
equipment, and tracking developments in American and European markets.  Their control 
and profits grew with the sugar industry, eventually allowing them to invest in individual 
plantations.  By the early 1900s, these investments had given American Factors, Theo. H. 
Davies, Alexander & Baldwin, Castle & Cooke, and C. Brewer absolute control over 
sugar production in the islands.  To further extend their power, these companies invested 
in the Matson Navigation Company, the only major maritime transportation company.  
Island railroads fell under their control as well.  Finally, they exercised a large degree of 
influence on Bishop & Company and the Bank of Hawai’i, Ltd., the only banks in the 
islands.15  In addition to controlling the Hawaiian economy, they were also the leading 
supporters of the Republican Party.  Throughout the territorial phase, this party 
dominated Hawaiian politics.  If Richard White is correct in his contention that “party 
loyalty in the West was markedly weaker than in the South, Northeast, and Midwest,”16 
then territorial politics in Hawai’i is clearly different from the American West.  The 
reliance of the Big Five on the American market ensured their allegiance to the 
Republican Party, which was the party of industry and commerce during the Progressive 
Era and Great Depression.  The Democratic Party, on the other hand, was based on a 
                                                 
15 Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time:  A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 
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constituency tied to the South, a region dominated by agriculture and the major source of 
domestic sugar for the nation.  More importantly, the Big Five control over the political 
machinery of Hawai’i, including law enforcement, retarded the growth of opposition 
groups in the islands.  In the early 1900s, unions discovered the extent of plantation 
owners’ control of Hawaiian politics.  As their representatives tried to approach 
plantation workers, management would remove them from their property.17 
However, the domination of the Republican Party in Hawai’i would not survive 
the first half of the twentieth century.  First, there clearly existed dissatisfaction with the 
status quo.  Native Hawaiians, like Duke Paoa Kahanamoku and Prince Jonah Kuhio 
Kalanianaole, thought that they could have the best effect on Hawaiian politics by 
working within the Republican Party.  As is commonly known, Prince Kuhio served as 
the territorial delegate from 1903-1922.  In his efforts, he continuously pushed for 
statehood as a means to secure Native Hawaiian rights under the protection of the U.S. 
Constitution.  He also labored to secure the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, a 
piece of legislation designed to provide Native Hawaiians with homesteads.18  Other 
politicians like Johnny Wilson and John A. Burns chose a different path to voice their 
discontent with Hawaiian politics.  Wilson aided in the formation of the Democratic Party 
in 1900, serving as the mayor of Honolulu and an influential party member during the 
tumultuous days of the Wilson Administration.  Unfortunately, the Democratic Party did 
not capitalize on Wilson’s presidential victory.  Discord within the party, in conjunction 
                                                 
17 Michi Kodama-Nishimoto, Warren S. Nishimoto, and Cynthia A. Oshiro, eds., Hanahana:  An Oral 
History Anthology of Hawaii’s Working People (Honolulu:  Ethnic Studies Oral History Project, 1984), 89-
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18 The Hawai’i State Archives houses the Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole Papers.  Collection  M-80 contains his 
personal correspondence outlining his political views.  In Box 1 of collection M-474, one finds copies of 
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with a “return to normalcy” and the Republican Party under President Warren Harding, 
led to the downfall of the Democrats.  Following World War II, the John A. Burns, Dan 
Aoki, Daniel Inouye, and others worked to revive the flagging Democratic Party.19 
Second, the hegemony of the Republican Party was not a product of the 
electorate’s loyalty.  Returning to the Big Five, the Republican Party received support 
from the five most powerful corporations and those that ran them.  As the principal 
employers throughout the island chain, these institutions influenced and directed every 
facet of daily life for the majority of Hawaiian residents.  The owners were the major 
landholders, as well as the wealthiest individuals.  In comparing their role in territorial 
politics, one could say that the principle players in the Big Five were the secular version 
of the religious leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in nineteenth-
century Utah Territory.  In the State of Deseret, Church authorities directed everything 
from water irrigation to public ordinances.  They guided the settlement of families around 
the Great Salt Lake, as well as throughout the Mormon Corridor.  In essence, the church 
was the state.  While the Territory of Hawai’i and the Territory of Utah both had histories 
of oligarchic control, it would be unfair to claim that they were exactly the same.  The 
Big Five amassed wealth and power throughout the years by purchasing land from the 
crown, influencing the monarchy, and replacing Native Hawaiian labor with underpaid 
Asian contract labor.  The story of the creation of the Big Five is an old story, told and 
retold in almost every Hawaiian history book.  Another rendition is not necessary.  
Suffice it to say, their accumulation of power differed remarkably from the church 
                                                 
19 For more on the Democratic Party and the role of Wilson and Burns in its history, see Dan Boylan and T. 
Michael Holmes, John A. Burns:  The Man and His Times (Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i Press, 2000); 
Bob Krauss, Johnny Wilson:  First Hawaiian Democrat (Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i Press, 1994); 
and Lawrence H. Fuchs, Hawaii Pono:  An Ethnic and Political History (Honolulu:  Bess Press, 1961), 
308-322. 
75 
 
leadership in the Territory of Utah.  The elders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints derived their authority from the church body.  Mormons followed Brigham 
Young to the Great Salt Lake region through their own free will.  During the settlement 
of the region, Young and the church leaders may have exercised unlimited authority, but 
they did not do so for personal glorification.  As Ray Allen Billington and Martin Ridge 
noted in Westward Expansion:  A History of the American Frontier, “unity was needed” 
in the irrigation and settlement of the arid lands in Deseret.20  In other words, the Saints 
may have lost political rights and powers, but this was a willing sacrifice for economic 
development. 
In addition to the relationships of power in Utah and Hawai’i, one can see other 
similarities between these two territories.  The history of the relationship between the 
Mormons in Utah and the federal government can be presented in two different manners.  
First, there is the classic presentation.  In the fall of 1847, Brigham Young led the first 
group of Mormons to the Great Salt Lake in order to build a New Zion.  Over the next 
five years, battalions of overland Mormon migrants increased the population of Saints 
residing in the desert.  Separated from the rest of the world, the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints built their utopian society in which both secular and ecclesiastical 
authority were vested in the church leadership.  Through community planning, the 
Mormons constructed irrigation canals and laws to govern their usage.  This development 
occurred at roughly the same time as other regions.  Again, the Saints distinguished 
themselves.  California and Colorado altered English Common Law governing riparian 
rights.  Their innovations would help shape water laws throughout the American West in 
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which ownership or first rights generally took precedents over other claims to water.21  
Mormons, however, ignored riparian rights and ownership.  Instead, each community had 
claim to an equal share of water.  And so the story goes.  Mormons constructed  a 
religious community that varied from the American norm.  Hostilities erupted in 1857 
between the State of Deseret and the U.S. Army, but the two sides reached a dénouement 
after the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad, finally placing Utah on the path to 
statehood, granted in 1896.22  
 There is a second way of perceiving Mormon history and the relationship between 
the Territory of Utah and the federal government.  In Something in the Soil:  Legacies 
and Reckonings in the New West, Patricia Nelson Limerick revisited Leonard Arrington’s 
earlier studies on Mormon ethnicity.  Limerick argued that the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints constituted an ethnicity separate from the white, Anglo-Saxon ethnicity 
of nineteenth-century America.  Joseph Smith’s teachings established the religious 
foundations of this ethnic group.  The practice of polygamy and the centrality of the 
church in Mormon life made this faith different from the Protestant and Catholic strains 
of Christianity.  These practices made them so strange in the eyes of American Christians 
that they viewed Mormons within their communities as dangerous.  According to 
Limerick, separation was the next step in the evolution of this uniquely American 
ethnicity.  With their cultural focus on the communities of the Great Salt Lake and their 
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22 Ray Allen Billington and Martin Ridge, Westward Expansion:  A History of the American Frontier, 6th 
ed. (Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 175-192.   
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isolation from mainstream American society, the Saints of Utah developed a society, 
language, and political system novel to the Western Hemisphere.23 
 Approaching Utah Territory from this perspective provides an interesting 
comparison with the Territory of Hawai’i.  When congressmen tried to frame a territorial 
government for Utah, the presence of a population considered different and outside the 
American norm troubled them.  The issue of polygamy itself caused great tumult in the 
national capitol.  Analyzing the language and laws used towards the Mormon population, 
one sees traces of overseas colonial rhetoric.  Congressional leaders were concerned 
about the “unchristian” practice of polygamy in the deserts of Deseret, just as the history 
of polygamy within Polynesian society caused concern.  The domination of society by the 
leadership of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and territorial governor 
Brigham Young in particular, was something that had to be eradicated and replaced by a 
territorial government based on American principles.  Thus, the Mormon population 
became as separate and “savage” as the population of the Hawaiian Islands.  In the eyes 
of influential Americans, the Saints’ leaders were as autocratic and dictatorial as the 
monarchs of the Kingdom of Hawai’i.  In short, the Mormons were the white heathens of 
the continent.  They, like the Kānaka, would fall under the politics of difference in the 
American empire. 
Comparing and contrasting the basic operations of political power in the 
territories provides ample evidence that the Territory of Hawai’i shared characteristics 
with trans-Mississippi territories, but the real links between these regions exist in the 
                                                 
23 For a discussion on Mormonism as an ethnicity, see Patricia Nelson Limerick, Something in the Soil:  
Legacies and Reckonings in the New West (New York:  W. W. Norton and Company, 2000), 235-255.   
Limerick cites Leonard Arrington, History of Idaho, vol. 2 (Moscow:  University of Idaho Press, 1994) as 
the historical starting point for her argument that Mormons form a separate ethnicity. 
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basic structure of territorial government.  By examining the basic structure of territorial 
governments, one sees a direct connection between Hawai’i and the mainland.  Extending 
this comparison to the other Pacific territories and Puerto Rico also produces interesting 
results.  They clearly prove that Hawai’i shares more characteristics with the older form 
of American expansion and less so with post-1898 colonial developments. 
Reviewing the process of statehood, territories organized during the Early 
Republic followed a three-stage pattern as outlined in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  
First, Congress organized an area into a district with a governor, secretary, and three 
judges.  The Northwest Ordinance extended the basic guarantees of personal liberty as 
delineated in the Bill of Rights and outlawed slavery.  Next, after the population reached 
5,000 free male inhabitants, the district became a territory and could indirectly elect a 
house of the legislature.  The legislature consisted of a council and an assembly.  
Territorial residents qualified to vote popularly elected ten legislative council nominees, 
of which Congress selected five to serve.  Before a legislature was created, laws were 
passed by majority rule of the governor, secretary, and three presidentially-appointed 
justices of the supreme court.  The assembly was chosen from territory residents by the 
President.  Anyone familiar with American colonial history quickly recognizes this 
structure.  When devising a system of governance for the territories, policymakers used 
the British imperial system as a model.  Adhering to their revolutionary ideals, they 
devised stages to prevent the creation of an American empire that reproduced the 
inequalities inherent in the British system.  Once the population reached 60,000, a 
popularly-elected constitutional convention drafted a state constitution.  Finally, they 
petitioned Congress for full admittance into the Union on an equal footing with the older 
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states.  This was the prevailing system used in the old Northwest and Southwest 
territories.24 
As American settlers poured into the lands obtained from France and Mexico, the 
basic principles of the Northwest Ordinance continued influencing territorial 
development, but congressional experience in governing the territories brought changes 
to territorial governments.  The most significant change occurred on April 20, 1836.  
Congress authorized An Act establishing the Territorial Government of Wisconsin.  On 
the surface, this piece of legislation seems unremarkable.  It provided the territory with a 
governor with veto powers, the authority to appoint lower officials, and other basic 
duties.  He was appointed by the president and had to reside in his appointed territory.  A 
bicameral legislature comprised of thirteen council members and twenty-six 
representatives of the assembly or house oversaw all legislative functions.  Law passed 
by this body were subject to gubernatorial and congressional approval, but assemblymen 
still had significant powers.  Also, the Wisconsin Organic Act provided the territory with 
a supreme court composed of one chief justice and two associate justices.  Territorial 
residents elected a delegate to the United States Congress, though he was not a voting 
member of that body.  Finally, residents were “entitled to, and enjoy[ed], all and singular 
the rights, privileges, and advantages, granted and secured to the people of the Territory 
of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, by the articles of the compact contained 
in the ordinance for the government of the said Territory, passed on the thirteenth day of 
                                                 
24 See Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union, Midwestern History and Culture, eds. James H. Madison and 
Thomas J. Schlereth (Indianapolis:  Indiana University Press, 1987), Lamar, Dakota Territory 1861-1889; 
and Robert V. Hine and John Mack Faragher, The American West:  A New Interpretive History (New 
Haven:  Yale University Press, 2000) for more information on the Northwest Ordinance. 
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July, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven.”25  In simpler terms, residents were 
guaranteed rights contained in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments to 
the Constitution. 
This was the basic structure that the United States Congress deliberately created 
for the Territory of Wisconsin and made for every territory to follow, save Hawai’i and 
Oklahoma.  The territorial acts of Iowa, Utah, New Mexico, Washington, Idaho, 
Montana, Arizona, Oregon, Dakota, and Colorado that followed “An Act establishing the 
Territorial Government of Wisconsin” were basically copies.  Every territory in this 
group had a governor, nominated by the president, with the power to veto legislation 
from the legislature and appoint lesser territorial officials.  These territories each had a 
legislature with a council composed of thirteen members nominated by the people and 
appointed by Congress.26  The territorial house generally consisted of twenty-six elected 
officials, except in the territories of Colorado and Oregon.  Coloradans initially elected 
eighteen members, a number later raised to twenty-six.  Oregon, however, only elected 
eighteen.  The make-up of the territorial supreme court and judicial systems did not vary 
throughout the territories.  In this one aspect, Congress never deviated from the basic 
principles outlined in the Northwest Ordinance.  Finally, each territory had a territorial 
delegate to Congress.  This individual attended congressional sessions and committees, 
but he was not a voting member.  Nonetheless, a canny delegate could have a beneficial 
influence in Congress for his territory.  By developing close connections, he could sway 
                                                 
25 An Act establishing the Territorial Government of Wisconsin, chap. 54, U.S. Public Statutes at Large 5 
(1856):  15.  (Hereafter referred to as the Wisconsin Organic Act). 
26 Oregon had only nine council members. 
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voting members of Congress to introduce and support legislation needed for the benefit 
of the region.27 
Congress also included provisions protecting the basic rights of American citizens 
living in the territories.  The Wisconsin Organic Act guaranteed settlers the protection of 
the Bill of Rights by extending the provisions in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that 
safeguarded civil liberties.  When organizing the territories of Iowa and Oregon, 
lawmakers referred to the Wisconsin Organic Act and Northwest Ordinance as a means 
of extending the Bill of Rights to pioneers in these regions.28  The territories of 
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Oregon were organized in 1836, 1838, and 1848, respectively.  
Following the Compromise of 1850, Americans were ready for another round of 
territorial organization.  When addressing the issue of personal liberties, Congress 
adjusted its approach in a way that was fundamentally important for the insular 
territories.  Starting with the Utah Organic Act in 1850, Congress altered their legislative 
template.  In the Wisconsin Organic act, settlers enjoyed the protections of the Bill of 
Rights through the following phrase:  
And be it further enacted, That the inhabitants of the said Territory shall be 
entitled to, and enjoy, all and singular the rights, privileges, and advantages, 
granted and secured to the people of the Territory of the United States northwest 
of the river Ohio, by the articles of the compact contained in the ordinance for the 
government of the said Territory, passed on the thirteenth day of July, one 
thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven; and shall be subject to all the 
                                                 
27 U.S., An Act to divide the Territory of Wisconsin and to establish the Territorial Government of Iowa, 
chap. 96, U.S. Public Statutes at Large 5 (1856):  235-241 (hereafter Iowa Organic Act); U.S., An Act to 
establish the Territorial Government of Oregon, chap. 177, U.S. Public Statutes at Large 9 (1862):  323-
331 (hereafter Oregon Organic Act); U.S., An Act to establish the Territorial Government of Utah, chap. 
51, U.S. Public Statutes at Large 9 (1862):  453-458 (hereafter Utah Organic Act); U.S., An Act to provide 
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177 (hereafter Colorado Organic Act); and U.S., An Act to provide a temporary Government for the 
Territory of Dakota, and to create the Office of Surveyor General therein, chap. 59, U.S. Statutes at Large 
12 (1863):  239-244 (hereafter Dakota Organic Act). 
28 Wisconsin Organic Act, 15; Iowa Organic Act, 239; and Oregon Organic Act, 329. 
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conditions and restrictions and prohibitions in said articles of compact imposed 
upon the people of the said Territory.29 
 
Starting with “An act to establish a Territorial Government for Utah,” lawmakers ensured 
civil rights by simply inserting the words, “the Constitution and laws of the United States 
are hereby extended over and declared to be in force in said Territory of Utah, so far as 
the same, or any provision thereof, may be applicable.”30 The wording of this phrase 
would later appear in the famous—or infamous—Insular Cases.   
Examining “An Act To provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii,” a.k.a. 
the Hawaiian Organic Act, one immediately recognizes the form and wording of the 
statute with some minor modifications.  The organic act provided for a governor to 
execute the laws of Hawai’i, appoint minor officials, and approve legislation.  Unlike the 
other territories, the Hawaiian Organic Act required gubernatorial nominees to hold 
citizenship in the islands.  This provision aroused a degree of debate within the Senate.  
Senator Eugene Hale, a Republican from Maine, introduced the amendment responsible 
for this requirement.  He wrote this amendment to provide more self-government for 
Hawaiian citizens and limit the involvement of the federal government in the 
administration of the islands.  Senator Benjamin Ryan Tillman (Democrat-South 
Carolina) rejected this motion.  In his mind, such a qualification would reinforce the 
oligarchic control that the landowners already exercised.  Ironically, it was Senator 
Clarence Don Clark of Wyoming (Republican) who presented the greatest opposition to 
the amendment.  In his speech, he recognized the dangers of appointing governors from 
outside the territory.  Political patronage often landed unscrupulous and unqualified men 
in these positions.  He agreed with recruiting from within the bounds of the territory.  His 
                                                 
29 Wisconsin Organic Act, 15. 
30 Utah Organic Act, 458. 
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concern, however, was limiting the ability of the president to search in other American 
communities for qualified candidates.  After all, citizenship in the territory did not 
guarantee competence.31 
 The Hawaiian Organic Act had other differences from the continental organic 
acts.  For instance, the Territory of Hawai’i had its territorial assembly.  It was bicameral 
in nature, but the upper chamber was termed a senate as opposed to a council and its 
members were elected without the approval of the United States Congress.  Also, the 
Hawaiian Organic Act explicitly extended legislation excluding the immigration of 
Chinese laborers to the islands.32  The racial composition of the Hawaiian Islands deeply 
troubled some congressmen.  In order to allay fears that Hawai’i would serve as an 
unguarded Ellis Island of the West for Asians, they made sure to include this prohibition 
and later the means to enforce it.  It would serve as a source of contention between the 
business community of the Territory of Hawai’i and the federal government.  The 
Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 also restricted immigration from Japan, by 1923 an 
acute labor shortage affected Hawai’i, leading to Hawaiian leadership petitioning 
Congress to permit the temporary immigration of Asian laborers.33 
 Otherwise, the governmental structure of the Territory of Hawai’i remained 
comparable to the other American territories in the American West.  The federal and 
                                                 
31 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, vol. 33 pt. 2, 1985-1986.   
32 The exact legislation referred to in the Hawaiian Organic Act is U.S., “An Act to prohibit the coming of 
Chinese persons into the United States” passed in 1892.  However, most historians of Hawaiian history 
acknowledge that the U.S. Congress was essentially extending the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to the 
Hawaiian Islands (The first statute only lasted ten years, requiring an extension of its life in 1892).  In 
books covering this issues, readers may either find references to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 or 
passages simply stating that the Hawaiian Organic Act prohibited the importation of Chinese laborers.  See 
Fuchs, 87, 206-207; and U.S., An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, chap. 
126, U.S. Statutes at Large 22 (1882):  58-61. 
33 U.S., Senate Committee on Immigration, Immigration to Relieve Emergency Caused by Shortage of 
Labor in Hawaii, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1923, S. Rep. 1252, 3-8; and House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1923, H. Rep. 1717, 1-9. 
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territorial government encouraged the formation of republican institutions within the 
spirit of the Constitution.  American culture and society flourished, as did the myriad of 
other cultures within the islands.34  And by the time of Pearl Harbor, the political culture 
of Hawai’i had strong ties to that of the mainland.  The wartime sacrifices of Hawaiians 
further strengthened these bonds between the states and the territory, making it difficult 
to deny them statehood by 1959. 
 There is one final, crucial link between Hawai’i and the American West.  Only 
four states existed as sovereign nations prior to admittance into the Union:  Hawai’i, 
Texas, Oregon, and California.35  The story of Texas is an old one.  Empresario Stephen 
F. Austin received permission from the Mexican government to establish a colony of 
three hundred families in 1821.  By 1824, a colony of American immigrants thrived in 
the Mexican province of Tejas.  In exchange for large tracts of land—the smallest grant 
was 177 acres—the American immigrants were required to swear loyalty to the Republic 
of Mexico and convert to Catholicism.  Just as the United States of America relied on 
immigrants to settle and farm the vast expanses of federal lands, the Republic of Mexico 
also required imported labor.  Yet, American immigrants resisted assimilating into 
                                                 
34 For a thorough examination of the cultural composition of Hawai’i, see Fuchs (1961). 
35 Oregon existed under a provisional government from 1843 to 1848.  As settlers arrived from the United 
States along the Oregon Trail, Oregonians recognized the need to create some form of government to 
oversee land sales, livestock, Native American relations, and other local matters.  In fact, the decision to 
hold a legislative assembly for the formation of a provisional government came on May 2, 1843, at the 
“Second Wolf Meeting.”  Participants arrived to discuss a way to combat the wolves preying on livestock.  
In the midst of the meeting, it was decided that Oregon Country needed a government that did not rely on 
Dr. John McLoughlin and the Hudson Bay Company.  Although some mountain men and Canadians 
supported the motion, American settlers were the primary proponents of the provisional government, which 
adopted the code of law for Iowa.  For more information, see Dorothy O. Johansen, Empire of the 
Columbia:  A History of the Pacific Northwest (New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1957), 225-245.  Although 
the Oregon Provisional Government is important in the study of territorial government in the United States, 
it receives less attention here than Texas and California.  In Oregon, two foreign populations vied for 
control of the lands inhabited by Native Americans in the Pacific Northwest.  The Kingdom of Hawai’i also 
had multiple foreign populations residing in its borders, yet only the American population provided any 
significant threat to Kānaka sovereignty.  The overthrow of Hawai’i was the product of one nationality as 
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Mexican society.  From the outset, Austin worked to placate the demands of government 
authorities to import a docile and law-abiding population, while trying to incorporate 
some form of American democracy as demanded by his fellow settlers. 36  
 For a time, the immigrant population of Tejas y Coahuila adjusted to the demands 
of their new nation.  The issue of slavery in Tejas, as well as demands for some degree of 
autonomy strained relations between Texians and their new government.  By the early 
1830s, the Mexican government revived the question of slavery in their provinces.  They 
permitted importing slaves into the province as a means of attracting new immigrants 
from the United States of America, but as more immigrants arrived with their slaves, the 
policy came under question.  Of course, this upset the American Mexicans living in 
Tejas.  Finally, on October 2, 1835, the issues of slavery and self-government for Texians 
entered a new field of debate, one of armed rebellion.  For, on this date, the opening shots 
of the Texas Revolution rang out in the small town of Gonzales.  As the history books 
show, the Texians fought and won their rebellion after finally defeating Santa Anna near 
the San Jacinto River.37     
 For the next nine years, Texians and Americans danced a convoluted minuet of 
admission.  The Americans in Mexico residing inside the borders of Tejas may have 
pledged allegiance to the Republic of Mexico; but in their minds the oath never included 
rebuking their dedication to American culture, ideals, government, prejudices, or 
industry.  Considering this, it was only natural that they would seek reunification with the 
nation they had left after wresting independence from the Mexican government.  The 
                                                 
36 Gregg Cantrell, Stephen F. Austin:  Empresario of Texas (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), 
134-146. 
37 For information regarding the Texas Revolution, see Marquis James, The Raven, intr. Henry Steele 
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political climate, however, had drastically changed from 1820 to 1836.  Having 
successfully preserved the peace and political balance of Congress with the Missouri 
Compromise, northerners were hesitant to incorporate a slaveholding Republic of Texas 
into the nation.  Unable to bully anti-slavery northern politicians, southerners and Texians 
alike had to wait patiently for the next nine years.   
 For Texians, the time did not pass quickly.  Every year they faced the possibility 
of war rekindling between their nascent nation and the Republic of Mexico.  With 
northern opposition to annexation of another slave state, there was no guarantee that the 
United States of America would incorporate the Republic of Texas, thereby extending the 
protection of the United States Army to the lands bordering the Rio Grande.  Finally, 
President Sam Houston devised the perfect scheme for incorporation.  Feigning 
indifference towards annexation and fostering closer relations with Great Britain, the 
Texians spurred annexationist democrats in the United States Senate to push harder on a 
bill adding the Lone Star Republic to the Union.  Finally, on March 1, 1845, President 
Tyler signed the resolution adding Texas to the United States of America. 
 Americans repeated the process of Texas ten years later in the province of 
California.  Following their independence from Spain, political leaders of the Republic of 
Mexico passed legislation permitting trade with foreign countries.  New England 
merchant vessels began making regular stops to trade for hide, tallow, and other 
Californian products.  Aboard these trade ships were men like Richard Henry Dana who 
sought adventure in other lands.  Dana later recorded his Californian experiences in Two 
Years Before the Mast.  This work was one of many that portrayed the area as an 
agricultural paradise.  The imagery was enough to draw American settlers off of the 
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Oregon Trail and onto the California Trail.  At the end of their journey, they emerged in 
California, most likely next to Sutter’s Fort.38 John Augustus Sutter was a Swiss 
immigrant who was wanted for bankruptcy in his native land, yet prospered in California, 
a common theme for early European immigrants.  When hostilities between the United 
States and the Republic of Mexico erupted in 1846, John C. Frémont and prominent 
Californians orchestrated the Bear Flag Revolt that severed California from Mexico.  
Since it was clear to both the American and Mexican governments that the leaders of the 
Bear Flag Republic favored annexation to the United States of America, the region was 
incorporated into the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  Unlike Texas, California did not 
have to wait nine years before Congress annexed the territory.  Instead, they became self-
governed in 1848 and a state in 1850.39 
  In comparison, Hawaiians had lived under the rule of various ali’i before 
Kamehameha I unified the islands under his crown.  Like the Lipan Apache, Kiowa, 
Comanche, Wichita, and Spanish residents of Tejas y Coahuila¸ Kānakas had their 
ancestral homelands stripped from them by European-American settlers living in the 
region.  Finally, the Republic of Hawai’i, as in the case of Texas, experienced a brief 
existence as a republic dominated by the rebellious settler society. 
 Yet the similarities stop there.  Hawaiians experienced two years of political 
limbo before their territorial bill passed Congress.  Afterwards, they lived through 
another 59 years of territorial status.  Texas, on the other hand, experienced only nine 
months and twenty-eight agonizing days after annexation and prior to statehood.  What 
                                                 
38 It is interesting to note for the purpose of this study that New Helvetia, a.k.a. Sutter’s Fort, was 
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39 Ray Allen Billington and Martin Ridge, Westward Expansion:  A History of the American Frontier, 6th 
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was the reason for the delay?  President John Tyler may have signed the joint resolution 
annexing the Republic of Texas on March 1, 1845, but the Texans still needed time to 
produce a constitution establishing a “republican form of government” within its 
borders.40  Once done, statehood was granted. 
 Hawai’i clearly has close connections with the tradition of territorial government 
begun with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, but how did it compare with other insular 
possessions?  Matching the history of Hawaiian government with the other insular 
territories shows a sharp break from the traditions established in 1787 and continued 
throughout the American West.  Regarding the extension of American government to 
areas in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, Hawai’i became the last remnant of the 
older American colonial system. 
 One noteworthy comparison between Hawai’i and the other insular territories is 
the legislative methods used to construct their governments.  In Hawai’i and Puerto Rico, 
the United States Congress actively participated in governing.  For Hawai’i, congressmen 
drafted the Hawaiian Organic Act.  This statute remained in effect until President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower in 1959 signed PL 86-3 admitting Hawai’i as a state.  Puerto Rico also 
had a formal territorial government organized by Congress.  The Foraker Act of 1900 
ended the military government in place since the conclusion of the Spanish-American 
War of 1898.  It created the office of the governor to be filled by a presidential nominee.  
The individual was an American and had significant powers over the Puerto Rican 
people.  Also it established a Legislative Assembly comprised of an Executive Council 
and House of Representatives.  Representatives were popularly elected by Puerto Ricans, 
                                                 
40 U.S., “Joint Resolution for annexing Texas to the United States,” Joint Resolution No. 8, United States 
Public Statutes at Large 5 (1845), 797-798; and U.S., “Joint Resolution for the Admission of the State of 
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thus providing for some democratic rule under the colonial government.  The Council, 
however, was not so democratic.  The president appointed eleven members, only five of 
which had to be from Puerto Rico.41 
 The framework established by the Northwest Ordinance and passed on to western 
territories was present in Puerto Rico, but its democratic nature was lessened.  Other 
territorial governments had limitations on the degree of self-government they exercised.  
The governor was appointed by federal authorities.  Legislative council members 
required congressional approval at first.  And any laws passed by the assembly were 
subject to gubernatorial or congressional veto.  Congressmen considered these controls 
necessary to the orderly settlement of colonies.  They wanted to direct the conquest of 
new lands without reducing fellow citizens to absolute colonial subjects.  The Foraker 
Act, on the other hand, created a colonial framework of government intended to control a 
foreign population.   
Here, American expansionist policy diverted from its earlier stages.  Before, 
American settlers and federal agents removed the indigenous presence from the land prior 
to settlement.  The reservation system aided in this process by concentrating first peoples 
in restricted areas.  Also, historians like Jared Diamond and Alfred Crosby have provided 
studies revealing the dramatic effect western diseases had on Native Americans.  By the 
time migrating families and individuals arrived, an illusion of “empty space” or “empty 
land” had been created.  For the first time in their expansionist history, Americans found 
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themselves confronted with a colonial dilemma.  They had to create a system with which 
they could govern a large foreign, non- 
English speaking population.  Moreover, they entered the Spanish-American War to 
expand liberty and democracy to the Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines.  To deny Puerto Ricans a role in the governance of their home would betray 
American claims as protectors of liberty.  The result in Puerto Rico was a colonial system 
with a veneer of democratic participation.  As the years passed, Congress extended the 
political rights of Puerto Ricans with the Jones Act of 1917 and the Elective Governor 
Bill of 1947.42 
The territories of Hawai’i and Puerto Rico were lucky in comparison to Guam, 
American Samoa, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands as they at least had some 
elements of democracy incorporated into the territorial government.   When Guam and 
American Samoa came under the control of the United States government in 1898 and 
1899, respectively, Congress was not responsible for establishing a working government.  
Instead, President William McKinley passed Executive Order 180-A for Guam and 
Executive Order 1900 for American Samoa.  In these islands, the ranking naval officer of 
the base assumed absolute authority over the islands and its inhabitants.  Under the naval 
government fell every office and department responsible for maintaining military 
discipline, as well as the civilian community.  The Department of Public Health, 
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Department of Public Works, Department of Agriculture, and other government 
organizations were organized by him and run by his appointees.43 
Records indicate that the naval governors of Guam and American Samoa 
conducted affairs honestly and efficiently.  Nonetheless, the continuous military rule in 
the islands at time affected the civil rights of the inhabitants.  For example, the military 
governor acted as the high court for the island.  Whereas Hawaiians and Puerto Ricans 
had recourse to the Supreme Court of the United States of America, Samoan justice 
stopped with the ranking naval officer.  44  In 1946 and 1947, the Law Offices of Peter 
and Dalton of Omaha, Nebraska, became involved in a case involving the seizure of an 
ocean vessel named Captain Steffany.  During World War II, the Governor of Samoa 
seized the vessel.  A board of appraisers valued the vessel at $23,035.00, after which the 
governor offered some compensation to the family of Joseph Steffany.45  The Steffany 
family, however, refused to accept the validity of the seizure.  Ownership of the Captain 
Steffany allowed them to conduct a transport business.  According to documents, the 
naval government transferred the vessel to the Samoan Navigation Company.  This was a 
transport business operated by the American Naval Administration in Guam.  Throughout 
1946 and 1947, the law firm of Peter & Dalton engaged in a prolonged legal battle to 
reclaim the vessel as well as business profits lost from the seizure.  What is important 
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here is the avenue the Steffany family chose in order to reclaim their property.  While the 
statute creating the territorial government of Hawai’i gave islanders a large degree of 
protections for their civil liberties, no such guarantees existed for Samoans or 
Guamanians.46 
 In addition to the structure and legislative roots of the insular territories, historians 
have often cited the Insular Cases47 as a defining legal difference between American 
island and continental colonies.  The Insular Cases were a set of Supreme Court rulings 
delivered at the beginning of the twentieth century.  They concerned the issue of whether 
or not the “constitution follows the flag.”  The opinions of the court were often 
contentious.  Perusing them, scholars can read the views of the Supreme Court justices, 
which, at times, were bitterly divided.  In the end, the Supreme Court made two 
important rulings.  First, the constitution does not follow the flag.  Second, the American 
territories were not designed with the same purposes in mind.  The continental territories, 
in addition to Hawai’i, were incorporated territories, and therefore, destined for 
statehood.  The insular territories, excluding Hawai’i, were unincorporated territories and 
not guaranteed future statehood.  The following sections will examine these rulings in 
more depth with regard to their effect on the insular territories, but its main focus will 
                                                 
46 For more information on the Steffany case, see Hugh Alfred Butler Papers, MS2331, Box 217, “4a 
General Samoa,” Nebraska State Historical Society; and Hugh Alfred Butler Papers, MS2331, Box 119, 
“4a—Samoa,” Nebraska State Historical Society. 
47 Fourteen Supreme Court cases form the core of the Insular Cases.  They are DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
1 (1901), Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243(1901), Goetze 
v. United States and Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901), Huus v. New York and Porto Rico 
Steamship Company, 182 U.S. 392 (1901), Fourteen Diamond Rings, Emil J. Pepke, Claimant v. United 
States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901), Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 152 (1901), Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 
197 (1903), Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1903), 
Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1904), Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914), Balzac v. 
People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1921), and Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911).  
Occasionally, scholars add to this list; however, these are the cases traditionally lumped under this title.  
Overall, DeLima v. Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell provided the basis for the insular cases and their impact 
on American colonialism.  Subsequent cases added to or refined certain points of law from these two cases. 
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center on the historical reasons given by the Supreme Court.  Viewing the Insular Cases 
from this particular perspective shows them to have firm, historical roots in the American 
territorial system starting with the Louisiana Purchase. 
 The cases of De Lima v. Bidwell (1901) and Downes v. Bidwell (1901) 
unquestionably reveal the connection between the Insular Cases and the American West.  
Beginning with De Lima v. Bidwell, Justice Henry Billings Brown noted that ports in 
New Orleans, Florida, and Texas were treated as foreign ports, regardless of the fact that 
they were within American boundaries.  Since the daily lives and activities of the 
communities had existed under foreign rule, the federal government needed time to 
develop and implement a policy for governing these new territories.  Secretary of the 
Treasury Albert Gallatin established the historical precedent starting in 1803.  He ordered 
his department to treat the port of New Orleans as a foreign territory from December 20, 
1803, to February 24, 1804.  Until Congress admitted New Orleans into the U.S. 
Customs, Spanish laws governing commerce remained in effect.  This treatment of newly 
acquired ports lasted until the acquisition of California.  At this point, Secretary of State 
James Buchanan issued orders to treat ports along the California coast as domestic ports.  
From these examples, Justice Brown dismissed the notion that Puerto Rico and the 
insular territories could exist under American sovereignty, yet remain foreign ports.  As 
in the case of New Orleans, Texas, and Florida, the federal government may have 
assumed control over new territories and retained existing laws and import duties, but it 
did so only as long as was needed to devise a political framework for the region.48 
 Questions over the validity of having different laws governing imports in Puerto 
Rico and the Pacific and Caribbean insular territories continued beyond De Lima v. 
                                                 
48 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. Rep. 1 (1901) at 174-200. 
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Bidwell.  In Downes v. Bidwell, the Supreme Court ruled on whether or not goods from 
Puerto Rico could be taxed upon entering the port of New York City.  Once again, Justice 
Brown delivered the opinion of the court in which he built upon his analysis of territorial 
history and law.  The Supreme Court ruled that the contiguous territories provided the 
colonial framework and basis for the way Congress legislated for the insular possessions.  
Brown stated that the U.S. Constitution was formed by states and their inhabitants and 
that the constitutional prohibition against discriminatory import duties as outlined in 
Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution applied only to states and not to territories.49   
As a basis for the ruling, Justice Brown relied on a literal reading of the 
Constitution and territorial history.  First, he cited the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as examples of how congressmen recognized and differentiated between 
states and territories.  In both amendments, lawmakers carefully included references to 
the states.  He noted that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery in the states and 
the territories, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment provided citizenship to residents of 
the states only.  This reading of the amendments corresponds with the wording of the 
organic acts of Wisconsin, Iowa, and other Trans-Mississippi territories.  As noted earlier 
in this chapter, congressmen included sections extending the U.S. Constitution and Bill of 
Rights to the continental colonies.50 
For the purpose of this study, Justice Brown’s treatment of territorial history is 
important.  Although the views of lawmakers towards the extension of the Constitution 
over the territories may have fluctuated over the years, Brown believed “Congress has 
been consistent in recognizing the difference between the States and the territories under 
                                                 
49 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. Rep. 244 (1901) at 250-251, 287. 
50 Ibid. at 250-251. 
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the Constitution.”51  For instance, Justice Brown showed that the first territory to have 
revenue laws different from the states was Orleans Territory.52  Until 1804, Orleans 
Territory was treated differently from the states.  Starting with this region and continuing 
with the Philippines, Congress had always extended constitutional protections and other 
relevant legislation to new regions.  Territorial association with the United States of 
America, however, did not entail the automatic extension of rights reserved specifically 
for the states.53 
Towards the end of the opinion of the court, Justice Brown went beyond mere 
import duties by commenting on the governance of an American empire.  He stated that 
“there may be territories subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, which are not of 
the United States.”54  This does not make them foreign to the U.S.  After all, the Court 
ruled in De Lima v. Bidwell that a territory could not be both domestic and foreign.  
Instead, the territories are not states, and therefore, do not automatically enjoy the 
protection of the Constitution, which is a compact between the states and the federal 
government.  As happened in “Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory . . . and still 
more recently in the case of Alaska,” the territorial governments resembled the British 
                                                 
51 Ibid. at 258. 
52 According to Jack Ericson Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires, 147, Orleans Territory 
consisted of the area encompassing modern day Louisiana.  After Louisiana entered the Union in 1812, the 
name of the territory was changed to Missouri Territory.  In reading Eblen’s study of the American 
territorial system, it is not surprising that Orleans Territory did not enjoy the same trade and taxation 
protections as the states.  Congress still used the district stage to govern this region.  In the district stage, 
the governor, secretary, and judges legislated.  Furthermore, the governor held near unlimited power over 
the legislative process, save that new statutes must have come from the law books of the older states (a 
point which caused some confusion).  Otherwise, he held the power to prorogue or dissolve the legislature 
during the second stage, oversee Native American affairs, apportion the territory, choose the seat of 
government, and influence local politics.  As Ericson illustrates, governors could overuse these powers to 
their detriment, as was the case with Winthrop Sargent in Mississippi territory.  An astute governor, like 
Arthur St. Clair (Northwest Territory), employed his gubernatorial powers with moderation.  With the 
abandonment of the district stage in the trans-Mississippi West, unlimited gubernatorial powers faded from 
the colonial process on the mainland, though they later reemerged in certain insular territories. 
53 Ibid., 251-258. 
54 Ibid., 278. 
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colonial system as existed in the colonies prior to the Revolutionary War.55  It is 
Congress who must extend the protection of the Constitution.  The confusion over the 
relationship between the Constitution and the territories emanated from historical 
congressional actions in which select constitutional provisions were extended shortly 
after the federal government assumed sovereignty over a new region.  This gave the 
illusion that the U.S. Constitution followed the flag.  Furthermore, no time limitations 
have ever been stipulated on territorial status.  Hawai’i, for instance, became an 
incorporated territory in 1898.  If Congress desired, Hawai’i could have remained an 
incorporated territory indefinitely.  Though the federal government obtains sovereignty 
and responsibility over annexed or conquered areas, it retains the right to define the 
relationship between the national government and territorial inhabitants.  Thus Downes v. 
Bidwell recognized the politics of difference important in creating and administering an 
imperial framework.56 
The Supreme Court, however, did recognize certain natural rights possessed by 
indigenous and territorial peoples that the federal government had to protect regardless of 
whether or not Congress extended constitutional protections to them.  These rights 
included the  
rights to one’s own religious opinions and to a public expression of them, or as  
sometimes said, to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own 
conscience; the right to personal liberty and individual property; to freedom of 
speech and of the press; to free access to courts of justice, to due process of law 
and to an equal protection of the law; to immunities from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, as well as cruel and unusual punishments; and to such other 
immunities as are indispensable to a free government.57 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 279. 
56 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question:  Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkley:  University of 
California Press, 2005), 22-25.  See the section on the question of spatiality in the American Empire and its 
effect on the territories. 
57 Downes v. Bidwell at 283. 
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These were the same civil rights protected in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and 
extended to the Trans-Mississippi territories through the Wisconsin Organic Act.58 
 The dawn of the twentieth century brought a vitally important shift in American 
expansionist policy.  Had the Supreme Court delivered a similar ruling prior to 1890, 
American settlement may have proceeded quite differently.  The forced removal and 
assimilation of Native Americans, as well as the actions conducted during armed conflict 
with them, relied on the absence of these natural rights, and many white settlers 
encouraged the genocidal policies of the American government.  Had the Supreme Court 
and federal government recognized and adhered to a ruling similar to Justice Brown’s, 
white settlement may not have penetrated the lands of the Kiowa, Cheyenne, Arapaho, 
Sauk, Fox, Nez Perce, and other first peoples.  In Downes v. Bidwell (1901), a shift in the 
aggressive, expansionist policies that allowed for the development of settler societies 
occurred throughout the continent to a system more akin to British and French colonies as 
exercised in their empires. 
 Since the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands with the Newlands Resolution, 
Hawaiian territorial government had a structure based on the Northwest Ordinance.  The 
Newlands Resolution ended the Republic of Hawai’i and authorized President William 
McKinley to appoint government officers to direct the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of government until Congress provided a new territorial government.  All 
treaties between Hawai’i and foreign nations ceased to function; the U.S. federal 
government assumed Hawaiian national debts; and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
was extended to include Hawai’i.  On the surface, it seemed that American policymakers 
                                                 
58 For more on the protection of these rights, see pages Downes v. Bidwell at 276-287. 
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desired the full incorporation of Hawai’i into the American political system.  There 
existed, however, a provision preserving existing customs laws between the islands and 
the continental states and territories.  These duties, of course, were prejudicial to 
Hawaiian agricultural products, intending to limit the importation of Hawaiian sugar into 
the United States.  The McKinley Tariff of 1890 established these taxes and are 
commonly known as some of the highest duties ever levied in American History.59  This 
aspect of the concurrent resolution suggests that American politicians had not completely 
decided on the nature of the relationship between the United States and Hawai’i.  The 
preservation of import duties raises the possibility that some in Congress wanted Hawai’i 
to be a colony without its potential addition to the formal, political American Union.60 
 Laying claim to Hawai’i, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, however, was 
easier than constructing a federal-territorial relationship between them.  This may seem 
odd considering the experiences congresses and presidents had amassed since the 
foundation of the republic.  When reviewing the debates over territorial formation prior to 
1860, slavery dominated the debate.  In 1857 with the Dred Scott v. Sanford decision, 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney attempted to end any contentions over slavery in American 
territories.  Ultimately he failed as his ruling increased northern opposition to the spread 
of the “peculiar institution.”  Chief Justice Taney’s tolerance of slavery could not be 
maintained after the vicious fighting from 1861 to 1865.  Radical Republican control in 
Congress and adoption of the 13th Amendment brought the end to slavery, and therefore 
an end to the territorial questions on the permissibility of slavery.  Even so, other issues 
                                                 
59 Kuykendall, 1874-1893 The Kalakaua Dynasty, 561.  Kuykendall and other Hawaiian scholars have 
analyzed the McKinley Tariff of 1890 as a source of unrest among American settlers in  Hawai’i.  It is 
often cited as a direct cause of the 1893 overthrow of Lili’uokalani. 
60 U.S., Newlands Resolution, Resolution No. 55, U.S. Statutes at Large 30 (1898): 750-751. 
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such as polygamy and race hampered the inclusion of southwestern territories into the 
Union.  Americans solved these contentions without resorting to extensive violence, as 
Mormons eventually rejected polygamous marriages and the lure of gold and valuable 
minerals increased the flow of settlers descended from Western European states into 
Arizona and Mexico.  The Hawaiian Islands lacked the institutions of slavery and 
polygamy when Congress annexed them in 1898, but other problems slowed the 
statehood process for half of a century.  American phobias about admitting a region 
dominated by a large population of Japanese Hawaiians, Chinese Hawaiians, Korean 
Hawaiians, Filipino Hawaiians, and Native Hawaiians lasted for fifty years.   
 Throughout the early 1900s, it was common to consider the United States of 
America as the mainland and its states, the metropole of the American Empire.  Hawai’i, 
Puerto Rico, Guam, and Samoa were territories or colonies held by the nation.  While the 
former kingdom entered American history as a region wrested from autocratic Kānaka 
control by revolutionary American settlers and guided by the federal government 
following annexation, few Americans readily admitted or even realized the close 
relationship that Hawai’i had with the rest of the country. 
 The process begun by the Northwest Ordinance did not stop at the Mississippi 
River or even the coast of the Pacific Ocean.  Just as the three-stage territorial process 
mutated to accommodate the needs of settlers in the American West, congressmen 
returned to the Northwest Ordinance to govern the Territory of Hawai’i.  Unlike Puerto 
Rico, Guam, Samoa, the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, or even Orleans 
Territory, Hawaiians never experienced the more traditional form of colonialism.  The 
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Organic Act modified the existing democratic institutions to conform to stage two of the 
Northwest Ordinance.   
 Nonetheless, Hawai’i would remain a stage-two colony until 1959, regardless of 
its large population, contributions to the federal treasury, extensive education system, 
predominant American culture, or republican institutions.   Hawaiians had achieved 
everything expected of a territory to win acceptance into the union, but American 
concerns about non-contiguity, race, communism, and labor prevented statehood for over 
sixty years.  Overcoming these obstacles would present a challenge to Hawaiians until 
after World War II. 
CHAPTER 4   
HAWAI’I TERRITORY AND COMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNANCE 
While drafting the Northwest Ordinance, American statesmen confronted the 
perplexing issue of establishing settlements in Native American territory, isolated by the 
Appalachian Mountains, and separated by dense forests.  Their task was a difficult one, 
yet they succeeded in drafting a landmark piece of legislation.  In accomplishing this feat, 
they relied on imperfect maps and eyewitness accounts to familiarize themselves with the 
territory.  Also, the creators of the ordinance knew that settlers would rely on rudimentary 
transportation, poor roads, and rivers to maintain contact with states, the federal 
government, and American markets.  Daunting though the task was, they never 
considered abandoning expansion into their neighbors’ lands. 
Having experienced two centuries of colonization, conquest, and settlement, 
organized by legislation over one hundred years old, and armed with modernized 
railroads and ships, controlling and developing the Territory of Hawai’i should have been 
an easy task for Americans living in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
especially when compared with the difficulties faced by settlers living in the Territory of 
Indiana in 1812 or Dakota Territory in the 1860s and 1870s.  Yet for all of the 
advancements in technology and communications, Americans found themselves 
challenged at the thought of colonizing or incorporating atolls.  While their ancestors 
poured across seas of grass en route to Oregon or California, the Pacific Ocean suddenly 
appeared as a menacing obstacle to controlling the Philippines and Hawai’i.  To 
overcome these ostensibly formidable obstacles, Americans slightly altered their 
approach to colonizing Hawai’i and completely abandoned the Northwest Ordinance in 
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their efforts to occupy Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, and the Philippines.  Abandoning the 
anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Revolutionary War and wary of incorporating non-
contiguous territories into the United States of America, the nation had to reconsider the 
role of colonization and the place of conquered peoples within its political framework.  In 
the process, concerns over distance, race, and national security caused the extension of 
Hawaii’s territorialism into the mid-twentieth century, while injecting the concept of a 
different and new colonial system into the American dialogue.   
For America’s insular possessions, a new subject appeared in congressional 
debates over the governing of islands—distance.  The Hawaiian Islands lay over 2,300 
miles southwest of California.  To reach the island of Guam, one had to travel an 
additional 3,000 miles west.  From there, almost 2,000 more miles separated the weary 
sojourner from the Philippine Islands.  Puerto Rico, on the other hand, was somewhat 
easier to reach, since the island lay less than 1,500 miles from the coast of Florida.  In 
1903, journalist John Marvin Dean made the journey from the West Coast to the 
Philippines after a brief stay in Honolulu.  According to his memoirs, the trip cost less 
than one thousand dollars.  Going directly to Manila from Seattle or San Francisco took 
twenty-eight days.  Should an early nineteenth-century tourist seek this trip, he or she 
could have reveled in the sights and sounds on Hawai’i at the minimal cost of a few 
days.1  In contrast, it could take months for settlers to make the journey from the eastern 
United States to destinations in the American West prior to the completion of the 
transcontinental railroad.  For example, Sarah Raymond Herndon and her family began 
their trip from Missouri to Montana on May 1, 1865.  During their trek west, their wagon 
                                                 
1 John Marvin Dean, “Reading Journey in the Borderlands of the United States,” The Chautauquan:  A 
Weekly Magazine 38, no. 4 (December 1903):  342-343.  http://0-www.proquest.com.library.unl.edu:80/ 
(accessed November 8, 2007). 
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train met no armed resistance from Native Americans nor suffered a contagious outbreak 
nor faced blizzards or other natural obstacles.  In comparison to other westward 
migrations, their trip was relatively uneventful.  Nonetheless, it took them four months to 
travel a distance equal to half of that Dean crossed on his way to Honolulu.2  Comparing 
these two “voyages,” one can easily see how dramatic changes in transportation between 
1865 and 1900 affected travel.  Still, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, the distance 
between Hawai’i, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines had dwindled further still.  To get 
from Washington, D.C., to Honolulu, Territory of Hawai’i, one needed only 20 hours of 
flight time.3  But regardless of the decrease in transit time, lawmakers and citizens had 
difficulty setting aside the issue of distance in their views of governing insular 
possessions. 
 Why is distance significant in a comparative history of Hawai’i, the American 
West, and the unincorporated insular possessions?  According to Frederick Cooper, a 
colonial empire is “a political unit that is large, expansionist (or with memories of an 
expansionist past), and which reproduces differentiation among people it incorporates.”4  
This is not to say that the policies of differentiation remain static.  He notes that some 
empires eventually allow subjugated minorities access to their political framework.  Also, 
space places a pivotal role in empire.  Imperial Rome, for instance, used the borders of 
their territory as a line demarcating the end of civilization and the beginning of 
barbarism.  For Romans, all persons residing outside of their borders were distinct and 
                                                 
2 Sarah Raymond Herndon, Days on the Road:  Crossing the Plains in 1865, the Diary of Sarah Raymond 
Herndon, foreword by Mary Barmeyer O’Brien (Helena, Montana:  TwoDot, 2003). 
3 Statehood for Hawaii, fo. 534, Box 11, Joseph Rider Farrington Papers, M473, Hawai’i State Archives 
40.   
4 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question:  Theory, Knowledge, History(Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 2005):  27. 
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different, and therefore naturally subordinate to them.5  Likewise, European empires of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had similar views of peoples residing on the 
periphery.   
 It should come then as no surprise that a republic that borrowed so heavily from 
Roman and Enlightenment political theories and practices should also develop similar 
views on conquered cultures residing outside national boundaries.  Americans initially 
subjected Native Americans to their virulent form of imperial differentiation.  At first, 
Americans believed that genocide was justified in their quest to fulfill their manifest 
destiny.  With the so-called Peace Policy of the 1870s and the Dawes Severalty Act of 
1887, previous policies of forced removal and warfare changed into programs intended to 
eradicate all vestiges of indigenous culture, thereby allowing for the incorporation of the 
remaining Native Americans namelessly into the American political system.  In this 
phase of American expansion, physical space was not so much a factor in the politics of 
differentiation as was culture.  The West, after all, was a place to be colonized and 
incorporated into the body politic.  To achieve these ends, settlers used brutal tactics to 
clear the lands of their original inhabitants and, in the process, to create the stereotypes 
and prejudices for cultural others that they would also apply to Africans, South and 
Central Americans, Polynesians, and Asians as the United States began global economic 
and military expansion in the late nineteenth century.6 
 While Americans showed an aptitude for formulating policies to facilitate 
continental conquest and thereby statehood, the move from governing contiguous 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 158-159. 
6 Richard Drinnon, Facing West:  The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire Building (Norman:  
University of Oklahoma Press, 1997):  220-221, 240-241.  The pages listed contain direct references to the 
application of Indian-hating in the Pacific Ocean; however, the entire work contains detailed information 
on the evolution of American prejudices towards the indigenous peoples of other countries. 
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territories to non-contiguous seemed a bit much for many Americans.  In the period from 
1898 to the early 1900s, anti-imperialists argued that incorporating non-contiguous 
territories would inevitably lead to the embrace of a colonial system.  They considered 
the insular territories unfit for settlement, since whites were incapable of living 
comfortably in tropical regions.  Unable to promote white resettlement similar to that of 
Oregon Country, Texas, California, and other continental regions, the populations of the 
islands would remain predominately foreign and non-white.  Without a significant 
presence of white Americans living in the islands, proper assimilation to American 
culture was impracticable, they reasoned.  During the debate over Hawaiian statehood, 
critics extended this argument.  By admitting a non-contiguous territory inhabited by 
large populations of Asian immigrants, Americans risked the possibility of having to 
admit the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, and the Pacific Territories to 
statehood.  Such a development threatened to provide equal representation of majority 
non-white populations in Congress.7 
 Commentary on American control of Puerto Rico extended anti and pro-imperial 
arguments.  In direct opposition to those who opposed annexation for purposes of non-
contiguity was the notion that possessing distant territories, or outposts, in the Pacific 
Ocean and Caribbean would enhance American security and trade.  By 1900 critics of 
American colonialism exposed the failings of the colonial government in Puerto Rico.  
For example, Ramón B. Lopez, editor of La Correspondencía de Puerto Rico, accused 
                                                 
7 George A. Richardson, “The Subjugation of Inferior Races,” Overland Monthly and Out West Magazine 
35, no. 205 (January 1900):  57.  http://0-www.proquest.com.library.unl.edu:80/ (accessed November 9, 
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the American government of failing to meet the educational, political, and economic 
needs of the Puerto Rican people.  Americans had promised to inaugurate policies that 
would fix the problems of the Spanish administration and enhance the infrastructure of 
the island, but the ineptitude of American administrators made things even worse.  
Unable to speak the language, ignorant of the culture, and unaware of Puerto Rican 
needs, colonial agents failed to run the mail service, maintain the roads, improve the 
education system, and unite the divided political climate on the island properly.8  
Ironically, nine months earlier, Dr. George G. Groff praised the same American 
administration in Puerto Rico.  Groff served as Secretary and Treasurer of the Superior 
Board of Health of Puerto Rico.  In his eyes, colonial policies successfully established an 
infrastructure capable of alleviating tropical diseases, educating the masses, protecting 
private property, and setting Puerto Ricans on the path to learning good governance.  
Moreover, Puerto Rico, Groff noted approvingly, was the beginning of an American 
presence throughout Latin America.9  “Anglo-Saxon” Americans now could set out in 
search of “unoccupied lands,” which they would find and settle throughout South 
America.10 
 Likewise, there existed in the U.S. the opinion that the Philippines and Hawai’i 
were crucial in controlling the Pacific Ocean and opening trade routes to China.  During 
times of peace, the national attention given to the strategic benefits waxed and waned.  
War, however, seemed to revive Americans’ interest in the value of American insular 
possessions.  For example, during the Boxer Rebellion in China, articles abounded in 
                                                 
8 Ramón B. Lopez, “The Needs of Porto Rico,” The Independent 52 (November 29, 1900):  2857-2859. 
9 Dr. George G. Groff, “A Successful Colonial Government,” The Independent 52 (January 11, 1900):  102-
104. 
10Ibid., 105. 
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American publications on the necessity of possessing Hawai’i, the Philippines, Guam, 
and Samoa.  These islands offered fueling stations necessary for oceanic transportation.  
Reviewing the articles published in Harper’s Weekly throughout the year 1900, the Boxer 
Rebellion and the Boer War in South Africa dominate the stories read by subscribers to 
this popular, national publication.  Riddled throughout the issues are articles on the 
Philippines, Hawai’i, and, at times, Puerto Rico.  Articles about the Philippine Islands 
emphasized the strategic importance of these islands to the American nation 
predominated.  Looming over the argument is a map centered on the archipelago.  
Extending outward are mile markers in a 360-degree radius.  They are marked at 1000-, 
2000-, and 3000-mile intervals illustrating the spatial importance of this American 
outpost in the Pacific Ocean.  This illustrated the projection of American economic and 
military power deep into Australia, China, Japan, and India.  By controlling the 
Philippines, the nation could exercise a “moral influence” and “anti-imperialistic” 
policies in China, while counteracting the extension of Dutch, British, and Japanese 
power in the region.11 
 Similar concerns appeared in the debates in Congress over the Hawaiian Organic 
Act.  While some congressmen loathed the possibility of providing a territorial 
government for the islands on the grounds that it could lead to statehood, Senator John 
Tyler Morgan of Alabama, Representative William Shadrach Knox of Massachusetts, and 
Representative Edward Hamilton of Michigan made cases in favor of Hawaiian 
incorporation based on its strategic importance.  Each congressman noted that the 
Hawaiian Islands lay 2,000 miles from the western coast of the United States of America, 
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and by controlling Hawai’i the United States gained the only viable coaling station in the 
middle of the Pacific Ocean.  This not only provided a military advantage to the United 
States Navy, but it also gave the U.S. control of the primary shipping routes in this 
sensitive region of the world. 12   
 The military importance of Hawai’i continued beyond World War II.  In fact, 
World War II, the Cold War, and decolonization movements reminded Americans of the 
strategic importance of Hawai’i.  Gavan Daws, John Whitehead, Victoria Wyatt, Tom 
Coffman, Lawrence Fuchs, and a myriad of others have published books or articles that 
delve into the effect World War II had on Hawaiian efforts to obtain statehood.  While 
World War II played a vital role in the history of Hawai’i, the Cold War Era and 
decolonization had an equally important impact.  Recent work in this area has produced 
intriguing results.  In his book, Completing the Union:  Alaska, Hawai’i, and the Battle 
for Statehood, John Whitehead remarked that Hawai’i became a physical and ideological 
“outpost to combat Communism” after 1950.13  In an article entitled, “‘A Symbol of the 
New Frontier’:  Hawaiian Statehood, Anti-Colonialism, and Winning the Cold War,” 
Gretchen Heefner continued the foray into this new approach to the history of Hawaiian 
statehood.  Her essay “explores the ways statehood advocates used the dual discourses of 
race and internationalism to present a Hawai’i that was both integral to U.S. interests and 
key in projecting a positive American image to the rest of the world.”14  Heefner’s 
scholarship reveals the ways in which Hawaiians and mainlanders recognized the 
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international implications that previous arguments against statehood on the account of a 
heterogeneous Hawaiian population had on the perceptions of America as an anti-
colonial power.  By annexing Hawai’i and embracing its myriad of races, American 
leaders might project an image of America that would counter a growing image of the 
Soviet Union as the only sincere anti-imperialist, global power. 
 The attack on Pearl Harbor alerted Americans, many for the first time, to the 
patriotism of Hawaiians and Hawaii’s strategic value.  It actually aided in strengthening 
the relationship between the territory and the federal government after World War II.  In 
1947, the Committee on Public Lands submitted a report on an enabling act pending in 
Congress.  For 49 years, pro-statehood Hawaiians had struggled to overcome the 
argument that non-contiguity made the territory unsuitable for statehood.  With this 
report, evidence now existed suggesting that this argument against Hawaiian statehood 
was weakening.  Throughout the first half of the 1900s, the status of “incorporated 
territory” was sufficient in tying the archipelago to the United States, thereby securing 
this vital outpost for the republic.  But according to the authors of the report, individuals 
interviewed on Hawaiian statehood claimed that “Hawaii’s value to the Nation as a 
defense outpost in the Pacific would be greater as a State than as a Territory.”15  Granted, 
opposition to a closer bond with the Territory of Hawai’i also existed.  Hawaiians found 
themselves battling charges of communism, questions over the racial makeup of the 
islands, and a myriad of other issues for their right to statehood from 1945 until 1959.  
Nonetheless, this report does reveal a shift in congressional attitudes towards non-
contiguous territories and political inclusion. 
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 Expanding beyond continental borders introduced Americans to the dangers and 
complexities involved in maintaining isolated strategic posts.  The very first Americans 
from the thirteen original states who moved into the lands of Kentucky and the Ohio 
River Valley learned the necessity of constructing well-designed forts and defenses.  
Creeks, Shawnees, Miamis, Sauks and Foxes refused to relinquish their lands without a 
fight.  Yet, Americans were never very far from the main population centers of the new 
U.S.A. during this time period.  Explorers and traders successfully entered the lands prior 
to the American Revolution, discovering the swiftest routes to potential frontier 
settlements. 
 Once American settlers began pushing past the Mississippi River, the situation 
changed.  Distance became more pronounced as overland wagon trains snaked their way 
across the arid and semiarid stretches of the Great Plains.  As Elliott West illustrated in 
The Contested Plains:  Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado, Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes relied on the lush grasslands astride the Platte and Republicans Rivers.16  
Further south, Kiowas and Comanches had long since laid claim to the Arkansas and Red 
Rivers.  And in the north, Lakotas, Dakotas, and Crows guarded precious sources of 
water for their families and herds.  After caravans crossed this stretch of land, Americans 
stood before the Rocky Mountains, a seemingly impenetrable obstacle to westward 
movement. 
 The pattern of settlement across Trans-Mississippi lands did not follow a smooth 
westerly progression.  As the old story goes, Americans skipped the Great American 
Desert altogether, opting to conquer and colonize the lands of Utah, California, and 
                                                 
16 Elliott West, The Contested Plains:  Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence:  
University of Kansas Press, 1998). 
111 
Oregon Country first.  In these regions, farming and industry was more akin to the more 
traditional forms practiced on the eastern seaboard.  Although southern Californian 
agriculture would later rely heavily on massive, federally-funded irrigation projects, early 
settlers found ranching and farming well suited to the region.  With the influx of 
settlement following the Gold Rush of 1848 and the conclusion of the Mexican-American 
War, it suddenly became highly profitable, too.  That California and Oregon’s statehood 
was isolated and not contiguous to America’s settled regions was not lost on Hawaiians.   
 Still, a primary concern among many Americans about the incorporation of 
Hawai’i was its perceived isolation from the States.  Initially, Hawai’i was separated 
from the United States.  Without airplanes, computers, telephones, and other modern 
amenities, distance caused delays in relaying orders and information from the islands to 
the mainland not unlike pre-railroad days for Californians.  World War II, the advent of 
radio communication, telephones, airplanes, and other technology lessened the effect 
distance had on the administration and defense of the islands. 
 Ironically, in their appeals against incorporation and statehood, Americans must 
have forgotten a celebrated part of their past  . . . the Great American West.  Hollywood 
glamorized the American West as a place of masculine virility in which bold settlers built 
a new American.  The reality, however, was much different.  In order to wrest the land 
from indigenous peoples, American policymakers had relied on two principle tools:  the 
treaty and the United States Army.  Treaties often served short-term purposes.  By 
offering incentives to Native Americans, diplomats received assurances that indigenous 
peoples would relinquish certain lands.  For example, Kiowas and Comanches agreed in 
the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek in 1867 to limit their hunting to the Texas 
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Panhandle and southwestern Oklahoma.  In exchange, Americans promised to provide 
food, supplies, education, and medical care until the Kiowa and Comanche peoples 
adjusted to their new lives on a reservation.  Inevitably, as with Kiowas and Comanches, 
indigenous groups quickly realized that the deal was one-sided and often not honored by 
the Americans.  This realization, in turn, led to war. 
 In order to conduct military operations in the West, the United States Army relied 
on forts manned by cavalry detachments.  Here, one sees parallels to the vulnerability of 
strategic points in the Pacific Ocean with the western lands.  Camp Supply, Fort Belknap, 
Fort Larned, and Fort Apache were some of the principle forts used in the Southwest and 
Great Plains.  Like Hawai’i, Guam, Puerto Rico, and American Samoa, they were 
isolated from the primary areas of settlement.  While oceans may have separated the 
islands from the Californian or Floridian coast, the Great Plains, Rocky Mountains, and 
the rivers in between served as natural obstacles to reinforcements and supply trains.  
When the presence of Native Americans determined to preserve their homelands was 
added, it could be argued that western continental outposts were just as isolated as the 
insular possessions. 
 Historians have previously made interesting points regarding this phase in 
Hawaiian history.  After World War II, decolonization movements erupted throughout 
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.  Indigenous demands for independence, coupled with 
the United Nations Charter denouncing colonialism, made American control over its 
insular territories uncertain.  By 1947, the Philippine Islands were nominally independent 
from the United States of America.  As H.W. Brands noted in Bound to Empire:  The 
United States and the Philippines, America insisted on maintaining economic controls 
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over the Philippines.  The fall of China, advent of the Eisenhower Administration, and 
beginnings of the Korean War revived a lagging American interest in the islands, and 
with communism gaining momentum in Asia, the Philippines again became an outpost 
for American might in the Pacific Ocean.17  
 The Philippines, however, were independent of the United States.  How did the 
Cold War and decolonization enter into the equation of spatiality and the territorial-
federal relationship of the island regions still under American control?  In the case of 
Puerto Rico, these global movements prompted two significant developments.  First, the 
militarization of Puerto Rican society increased.  The United States military enhanced its 
use of the island as a staging point in the Caribbean and Central America.  As the Cold 
War continued and the U.S. increased interventions in Latin America, Puerto Rican 
strategic value increased.  Efrén Rivera Ramos noted in American Colonialism in Puerto 
Rico:  The Judicial and Social Legacy that by 1999 Puerto Rico housed the Roosevelt 
Roads Naval Station and the U.S. Army Southern Command among other vital 
installations.  Moreover, American military operations in the War on Drugs relied on 
Puerto Rico.  Second, Puerto Rico was not insulated from the wave of independence 
movements occurring globally.  The 1950s and 1960s witnessed increased demands for 
independence.  By 1967, the Puerto Rican Congress held a plebiscite on continued 
political association with the United States or self-government as a result of public 
demand.18 
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 The ideological conflict between capitalism and communism had a significant 
impact on post-World War II treatment of the insular possessions, but this struggle alone 
did not dictate a policy shift.  The creation of the United Nations greatly affected the 
political ties between America and its colonies.  Americans’ rhetoric and actions 
regarding imperialism have always been rather duplicitous.  Since the founding of the 
republic, lawmakers espoused anti-colonial rhetoric.  The Monroe Doctrine and 
Declaration of Independence exemplify national positions on colonialism.  Combined, 
these historic documents rejected control of the New World and its peoples by the Old 
World.  Supposedly, every human being had a natural right to live free of colonial control 
in a democratic government that provided its citizens with the liberty to progress as far as 
their abilities would allow.  England and other European nations represented the 
antithesis of these liberties as they expanded across the globe, subjugating smaller nations 
in the process.  In 1823, the United States of America began its long career as the 
professed defender of the rights of international sovereignty.  By 1919, President 
Woodrow Wilson added to this image with his views on self-determination.  Humans had 
the right to form nations and identities based on the national, historical developments of 
their cultures.  No foreign power had the right to intervene in this process.  Throughout 
the twentieth century, Americans pressed to transform this policy into international law. 
 While the U.S.A. projected this foreign policy throughout the world, it never 
applied it within its own borders.  Looking back on four centuries of history, one sees the 
European-American settlers pushing Native Americans from their lands, using education 
and law to assail indigenous cultures, and sanctioning the civil and legal discrimination of 
ethnic minorities.  In their insular colonies, the American Navy replaced civilian 
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government in Guam, Samoa, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.  Hawai’i, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines enjoyed some degree of autonomy, but the inhabitants of 
these islands could only exercise their democratic rights under the aegis of Congress. 
 The formation of the United Nations forced the United States to face its colonial 
past.  Chapter XI, Article 73 of the U.N. Charter initiated a move towards ending 
colonialism and reducing its legitimacy among western populations.  Following World 
War II, colonial powers were obligated to aid their territories in developing healthy 
governments, economies, educational systems, and infrastructures.  Basically, member 
states refused to recognize the right of the colonizer above the colonized.  Indigenous 
peoples possessed the natural right to live under a popularly supported government, and 
the colonial powers had to ensure the stability of countries emerging from their colonial 
territories before they withdrew.  Granted, this was a policy on paper.  Algeria, Angola, 
Vietnam, and Kenya often represented the violent process indigenous peoples had to 
endure to achieve their freedom. 
 To facilitate the process of decolonization and ensure that colonial powers 
fulfilled their obligations, U.N. member states authorized the creation of the trusteeship 
system.  Like the mandate system under the League of Nations, the colonies and 
territorial possessions of the Axis Powers went to Allied nations in trust.  England, 
France, America, and other colonial powers also had to place their territories on a list of 
non-self governing and trust territories.  The United States received a U.N. trusteeship of 
the “Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.”  Since the Philippines gained their 
independence in 1946, they were not listed.  Hawai’i, Alaska, American Samoa, and 
Puerto Rico did make the list, however.   This international classification of the insular 
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territories gave them a status equal to that of European colonies in Africa, Asia, and 
South America.  This threatened an American cultivated anti-colonial image as 
independence movements ripped through Africa and Southeast Asia.  In The Cold War 
and the Color Line:  American Race Relations in the Global Arena, Tim Borstelmann 
revealed the ways domestic racism complicated Cold War foreign policy.  With African 
Americans’ political freedoms denied by segregation codes, America could not claim a 
moral authority over the Soviet Union.  Moreover, it made competing with the 
communist state rather difficult in Africa.  The American system of freedom and 
democracy was hypocritical in the eyes of the colonized.19   
 In addition to affecting America’s image as an anti-colonial power, the trusteeship 
system threatened congressional control over its colonies.  The major powers debated 
over what cultures U.N. Charter, Chapter XI, Article 73, affected.  Nations like the Soviet 
Union and the U.S.A. supported the “salt water” theory.  This defined colonies as “being 
separated from the colonial power by a substantial body of water, preferably an ocean.”20  
These two nations recognized the threat decolonization posed to their national 
boundaries.  Within these large empires existed communities of indigenous peoples that 
maintained their separate, traditional cultures.  Should the U.N. Charter apply to these 
groups, they would have pockets of sovereign nations within their borders.  For the 
United States of America, imperium in imperio was pure blasphemy.  Britain, Belgium, 
and other colonial powers also recognized this.  Enforcing the salt water theory would 
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result in the loss of their empires while the U.S. and U.S.S.R. remained intact.  Finally, 
Belgium proposed an extended view of decolonization, essentially expanding the right of 
self-determination to all indigenous peoples.  Luckily for the United States and Russia, 
the Belgian thesis was never adopted as official U.N. policy.21 
 While the United Nations did not immediately affect Native Americans in their 
fight for self-determination, the relationship between the federal government and the 
insular territories, both incorporated and unincorporated, quickly came under the scrutiny 
of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.  Starting in 1946, the Trusteeship Council 
required that the United States, Britain, France, and other colonial powers submit reports 
on political, economic, health, educational, and cultural developments in their colonies 
and trust territories.  In addition to reports from the actual trustees, annual inspection 
tours comprised of U.N. representatives submitted information to the Security Council, 
Trusteeship Council, and General Assembly. 
 The United States of America faithfully provided detailed reports on its 
noncontiguous territories.  Included were economic, cultural, educational, and political 
goals and achievements for each island.  Describing each territory, the federal 
government made sure to inform the reader that the U.S.A. took its duties seriously.  
Guam, Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawai’i, the Virgin Islands, and Samoa all had protections in 
place to safeguard the civil rights of the indigenous inhabitants.  In terms of education, 
every territory had a system in place that not only provided sound, vocational instruction 
to the populace, but was also relayed to the masses through indigenous instructors.  The 
education the children received may not have prepared them for university life in the 
                                                 
21 For more information, see Morris, “International Law and Politics:  Toward a Right to Self-
Determination for Indigenous Peoples,” and Quincy Wright, “Recognition and Self-Determination,” 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 23 (1954):  23-36. 
118 
contiguous states; however, it gave them vital information on producing the goods and 
services necessary to their homelands.  Furthermore, the authors of the American reports 
constantly highlighted the national commitment to establish a proper infrastructure that 
would eventually lead to self-government.  For example, Guam and American Samoa 
were listed as unorganized territories.  In 1946, the U.S. Naval Military Government 
devised five objectives necessary for the reconstruction of Guam and Samoa after the 
Japanese occupation.  These efforts centered on physical reconstruction, improved health 
care, fostering “self-governing communities,” an economic program, and an education 
program designed to help islanders meet these objectives.  The stated purpose of this 
policy was the eventual granting of U.S. citizenship to all Guamanians and Samoans, thus 
including them within the political framework of the empire.22 
 While meeting the requirements established by the U.N. Charter for the 
improvement of trust and non-self-governing territories, the report on Guam and Samoa 
did not necessarily provide a time frame for complete independence from the United 
State of America.  Reports concerning Hawai’i, however, always included references 
towards the possibility of statehood.   The 1946 report to the Secretary-General provided 
information on various facets of human life, but it began with a statement contained in 
the Hawaiian territorial governor’s report to the Secretary of the Interior:   
  Hawaii, where the first blow of the Pacific War was struck, has devoted 
 every resource at its command to the production of that war.  The cost to Hawaii 
 in terms of expended resources, natural and human, recurring and non-recurring is 
 incalculable.  Its civilian population, swollen during three and one-half years of 
 war to a figure in excess of half a million, cheerfully shared with uncounted 
 thousands of  service men and women accommodations and facilities for human 
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 subsistence which in other times would have been considered intolerably 
 inadequate.23 
 
This report continued noting Hawaiians’ patience with military rule.  Although they 
experienced restricted civil liberties under military rule, they regained those liberties 
afterwards, and, one gathers from the short quote, they bore these restrictions with a 
sense of nationalism.   
In the following year, the U.S. provided a report even more upbeat than the first.  
It details the territorial government of Hawai’i.  Anyone reading the document could 
quickly discern the colonial nature of the government.  Yet, the authors of the report 
countered this colonial image with a section suggesting the possibility of statehood.  They 
noted that a congressional delegation to the islands declared in a report dated February 
15, 1938, that the Hawaiians met every qualification necessary for statehood, but the 
federal government needed a clear statement from the islanders that they desired 
inclusion into the Union.  This came in 1940 when 46,174 people voted in favor of 
statehood, 22,428 against.  By 1951, these reports clearly marked Hawai’i as on the verge 
of gaining statehood.  The islanders had called a constitutional convention, like citizens 
in the mainland territories did throughout the nineteenth century, which drafted the 
framework for the first American state government in the islands.  Finally, the United 
States issued its last U.N. report concerning Hawai’i on December 12, 1959.24 
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 Examining the reports concerning Hawai’i, Guam, Puerto Rico, Alaska, the 
Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, one notices a constant 
trend in each document.  The national government wanted to prove that they truly had the 
best interests of the islands at heart.  After the end of World War II, the United States 
vocally supported an end to colonialism, even though it funded French attempts to rebuild 
their colonial empire in Southeast Asia.  Also, it was not a secret that the U.S. Navy 
valued these islands as strategic bases within the Pacific Ocean.  This aspect of their non-
contiguous nature never lost its appeal to the military.  Just as Hawai’i and other islands 
projected American dominance during the early 1900s, it would do so again at mid-
century as the nation confronted their communist rivalries in Asia and Russia.  Still, these 
reports clearly set the Americans apart from their European allies.  They did not have vast 
tracks of land colonized.  The Guamanians and Samoans may have lived under U.S. 
Navy rule, but the Puerto Ricans, Alaskans, and Hawaiians had a larger degree of 
autonomy.  The colonial administrators carefully monitored health, sanitation, and 
education.  So why would the trusteeship pose a threat to Americans during the Cold 
War? 
 Every year, a delegation of U.N. representatives visited the trust and non-self-
governing territories.  After their review tour, the representatives submitted reports to the 
Secretary-General.  These documents, in addition to the reports voluntarily submitted by 
the administering nations, listed the conditions in the territories and were made available 
to the Security Council, Trusteeship Council, and General Assembly.  Any curious 
person could access them to reference the actions of the nation responsible for these 
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developing areas.  Moreover, the reports were analyzed by the Security Council, the 
members of which submitted commentaries on the behavior of the administering 
authority.  This is where the U.S.S.R. and other communist or nonaligned nations 
unsympathetic to the United States had an opportunity to link Americans with their 
imperial allies.  This provided a vulnerable spot in the Americans’ anti-colonial armor.25 
 For example, the American 1949 report on conditions in the Trust Territories of 
the Pacific Islands contained its standard information on educational, economic, cultural, 
and political developments.  Examining commentary on the contents reveals that the 
Soviet Union used the United States territorial system against the Americans.  The Soviet 
representative argued that Guam’s primary administrative center lay outside of the 
territory.  This made it very difficult for indigenous Guamanians to participate in 
governmental affairs.  Also, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean was the 
primary person responsible for governing the island.  After all, the U.S. Navy had 
jurisdiction over these islands.  In essence, this was not an effective means of promoting 
self-government within the islands.  The language used by the U.S.S.R. representative 
was not bellicose, yet it suggested that Americans were asserting a form of colonial 
control over the islands instead of preparing them for self-government.  Other 
representatives on the council, such as one from Iraq, suggested that this was simply a 
government that was left over from World War II.  Once Americans finished 
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reconstructing the islands infrastructure, they would no doubt initiate policies aimed at 
providing self-government.26   
 The nuclear testing during the late 1940s and early 1950s provided rival nations 
an additional opportunity to question American motives towards their insular 
possessions.  Since the United States of America was the administering authority 
responsible for preparing an island and its people for self-government, it appeared 
hypocritical that they would make the land inhospitable from nuclear fallout, especially 
when the Department of Defense conducted these experiments without the consent of the 
indigenous people.   
 By August of 1956, U.N. member states and local leaders had already voiced 
opposition to further nuclear tests in American controlled Pacific Islands.  Prior to 
nuclear tests conducted in the spring of 1956, the Marshallese had petitioned the United 
States to stop any further testing in the area.  They were well informed of the problems 
suffered by the people residing on Bikini and Eniwetok after naval experiments.  The 
American administering authority, however, refused to respect the Marshallese request.  
According to a report submitted by visiting U.N. representatives, President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower had full knowledge that the islanders desired the cessation of nuclear testing.  
In his response, Eisenhower placed more value on national defense.  Without a treaty 
between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. guaranteeing nuclear disarmament, the federal 
government argued it had no other choice than continuing the tests.  Eisenhower did not 
view this line of thought as selfish.  According to him, “the [United States] had a 
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responsibility not only to its people but to all the peoples of the free world to maintain at 
a maximum its capacity to deter aggression and preserve peace.”27   
 Comparing the Hawaiian experience with that of the Marshallese, non-contiguity 
was disadvantageous to the residents of the islands.  Both Hawai’i and the Marshall 
Islands were declared strategically necessary to the defense of the United States of 
America during the Cold War.  The U.S. Navy could use them for training ground, 
operations, and other purposes.  Also, both territories experienced a period of naval 
dominance over their civilian affairs.  The Hawaiians experienced this during World War 
II.  Marshall Islanders lived under military rule from World War II until the late 1970s.  
However, Hawai’i’s population, its popularity as a haven for tourists and its status as an 
incorporated territory spared it the pains of nuclear testing.  Granted, the testing of 
conventional weapons in the islands proved problematic for all Hawaiians.  The U.S. 
Navy used Kaho’olawe during their bombardment exercises.  For Kānakas, Kaho’olawe 
held deep spiritual and historical importance.  When Native Hawaiian activism 
reemerged after statehood, ending naval training exercises was a top priority among the 
people.  In viewing the environmental inequalities suffered by these cultures, one sees a 
shared experience.  While the Department of Defense never subjected Kānakas to 
radiation or nuclear testing, it threatened their cultural inheritance with conventional 
weaponry.  One can attribute this to the noncontiguous nature of the islands.  Separated 
from the continent by thousands of miles, Americans were less likely to raise a fuss over 
“necessary” weapons testing than they were if it occurred in the borders of their own 
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states.  Moreover, the islands and their people resided beyond their borders, far from 
public awareness. 
 The United States of America also discovered the disadvantages of controlling 
non-contiguous territories following World War II.  As decolonization movements swept 
throughout Africa and Southeast Asia, and the nonalignment movement roused people in 
undeveloped nations against economic and military domination by foreign powers, 
reports to the United Nations Trusteeship Council threatened Americans’ anti-colonial 
image.  Americans had tried to present itself as a bastion of democracy, but descriptions 
of naval rule in Guam, Samoa, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Ocean prevented 
them from successfully doing so.  The Security Council gave the Russians a perfect 
podium from which to highlight the colonial nature of American insular possessions as an 
example of their colonial nature.  Moreover, the inclusion of their possessions on the list 
of non-self-governing territories would eventually force Americans to one day redefine 
their status.  Either they would need to provide full independence, or they would have to 
find an alternate solution.   
In the end, Americans followed both paths.  For Hawai’i, they granted statehood.  
There existed a significant white settler population in the archipelago.  Other inhabitants 
descended from Pacific Rim countries had proven their loyalty during World War II and 
thereby had sacrificed much for the right to be American citizens.  Also, the islands had a 
history of constitutional government.  They formed their earlier political and legal 
systems from the English and the Americans.  Economically, they had much to offer the 
nation.  In the end, the historical relationship between Hawai’i and the United States 
made Hawai’i too valuable to lose.   
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The other insular possessions, on the other hand, were not so lucky.  Non-
contiguity, in conjunction with racial and economic matters, prevented their full inclusion 
into the American political system.  While their inhabitants received citizenship, their 
territorial status prevented them from sending a representative to sit in the Senate.  Some 
of the territories gained independence by the 1970s, but others, like Puerto Rico, 
remained attached to the United States under the label of “Commonwealth.”   
 Reviewing the role of contiguity in Hawai’i and the insular possession, one sees 
the way in which territorial non-contiguity affected the federal-territorial relationship.  
First, the distance separating the continental states and insular possessions gave them a 
sense of “otherness” to Americans.  They were the lands outside of the national 
boundaries bordered by the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans to the west and east, as well as 
Canada and Mexico to the north and south.  If anything, some Americans disdained 
national policy that marked these places as American property.  This aspect of non-
contiguity remained with Hawaiians throughout the statehood process, acting as one of 
the primary obstacles the islanders faced.  Second, their global positions made these 
possessions valuable.  The Philippines, Guam, Samoa, and Hawai’i provided the United 
States Navy with bases from which they could project American power into Asia, 
Australia, and the far eastern edges of Russia.  American corporations also found these 
commerce lanes useful when opening new markets in the Pacific Rim.   
Finally, the United Nations Charter, Trusteeship Council policies, and 
independence movements forced American policymakers to reconsider the association of 
the federal government with these territories.  In 1947, Senator Hugh Alfred Butler, 
Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, received a preliminary report 
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on the status of American Pacific possessions.  In the opening pages of the report, the 
author described the transfer of sovereignty from the Navy Department to civil authorities 
under Executive Order No. 10077.  According to this document, the Secretaries of Army, 
State, Navy, and Interior recommended this move to President Truman.  The increasing 
international interest in the administration of U.N. trust territories and non-self-governing 
territories was paramount in this decision.28  With the era of European colonialism and 
American expansion gone, the U.S. was left with the option of statehood or self-
government. 
 
 
28 Mills Astin, Chief Clerk of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to Hugh Alfred Butler, U.S. 
Senator, 24 January 1950, Hugh Alfred Butler Papers, MS-235, Box 217, “Interior and Insular Affairs, 
1950-1951,” Nebraska State Historical Society.  The report is attached to this letter in Butler’s files. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
PACIFIC ISLANDERS, NATIVE AMERICANS, AND AMERICAN  
 
COLONIALISM 
 
Three areas are crucial in comparing the history of Native Hawaiians with 
indigenous peoples in the American West and insular territories.  Most important is the 
loss of indigenous sovereignty.  From here, all other concerns originate.  The loss of 
Native sovereignty is unique to each area in what becomes the United States.  Richard 
Drinnon argued in Facing West:  The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building 
that American policy towards indigenous peoples originated with the first English 
settlements and evolved with the westward march of American civilization.1  But 
subsequent incorporations of lands deflect this British-centric view.  Other European 
colonial powers—Spain, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Russia—opted in various 
ways to restrain and attack Native sovereignty, and they influenced American actions.  
The construction of the American empire also relied on the creation of an “Indian 
Policy,” ultimately geared toward the destruction of indigenous ways of life.  While the 
federal policies towards First Peoples of North America, the Hawaiian Islands, and the 
insular territories shared a common origin, indigenous peoples experienced the process of 
conquest differently.  On the continent, Native Americans lost sovereignty through war 
and dishonored treaties.  The white settler society in Hawai’i gradually brought the 
islands and Native Hawaiians under the dominion of the American empire through 
                                                 
1 Richard Drinnon, Facing West:  The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1990), xi-xix, xxi-xxx.  Although the preface and introduction lay out the 
structure and basic argument of the work, the entire point that American racism in the construction of the 
American Empire is tied to the racial conflicts with Native Americans is quite convincing.  Needless to say, 
this study is crucial for students examining American imperialism, as well as the origins of American 
genocide in the West. 
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political maneuvering, while South Pacific Islanders came under American rule through 
diplomatic negotiations among various colonial powers. 
 After conquest the subjected populations experienced different manifestations of a 
common policy towards indigenous cultures.  Until the 1860s to 1880s, politicians 
followed the Jeffersonian policy of keeping Native Americans isolated from the capitalist 
system.  With the advent of President Ulysses S. Grant’s Peace Policy, reformers and 
humanitarians reformulated American Indian policy to incorporate indigenous peoples 
into the economy once they assimilated the American ethos towards private property and 
individual acquisitiveness.  To achieve these ends, American agents took Native children 
to live in boarding schools so that they would forget their parents’ culture.  Taken east to 
Carlisle Indian School, Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute, or other assimilation 
facilities, children were prohibited from contacting their relatives, parents, and friends on 
the reservation in hopes that they would forever lose any knowledge of their childhood 
cultures.  Back on the reservations, Native Americans suffered because of a corrupt, 
inefficient, and deadly Indian policy.  The adult population lacked any serious economic 
opportunities.  To compensate for the lack of purchasing power among adults and 
inadequate food sources available on the reservations, federal agents doled out annuities 
and rations, sometimes withholding them to enforce the will of the federal government.  
The Dawes Act ended the reservation policy by forcing residents onto individual plots in 
hopes of transforming them into farmers and workers.   
 Losing sovereignty over their homelands seriously affected indigenous economies 
well into the twentieth century.  American Indian policy caused incalculable hardship and 
suffering among urban and reservation communities.  After World War II, the federal 
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government attempted to shirk its responsibilities towards the First Peoples during the 
Termination Program, an inconsistent policy that left indigenous peoples destitute by the 
mid-1960s.  With the expansion of the American economy in the post-World War II era 
came a desire to open natural resources on indigenous lands to corporate development.  
This goal was achieved in one of two ways.  First, agreements between the private 
business and tribal governments provided industry with valuable resources while 
providing limited employment on destitute reservations.  Second, terminated tribal 
governments usually had to sell their landholdings.  As in the case of the Menominees 
and Klamaths, larger firms benefitted from the opportunity to purchase indigenous lands 
rich with natural resources at bargain prices.  Although First Peoples experienced short-
term benefits from these transactions, they oftentimes suffered in the long-term. 
 On the surface, American policy towards the Pacific Islanders appeared different 
from Native American policy, and yet all Native peoples experienced land loss.  After 
conquest, the inhabitants of Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territories of the 
Pacific Islands retained most of their traditional homelands, and the Naval Department 
established vocational schools and prevented the encroachment of private enterprise into 
the islands.  In comparison with the Native Americans, it would appear that South Pacific 
Islanders fared better.  However, naval base construction and nuclear experiments on 
South Pacific atolls rendered entire island chains uninhabitable.  Clearly, the drive to 
displace indigenous populations from economically viable or strategic lands and 
incorporating them into the global economy remained a mainstay in overseas colonial 
policy.  One could say that the US government recreated a reservation system in the 
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South Pacific Ocean, since many islands themselves were transformed into floating 
reservations isolated from the public eye. 
 In contrast to Native Americans, the Kānaka experienced the policy of 
termination over forty years prior to its implementation in the mainland.  Beginning with 
the Great Mahele of 1848, the monarchy and their American “advisors” slowly 
transformed the Native Hawaiian economy into a capitalist system based on the 
American model.  Scholars often perceive the Great Mahele of 1848 largely as a failure.  
Kamehameha III wanted to care for the economic needs of his subjects, but large portions 
of royal land went to settlers and foreign businesses.  They, in turn, used this land to 
amass political and financial power at the expense of the Kānaka.  Like Native 
Americans, Kānaka were pushed into an alien economic system in which they lacked the 
financial resources to compete.  The Hawaiian Homes Commission made another attempt 
at reestablishing a Native Hawaiian agricultural economy in 1920 by placing Native 
Hawaiians back on the land; however, the valuable land once again fell into the hands of 
sugar plantations, pineapple companies, wealthy landowners, or hotel owners.  Needless 
to say, when annexation occurred in 1898, lawmakers saw no need to institute a 
reservation system or Hawaiian boarding schools or official recognition since Native 
Hawaiians were already acquainted with American capitalism.  Instead, Kānaka were 
immediately thrust into the economy.  Native Hawaiian communities became 
marginalized in the expanding tourist industry and agribusiness.   
 Control over their ancestral homes became crucial to the survival of Native 
Americans, Kānaka, and South Pacific Islanders in the twentieth century.  The Pacific 
territories of Guam, the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), and American 
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Samoa escaped the great land grab of American settlers.  United States policy regarding 
these islands preserved the indigenous rights to the land.  Instead of opening the islands 
to extensive economic competition, the Naval Department prohibited white settlement in 
the islands during the early 1900s.  This did not come without a price.  In addition to the 
continued military presence in the region and the absence of democratic institutions, the 
Administering Authority used the land to benefit American interests.  For example, the 
victory of communist forces in China changed American policy in Asia.  Without Chiang 
Kai-sheck acting as a bulwark against the U.S.S.R., the Truman Administration had to 
turn to Japan as its primary ally in the region.  In 1949 U.S. military authorities in Tokyo 
authorized the mining of phosphates in the islands, transforming the South Pacific into a 
storehouse of natural resources for Japanese industry.  That year alone the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Forces in Japan, Douglas MacArthur, authorized the shipment 
of 148,000 tons of phosphate to Japan to aid in the rebuilding of its industrial base.  
Although the shipment was worth at least $1,480,000, the islanders only received twenty-
five cents per ton ($37,000) in royalties. 2   
 Here, one sees the colonial nature of America in the Pacific Ocean.  World War II 
may have destroyed the military power of the Japanese Empire, but it retained its 
economic and strategic importance in Asia as one of the few nations with viable 
industries.  Suddenly, American policymakers found themselves faced with the dilemma 
of securing natural resources for the rejuvenated Japanese economy, a problem that 
originally had lead the Japanese Empire to its aggressive policy of military expansion in 
the first place.  The TTPI once again became a source of exploitation for the Japanese 
                                                 
2 See United Nations Security Council, S/1358, 29 July 1949, 8, 13. 
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economy, only this time regional resources were exploited under the direction of its 
liberator.3   
 In Hawai’i, tourism became the next greatest business venture following World 
War II.  With more Americans aware of the islands’ scenic attractions and the growth of 
commercial aviation, tourists came in increasing numbers.  Here a comparison of Native 
American casinos and Hawaiian tourism provides interesting results.  While Native 
Americans found new economic opportunities in catering to Americans’ desire for games 
of chance starting in the late 1970s, Native Hawaiians did not benefit from the growing 
tourism industry.  Instead of becoming investors in the new industry or shaping its 
development, the Kānaka Maoli became another the commodity for the tourist industry.  
As Haunani-Kay Trask, a leading Native Hawaiian activist and scholar, writes:   
In Hawai’i, the destruction of our land and the prostitution of our culture is 
planned and executed by multinational corporations (both foreign-based and 
Hawai’i-based), by huge landowners (such as the missionary-descended Castle & 
Cook of Dole Pineapple fame), and by collaborationist state and county 
governments.  The ideological gloss that claims tourism to be our economic 
savior and the “natural” result of Hawaiian culture is manufactured by ad agencies 
(such as the state-supported Hawai’i Visitors Bureau) and tour companies (many 
of which are owned by the airlines) and spewed out to the public through 
complicitous cultural engines such as film, television and radio, and the daily 
newspaper.4 
 
Within the tourist industry, promoters twisted Native Hawaiian culture into an alluring 
package intended to attract tourists.  Marketing Kānaka traditions has had a long lasting 
impact as Native Hawaiian culture in addition to Hawaiian landscapes remain at the core 
of the tourist industry.  Just as Native Americans fight to regain their cultural property 
                                                 
3 See Thomas J. McCormack, America’s Half-Century:  United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and 
After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 57, for more information on the role of 
Japan in post-World War II Asia. 
4 Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter:  Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai’i, rev. ed.  
(Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 137. 
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and identities, the Kanaka Maoli fight for control over their cultural identity from an 
industry that has become the mainstay of a predominately non-indigenous Hawaiian 
economy. 
 Finally, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders alike suffered environmental 
inequalities generated by post-World War II military policy.  The story starts in the 
southwestern United States.  From Native American lands, the military mined the 
uranium necessary for atomic bombs.  First Peoples suffered from the mining detritus and 
nuclear fallout as a result of nuclear production and testing.  In Hawai’i, the US Navy and 
Army confiscated Kānaka lands for bases.  Kaho’olawe, a place of great cultural 
importance for Native Hawaiians, became a stationary target for vessels of war.  Lastly, it 
was a staging point for military drills and operations in the Pacific Ocean.  From Hawai’i, 
the Navy shipped atomic bombs and scientists vital to the nuclear tests conducted in the 
southern Pacific Islands. 
 Born of a formidable imperial parent, Great Britain, America has fostered 
imperial ambitions since its formation.  The framers of the U.S. Constitution, early 
presidents and statesmen, economists and preachers, and the average citizens of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often embraced the notion of a republican empire.  As 
supporters of this vision, they accepted the fact that an empire requires the “forcible 
subjugation of formerly independent peoples by a wholly external power.”5  Throughout 
North America and the Hawaiian Islands, indigenous peoples fought to preserve their 
sovereignty and cultures while halting the United States’ slow progression to the Pacific 
Ocean.  By 1890, the last formal resistance of North American First Peoples fell in a 
                                                 
5 William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life, introduction by Andrew Bacevich (New York:  Ig 
Publishing, 2007; First published 1980 by Oxford University Press), 13.  
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cloud of smoke at Wounded Knee Creek, and although Native Americans would rise 
again to assert their right to self-government at Alcatraz Island in 1965 and the takeover 
of Wounded Knee village in 1973, many historians consider the Massacre at Wounded 
Knee to be the symbolic end of indigenous geo-political sovereignty in the United 
States.6  In Hawai’i, the overthrow of Queen Lili’uokalani in 1893 by the so-called 
Committee of Safety marked the end of Kānaka sovereignty in the Hawaiian Islands.   
 Throughout the twentieth century, sovereignty, land, and culture played major 
roles in the histories of Kānaka, Native Americans, and South Pacific Islanders.  By the 
post-World War II era, their struggles against an aggressive, imperialist power of the 
nineteenth century, changed into a movement to reclaim them from one of the two major 
superpowers locked in the middle of a Cold War.  While this chapter will address some 
of the attempts by Native Hawaiians, North American indigenous peoples, and South 
Pacific Islanders to retain their traditions and values, it will mainly focus on an 
examination of the struggles by indigenous peoples in the United States for their 
sovereignty and land, as well as the environmental consequences of American 
imperialism in the Twentieth Century. 
 For Native Americans, sovereignty was lost to the American nation in sheets of 
paper and clouds of lead.  American policy toward First Peoples was never uniform.  In 
fact, the only thing consistent about federal Indian policy is its inconsistency.  American 
Indian policy began as negotiations between equals.  Emerging from the Revolutionary 
War, the nation suffered from debt, instability, and division.  Congress under the Articles 
of Confederation was a weak institution.  Fearing the creation of a strong, centralized 
                                                 
6 We recognize the continuing struggles of indigenous peoples to regain their sovereignty.  However, 
Wounded Knee is seen as the final blow dealt by the federal government to subjugate the First Peoples of 
the nation. 
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government, the states intentionally limited powers of the federal government.  At the 
same time, they delegated to Congress the responsibility for treating with Native 
Americans and maintaining peace between indigenous and settler communities.  After 
demarcating the borders between American and Native settlements, the federal 
government sometimes tried to preserve the peace by preventing white settlement on 
indigenous lands.  This was a difficult task considering settlers’ rampant desire in the 
future states for indigenous lands.  Recognizing their vulnerability during and following 
the war, Congress and some individual states entered into treaty negotiations in an 
attempt to solidify the boundaries between American regions of settlement and Native 
lands.  This is not to suggest that Americans were always vindictive in the negotiations.  
Having supported the revolution, Tuscaroras and Oneidas received decent terms 
following the American Revolution.  The remaining tribes of the Iroquois Confederation, 
however, did not.7 
 Congressional restraint towards First Peoples was fleeting.   The United States, 
after all, had imperial ambitions.  Expansion and settlement was the modus vivendi of 
Americans.  As Colin G. Calloway notes in One Vast Winter Count, the Northwest 
Ordinance presaged things to come in national Indian policy.  Although the blueprint for 
the Ohio River Valley promised to respect Native American rights to their lands, the 
development of new settler communities was the thrust of the Northwest Ordinance.8  
From 1790 to 1834, Congress passed a series of bills that served as the foundation for the 
legislative assault on Native sovereignty in all American territories.  The next major 
                                                 
7 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father:  The United States Government and the American Indians, 
unabridged (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 40-50; and Colin G. Calloway, One Vast 
Winter Count:  The Native American West before Lewis and Clark, History of the American West Series, 
ed. Richard W. Etulain (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press,2003), 371-376. 
8 Calloway, One Vast Winter Count, 373. 
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evolution occurred in the 1850s when congressmen and bureaucrats created a reservation 
system to facilitate national expansion into the American West. 
 Beginning with the first trade and intercourse law in 1790, Congress tried to limit 
the occasions for conflict between whites and Natives by monitoring interaction between 
the two groups and by requiring all persons engaged in commerce with indigenous 
peoples to apply for a license.  By doing so, Congress ensured that only authorized, 
respectable traders could come in contact with indigenous communities.  American 
statesmen hoped that this would end, or at least curb, the abuse of First Peoples by 
unscrupulous traders and in the process reduce the possibility of conflict.  The act also 
prohibited private American citizens from purchasing land from Native Americans.  By 
controlling all land transactions, Congress could pace expansion in such a way that 
Native Americans would not feel threatened by white advancement into the interior and 
prevent fraudulent land deals from reigniting warfare along the borders.9 
 From 1790 to 1834, congressmen periodically renewed, updated, and amended 
these trade laws as frontier conditions dictated.  In 1793, the new Trade and Intercourse 
Act further delineated the boundaries between white-indigenous settlements.  An 1802 
statute attempted to stop traders from selling whiskey to Native Americans.  This 
congressional action received popular support given the deleterious effects liquor had on 
Native communities, economies, and cultures.  Finally, Congress passed an 1834 version 
during an overhaul of the entire Indian Department in an attempt to formalize and 
rationalize Indian policy.  In addition to transferring Indian affairs to the new Department 
of the Interior, congressional action formed the post of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to oversee and execute congressional policy.  The Trade and Intercourse Act of 
                                                 
9 Prucha, The Great Father, 90. 
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1834 added to this process by:  1) recognizing formally the boundaries of lands under 
Native American sovereignty as defined by the multitude of treaties between indigenous 
nations and the federal government, 2) continuing the licensing system and placing it 
under the supervision of federal field agents, and 3) expanding U.S. national interests in 
Native American affairs by acting as a mediator in inter-Native American conflicts.  
There was also an attempt to create an “Indian state,” but opposition in Congress quickly 
defeated this idea.10 
The trade and intercourse laws were instrumental in eroding Native American 
sovereignty.  According to Francis Paul Prucha, the “laws were not primarily ‘Indian’ 
laws, for they touched the Indians only indirectly.  The legislation, rather, was directed 
against lawless whites and sought to restrain them from violating the sacred treaties.”11  
This analysis is correct in that the letter of the law was aimed at American citizens.  Other 
historians offer alternative analyses that have linked the trade and intercourse acts to the 
overall process of destroying Native American sovereignty.  As part of a larger process 
aimed at assimilating indigenous culture with Anglo-American education, trade, and 
culture, the trade and intercourse acts directly affected Native rights by limiting their 
trade with Americans and other nations.12 
Indian Removal was the next major onslaught on Native American sovereignty.  
The notoriety of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 is legendary and requires little 
additional analysis.  Needless to say, it was passed under the aegis of Andrew Jackson, a 
president with no compunction against forcibly taking lands from indigenous nations.  
                                                 
10 Prucha, The Great Father, 293-309. 
11 Prucha, The Great Father, 92. 
12 John R. Wunder, “Retained by The People”:  A History of the American Indians and the Bill of Rights 
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 1994), 21-23. 
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Prior to this presidency, the federal government had experience in seizing indigenous 
land either through force or the threat of force.  In the years following the American 
Revolutionary War, white settlers quickly seized Native American territory.  Some lands 
were conquered by militiamen; others were left vacant when Native American refugees 
fled the fighting.  After the smoke of war cleared, settlers, speculators, and squatters 
claimed these areas as vacant land open for settlement.13   
Why was Indian Removal important in terms of federal policy towards Native 
peoples?  Indian Removal broke from the previous policy of obtaining lands as need 
dictated.  The Indian Removal Act initiated a national program in which federal agents 
actively sought the total removal of indigenous nations from within state borders or in 
close proximity to future settlement.  Whereas post-Revolutionary War treaties were 
more akin to national purchases of smaller segments of land to accommodate settlement, 
Indian Removal was the process of emptying national lands of indigenous peoples, often 
under the threat of force.  In short, Indian Removal introduced a new vein of genocide 
into American Indian policy. 
Finally, the reservation system was unquestionably directed at undermining 
Native American sovereignty.  The origins of this system did not begin on a specific date.  
The reservation system, like other elements of American Indian policy, developed over 
time.  Some of the earliest proposals to relocate indigenous populations emerged during 
the presidencies of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.  Placed on their new 
lands, the federal government would assist in the education and “civilization” of 
                                                 
13 See Calloway, One Vast Winter Count, 371-372, for information regarding the seizure of indigenous 
lands during and immediately after the Revolutionary War.  This process was not unlike that seen during 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1848 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Palestinians fled their homes during 
the fighting, only to find them occupied after the conflict ended. 
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relocated tribes.  Although this was never fully developed during the Early Republic, its 
basic tenets appeared in legislation such as the trade and intercourse acts.14   
The reservation system was fully developed by the decades following Indian 
Removal.  Relocating Native nations to the Trans-Mississippi West sufficed until settlers 
developed an interest in lands located in Texas, Oregon, Nebraska, Utah, and California. 
As American expansion took the nation into lands supporting transplanted indigenous 
peoples, leaders in the Office in Indian Affairs had to reevaluate their approach to 
assimilation.  Under commissioners Luke Lea and George W. Manypenny, with the 
assistance of Charles E. Mix, policy shifted from forcefully removing indigenous nations 
to lands outside the limits of white settlement to placing them on “small parcels of land 
‘reserved’ out of the original holding of the tribes or bands” where American agents 
would assist in the transformation of indigenous culture to a capitalistic, agrarian society 
modeled after the United States.15 
Although the trade and intercourse acts and reservation system implemented 
American policy towards Native Americans, they were not enough to conquer indigenous 
homelands.  Americans relied on violence, or the threat of violence, to force First Peoples 
to submit to the law.  As Robert M. Utley once wrote, Native Americans “posed a 
practical problem that had to be dealt with.  About [the Native American’s] ultimate fate 
none disagreed:  progress demanded his destruction along with the wilderness.  About the 
means of his destruction, however, there was disagreement.  He could either be destroyed 
                                                 
14 Prucha, The Great Father, 90-93. 
15 Prucha, The Great Father, 317.  For information regarding the events of this transformation, see pages 
323-328. 
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outright by killing or, consistent with the tenets of progress, elevated from savagery to 
civilization.”16   
From the 1850s to the 1890s, the federal government used a combination of 
treaties and wars to secure access to the West.  Treaties promised Native Americans 
annuities, land, education, and security to relinquish claims to prime agricultural, 
pastoral, and mineral resources.  War ensured that the Native nations would accept a 
treaty. 
Of course, treaties lasted only so long as Americans remained uninterested in 
Native American lands.  For example, the Treaty of Ft. Laramie (1868) ended hostilities 
between Lakotas led by Red Cloud and the U.S. Army over the Bozeman Trail.  News of 
Lt. Col. George A. Custer’s discovery of gold in the Black Hills of South Dakota 
shattered the tenuous peace six years later as Americans rushed to the spiritual center of 
Northern Plains indigenous nations.  There, they established illegal mining operations 
and towns.  Instead of forcefully closing these squatter settlements, the American 
government authorized the use of force to wrest these lands from the Sioux.  In other 
cases, Native Americans grew disillusioned with the reservation system.  In 1874, 
Kiowas and Comanches residing on the Ft. Sill Reservation in Indian Territory grew 
weary of reservation life after 5 years.  That year, some of their warriors left Ft. Sill and 
joined the Quahadi Comanches in the last act of armed resistance by the Comanches and 
Kiowas on the Southern Plains. 
The regulation of trade between indigenous and white populations, removal to 
inferior lands outside of white settlement, and confinement to reservations to undergo 
                                                 
16 Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque:  University of 
New Mexico Press, 1984), 35. 
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forced assimilation assumed primary concern for Native Americans until national 
legislators passed the General Allotment Act of 1887.17 Under this law, Congress 
authorized the President to divide up the reservation lands among the inhabitants.  
Married occupants received one hundred sixty acres of land, and unmarried persons over 
eighteen and orphans received eighty acres.  Lands remaining after the division were 
opened to non-Indian settlement.  The statute also granted American citizenship to Native 
Americans who received lands under this act.18  Politicians and humanitarians hoped that 
by dividing the reservations and granting Native Americans citizenship the process of 
assimilation would accelerate by disrupting the communal nature of tribal society. 
Sentiment among politicians and humanitarians moved away from the existing 
allotment approach to U.S.-Native American relations by the late 1800s.  Perceiving the 
reservation system as a flawed tool for assimilating Native peoples, they believed the 
General Allotment Act would force Native Americans into the capitalist marketplace, a 
good development.  Although it succeeded in fracturing tribal lands, opening territory to 
white settlement, and severely disrupting indigenous society, the legislation did not 
produce the desired reform results.  By the Great Depression, allotment was judged a 
failure, and new reformers led by John Collier reconstructed Native nations with the 
Indian Reorganization Act.  Passed in 1934, this law allowed indigenous peoples to 
reconstruct tribal governments with greater degrees of self-government.  Instead of 
assaulting Native cultures, John Collier wanted to preserve indigenous lifestyles and 
reinstitute dialogue between Congress and tribal governments.  Although Collier did not 
                                                 
17 Also referred to as the Dawes Severalty Act. 
18 An act to provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the various reservations, and to 
extend the protection of the laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians, and for other 
purposes, chap. 119, U.S. Statutes at Large (1887) 388-391. 
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achieve everything that he wanted,19 the Howard-Wheeler Act included provisions 
allowing for the reconstruction of tribal governments, ending allotment, and granting 
funds under the Secretary of the Interior for tribal economic development.20 
The final assault on Native American sovereignty and culture, however, was a 
product of the post-World War II era.  From 1947 to 1949, former President Herbert 
Hoover chaired the U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government, with Secretary of State Dean Acheson as vice chairman.  Dubbed the 
“Hoover Commission,” Hoover and his associates examined ways to reduce operating 
costs in the executive branch.  After two years of extensive investigation, the committee 
produced The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of 
the Government.  Within this publication, committee members made recommendations 
aimed at rationalizing the executive bureaucracy and reducing expenditures in the 
process. 
The report included recommendations on streamlining each executive department, 
including the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  The Commission estimated that the executive 
department spent roughly $40,000,000 on Native Americans every year.  Taken out of a 
federal budget of $40,000,000,000, appropriations for indigenous programs accounted for 
1/1000 of total annual federal expenditures.  This averaged out to almost $100 per Native 
American.  Moreover, the Commission concluded that programs aimed at alleviating 
                                                 
19 Note that this was a unilateral effort undertaken by John Collier and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  As 
John Wunder notes in “Retained by The People,” this unilateral decision making process was very much a 
continuation of past approaches to Indian policy. 
20 Wunder, “Retained by The People,” 61-71; David H. Getches and Charles F. Wilkinson, eds, Federal 
Indian Law:  Cases and Materials, 2nd ed., American Casebook Series (St. Paul:  West Publishing Co., 
1986), 122-127.  For a more complete history of the Indian Reorganization Act, see Vine Deloria, Jr. and 
Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within:  The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (Austin:  
University of Texas Press, 1984).  This book not only provides the reader with a thorough narrative on the 
history of the Indian Reorganization Bill, it also includes a side-by-side comparison of the Collier Bill and 
the Howard-Wheeler Bill in the appendix. 
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problems in indigenous communities were ineffective.  Poverty, malnutrition, illness, and 
unemployment still plagued Native populations.  Committee members attributed this to 
the cessation of allotment.  Transforming Native Americans into independent citizens 
who did not rely on federal largesse presented the best option to rehabilitate tribal 
members.  The commission viewed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) as only 
propping up antiquated tribal governments that lacked the ability to care for their 
people.21  Since the Hoover Commission was charged with finding financially 
burdensome or nonviable government programs and recommending action to either 
streamline, reform, or end them, an inefficient and unsuccessful Bureau of Indian Affairs 
became the perfect target. 
To resolve the growing social problems and rationalize the administration of 
Native American affairs, the Commission made a number of recommendations.  The first 
outlined the basic approach the federal government took in fulfilling its obligations to 
Native inhabitants of the United States.  “Our task force on Indian Affairs, supported by a 
considerable body of thought both inside and outside the Government, advocates 
progressive measures to integrate the Indians into the rest of the population as the best 
solution of ‘the Indian Problem.’  In the opinion of the Commission this policy should be 
the keystone of the organization and of the activities of the Federal Government in the 
field of Indian Affairs.”22  The IRA of 1934 reversed the assault on tribal governments.  
Now, the Hoover Commission advocated a return to pre-IRA policies.  After making this 
recommendation, the Hoover Commission outlined a plan of action.  In devising future 
                                                 
21 U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, The Hoover Commission 
Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (New York:  McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1949), 463-465 [hereafter referred to as The Hoover Commission Report]. 
22 The Hoover Commission Report, 465. 
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Native American policies, the federal government needed to insure that every American 
Indian receive adequate educational and medical services, as well as a standard of living 
equal to that enjoyed by the rest of the nation.   Instead of tribal governments directing 
affairs over tribal lands and their occupants, Native American resources and property 
should be transferred to “Indian-owned corporations.”23  Collier’s plan for Indian 
reorganization already included provisions for such economic entities, so what made this 
idea unique?  The cornerstone of the Hoover Commission Report was the transfer of all 
Native Americans to state jurisdiction after the consolidation of tribal assets into 
corporations.  In other words, Hoover’s team recommended the end of federal 
stewardship over Indian affairs and the incorporation of reservation inhabitants to state 
control, thus blending America’s First Peoples into the mass of society.24 
Within the pages of the Hoover Commission Report, the committee members 
wrote the cold, hard ideology that served as the core of the Termination Program.  It 
meshed with the Cold War logic of conformity, efficiency, and Americanism permeating 
the Eisenhower and Truman administrations.  In an era where the treatment of First 
Peoples served as an embarrassing blemish in a history that Americans used to justify 
their worldwide claims to moral superiority, the existence of impoverished, 
malnourished, racial, and national minorities within the borders of the United States 
worked against the nation in foreign affairs.  Coming out of the Second World War, 
Americans, and some Native Americans, believed that all citizens should enjoy in the 
post-wartime prosperity.  In the eyes of men like Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Senator Arthur V. 
                                                 
23 The Hoover Commission Report, 467. 
24 The Hoover Commission Report, 466-467. 
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Watkins of Utah (Republican), the Indian Reorganization Act and its tribal governments 
prevented indigenous communities from partaking in the national prosperity of the 1950s 
which, in turn, affected American society as a whole.25 
Although the House and Senate passed a number of bills implementing the 
Termination Program, two pieces of legislation were crucial.  First, House Concurrent 
Resolution 108, passed in July of 1953, terminated the federal-tribal relationship for “the 
Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Klamaths of Oregon, the Menominees of Wisconsin, the 
Potawatomis of Kansas . . . and the Chippewas located on the Turtle Mountain 
Reservation in North Dakota.”26  This resolution marked the beginning of the renewed 
assault on indigenous governments, economies, and homelands.  Throughout the 1950s, 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, congressmen, and other federal agents persuaded or coerced 
indigenous nations into relinquishing their right to self-government, consolidating tribal 
property into corporations, and selling valuable natural resources.  As in the case of the 
Menominee and Klamath Nations, the revenue received from land sales cost the people 
long-term economic security.  House Concurrent Resolution 108 worked in concert with 
Public Law 280, signed by President Eisenhower on August 15, 1953, which placed 
Native Americans living in California, Nebraska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin 
under state jurisdiction of the law.  By severing their legal relationship with the federal 
government, indigenous people became citizens of their respective states.  To advance 
this process further, the federal government also initiated the Relocation policy to move 
young Native Americans from the reservation to urban centers, thus scattering their 
communities and social networks.  In places like Chicago, Native Americans were left to 
                                                 
25 Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation:  Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960 (1986; Albuquerque:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1990), 63-77, 91-96. 
26 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 97. 
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scratch a living in menial jobs in an effort to realize the American dream, an illusion 
unattainable to minorities in pre-Civil Rights America.27 
Returning to the Hoover Commission Report, the text included a section on “The 
Indian Population,” which defined the “term ‘Indian’ as . . . all persons of Indian descent 
who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all 
persons who are descendants of such members who were on June 1, 1934, residing within 
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other 
persons of one-half or more Indian blood.”28  This phrasing reveals the perceptions of 
Americans toward indigenous persons under their control.  The nation had a 
responsibility toward Native Americans living within the continental U.S. and Alaska.  
Indigeneity was characterized by blood and location as opposed to culture, tribal 
recognition, or history.  More important for this study, American policies toward 
indigenous peoples excluded Native peoples outside of the continental United States. 
The origin of the Kānaka is one reason for this.  Historical texts and government 
documents often list Polynesians as a group distinct from Native Americans.  If one 
accepts the Bering Strait Theory, the First Peoples of the Americas migrated across the 
great northern glaciers from Asia.  Once the “low bridge” formed, flora, fauna, and 
humans all rushed over and south, hoping to seize prime real estate—at least, this is the 
                                                 
27 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 97-98, 111-113, 134-157.  While Donald Fixico’s work serves as 
the authoritative source on the Termination Era, Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford Lytle briefly delve into this 
subject in The Nations Within, 192-196.  Prucha’s The Great Father also has material on this subject.  
Finally, John Wunder provides interesting material on Termination.  His analysis links the program to past 
legislation like the trade and intercourse acts and also places it in the context of events leading to the Indian 
Bill of Rights.  See Wunder, “Retained by The People”, 98-111. 
28 The Hoover Commission Report, 464. 
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rather witty description offered by Vine Deloria, Jr.29  Satirical descriptions aside, 
proponents of this theory point to Siberia and the Eurasian landmass as the origin of 
Native Americans.  Some indigenous people claim otherwise.  According to their 
spiritual beliefs, they emerged in North America, and thus they are a people distinct from 
Africans, Europeans, and Asians.  Historical records, on the other hand, trace a clear 
migration route across the southern Pacific Ocean for the Kānaka.  They share an 
ancestry with other Polynesians (Tahitians, Samoans, etc.).  Sometime around 750 A.D., 
they crossed the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and discovered the Hawaiian Islands 
after having migrated through various island chains in Oceania.  Their legends speak of 
another people already living in the atoll, the Menehune, which suggests that there were 
multiple migrations to the islands.  According to Ralph S. Kuykendall, Native Hawaiians 
most likely absorbed these people into their communities.30 
By examining their legends, art, and religion, scholars will notice that Native 
Hawaiians absorbed everything about the islands into their social consciousness.  The 
‘aina (land) became a part of their very essence. Regardless of their ancestral migrations, 
they are an indigenous people.  As of 1898, they became a colonized, indigenous people 
to whom the United States government owed certain obligations as outlined in the United 
Nations Charter.   
As noted, the Hoover Commission had numerous recommendations for Native 
Americans, yet it did not specifically mention Native Hawaiians.  This is a common 
                                                 
29 Vine Deloria, Jr., “Low Bridge—Everybody Cross,” in Spirit and Reason:  The Vine Deloria, Jr., 
Reader, eds. Barbara Deloria, Kristen Foehner, and Sam Scinta.  Foreword by Wilma P. Mankiller 
(Golden, Colorado:  Fulcrum Publishing, 1999), 78-100. 
30 Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, Foundation and Transformation (Honolulu:  
University of Hawaii Press, 1968), 3; and Lawrence H. Fuchs, Hawaii Pono:  An Ethnic and Political 
History (Honolulu:  Bess Press, 1961), 4. 
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pattern in American history.  Unless the territorial delegate or Hawaiian residents raised 
the issue, the federal government largely neglected this indigenous group.  Instead of 
focusing their attention on making the executive branch more responsive to Native 
Hawaiian needs, the Commission addressed the issue of colonial administration for the 
territory as a whole.  In other words, the colonizer considered the colonized secondary to 
the needs of maintaining an imperial infrastructure.  The committee members noted that 
administrative responsibilities were spread throughout the various branches of 
government.  Within the Executive Branch alone, offices of the administration of 
Organized Territories, Trust Territories, the Philippine War Damage Commission, Non-
self-governing Territories, Philippine Alien Property Administration, and a legion of 
other administrations and departments fell under the jurisdictions of the president’s 
office, the Interior Department, the Navy Department, or the State Department.  The lack 
of a rational organizational structure was already problematic.  Its weaknesses were 
compounded by the absence of a trained cadre of colonial administrators.  The 
commission recommended the consolidation of all overseas administrations, departments, 
and territories under an Administration of Overseas Affairs.  This would essentially 
create a colonial office for the first time in American history.31 
This is a common theme in Hawaiian history.  Americans’ interest in the islands 
had always centered on the possible benefits the region had for the continental nation.  
Little consideration was given to the original occupants and rulers of the region once they 
were conquered and the island chain annexed.  Like Native Americans, Native Hawaiian 
culture and sovereignty faced assaults from white settlers and missionaries bent on 
transforming them into participants in the western capitalist economy.  But unlike Native 
                                                 
31 The Hoover Commission Report, 477-487. 
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Americans, the Kānaka were not a tangible element in American society.  The settler-
Kānaka relationship did not permeate the dime novels of the late 1800s.  No Buffalo Bill 
emerged to produce Wild West shows that captured the attention of mass audiences in 
Europe and America.  In short, Native Hawaiians and Polynesian cultures did not enter 
popular culture and memory in the same manner as Plains Indians did until the post-
World War II Era. 
In examining the manner in which the Americans conquered the Hawaiian 
Islands, one not only learns why the federal government has treated the Kānaka different 
from Native Americans, but also the reason why Americans have always faced a tougher 
task in justifying the overthrow of the indigenous kingdom.  Aside from popular culture 
and memory, the fundamental difference between the conquest of Hawai’i and the 
American West is the absence of any treaty or agreement with which Americans could 
mask their blatant betrayal of the Hawaiian people and absolute disregard of international 
law in subjugating the Kānaka homeland.  In the West, Americans bought the Louisiana 
Purchase and Gadsen Purchase.  They took the Southwest from the Republic of Mexico 
in the course of a “just war.”  Texans delivered their republic to the Union after a 
revolution aimed at protecting their natural rights.  In the exchange of lands, Native 
Americans were shuffled from one benign caretaker to another.  According to American 
and European perceptions of human relations and international law, trading land and 
wardship over indigenous peoples through treaties and war were legitimate acts.  Or so 
the old narratives say.   
For Hawai’i, no such justification of conquest exists.  Native Hawaiians never 
lived under the protection or dominion of a foreign nation.  In 1810, Kaumualii, the ali’i 
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of Kauai, formally yielded to Kamehameha, ending the days of a fragmented Hawai’i.  
From 1810 to 1893, the direct descendents of Kamehameha, or those related to his house, 
ruled the Kānaka under the title of mō’ī, or ruler.32  The ali’i continued to govern the land 
as agents of the monarch, something akin to the nobility of western monarchies.  
Generally, they held positions as governors, royal councilors, or members of the ‘Aha 
Ali’i (House of Nobles).  A traditional western political system would evolve over the 
years and Hawaiian leaders confronted serious threats to their sovereignty by foreign 
nations, but the Hawaiian Kingdom always remained a nation completely independent of 
other powers.33 
Since other nations identified with or recognized the constitutional monarchy 
developing on the islands, Native Hawaiians’ adaptation of western political models 
helped them in terms of foreign affairs; however, these new ideas and institutions also 
facilitated the downfall of the monarchy.  American textbooks generally hail the adoption 
of western representative government and writing by the Cherokee Nation as a unique 
case in Native American history; yet, they were not the only indigenous peoples living in 
what became the United States to do so.  After appraising the tensions between foreign 
powers and the position of the Hawaiian Islands in Pacific maritime transportation and 
trade, Kamehameha began the process of adopting western technologies and ideas in 
                                                 
32 According to Kuykendall, the office of kuhina-nui was instituted after Kamehameha’s death when his 
son, Liholiho, accepted the suggestion of Ka’ahumanu, wife of Kamehameha, to elevate her status.  Osorio 
notes that this office was an extension of the mō’ī.  Kuykendall writes that historical documents generally 
compared this office to that of a prime minister; however, the uniqueness of this position makes it difficult 
to translate it directly into a position in a western constitutional monarchy or republic.  See Kuykendall, 
The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, Foundation and Transformation, 64, or Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo’ole 
Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui:  A Hisitory of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (Honolulu:  University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2002), 290. 
33 For information of the Hawaiian monarchy, Ralph S. Kuykendall’s three volume series, The Hawaiian 
Kingdom, provides ample information on issues ranging from economics to politics to social issues.  
Osorio’s Dismembering Lāhui offers a history of these years from the Native Hawaiian perspective, 
something quite muted in The Hawaiian Kingdom.  Finally, Gavan Daws’s Shoal of Time:  A History of the 
Hawaiian Islands gives the reader an abridged account of the Hawaiian monarchy. 
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order to strengthen the Hawaiian nation.  In 1839, Mō’ī Kauikeaouli, a.k.a. Kamehameha 
III, officially adopted a western political theory of constitutional government when he 
issued the Declaration of Rights and Laws.  It read: 
 God hath made of one blood all nations of men, to dwell on the face of the 
 earth in unity and blessedness.  God has also bestowed certain rights alike on all 
 men, and all chiefs, and all people of all lands.” 
  These are some of the rights which he has given alike to every man and 
 every chief, life, limb, liberty, the labor of his hands, and productions of his mind. 
  God has also established governments and rule for the purposes of peace, 
 but in making laws for a nation it is by no means proper to enact laws for the 
 protection of rulers only, without also providing protection for their subjects; 
 neither is it proper to enact laws to enrich the chiefs only, without regard to the 
 enriching of their subjects also; and hereafter, there shall by no means be any law 
 enacted with is inconsistent with what is above expressed, neither shall any tax be 
 assessed, nor any service or labor required of any man in a manner at variance 
 with the above sentiments. 
  These sentiments are hereby proclaimed for the purpose of protecting 
 alike, both the people and the chiefs of all these islands, that no chief may be able 
 to oppress any subject, but that chiefs and people may enjoy the same protection 
 under one and the same law. 
  Protection is hereby secured to the persons of all the people, together with 
 their lands, their building lots and all their property, and nothing whatever shall be 
 taken from any individual, except by express provision of the laws.  Whatever 
 chief shall perseveringly act in violation of this constitution, shall no longer 
 remain a chief of the Sandwich Islands, and the same shall be true of the 
 governors, officers, and all land agents.34 
 
The Declaration of Rights and Laws moved the Kingdom of Hawai’i away from their 
traditional form of government in which the ali’i nui ruled absolutely.  With this 
publication, the king voluntarily limited his powers and defined the rights of the people.  
Also, the decree placed the nobility and the people under the law, essentially recognizing 
that subjects possess certain fundamental rights, which their leaders must respect.  In this 
process, one can see the influence of westerners on Hawaiian political thought.35 
                                                 
34 Reprinted from Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, Foundation and Transformation, 160-161. 
35 Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui, 24-25; and Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, Foundation and 
Transformation, 160. 
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 This document was followed by the Constitution of 1840, the first of three 
constitutions willingly accepted by the Kānaka.  Under the constitutions of 1840 and 
1852, the government consisted of the mō’ī, kuhina nui, the ‘Aha Ali’i (House of 
Nobles), the House of Representatives, and a judicial system.  When Dr. Gerritt P. Judd, 
Judge John I’i, and Judge William L. Lee drafted the 1852 version, they incorporated a 
system of checks and balances.  Also, the new constitution permitted universal male 
suffrage.  In 1864, Mō’ī Lota Kapuāiwa oversaw the passage of the last constitution that 
was willingly accepted by the Hawaiian people and their rightful leaders.  This version 
merged the ‘Aha Ali’i with the House of Representatives and increased the powers of the 
executive branch.  New property and education qualifications, however, curtailed the 
political powers of the maka’āinana36 by eliminating universal suffrage.37   
 Native Hawaiians successfully incorporated western political ideas into their 
government with the help of European and American advisors.  After Captain James 
Cook’s discovery of the islands, ships increasingly stopped at Hawaiian ports to resupply 
during their cross-Pacific voyages.  At times, sailors would desert and take shelter among 
the population, providing a source of European and American immigration.  The most 
significant source, however, came from New England seminaries.  The American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM)—an organization established in 1810 
by Andover Theological Seminary alumni—sent its first group of missionaries to the 
                                                 
36 Maka’āinana was used to refer to the native inhabitants of the islands. 
37 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, Foundation and Transformation, 115-117, 160-161, 167-
169, 266-268; Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 2, 1854-1874, Twenty Critical Years  
(Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 1966), 127, 131-133; and Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui, 25-29, 88-
89, 105-106, 126. 
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islands aboard the U.S.S. Thaddeus on October 25, 1819.  They arrived in the islands in 
1820, the first of many groups to make the journey.38 
 The missionaries became a major source of change and colonization over the 
years.  Dedicated to teaching Protestant Christianity, these men and women established 
churches and built schools.  Over the years, they turned the ali’i and maka’āinana away 
from traditional Native Hawaiian cultural and political practices.  Missionaries like Dr. 
Judd also endeared themselves to the rulers of the Kingdom of Hawai’i and received 
appointments as royal advisors.  The missionaries, their descendants, and foreign 
businessmen later capitalized on their growing political influence and economic power to 
change gradually the Hawaiian government to serve their purposes.  Within twenty years 
of their arrival, more members of their ranks served as advisors to the mō’ī, assisted in 
drafting the 1840, 1852, and 1864 constitutions, and served as elected representatives.39   
 The apex of foreigners’40 influence on the Kānaka was felt in the Constitution of 
1887, a.k.a. the Bayonet Constitution.  Forced on the mō’ī, David La’amea Kalākaua, by 
the Hawaiian League,41 this constitution weakened the monarchy and consolidated power 
in the cabinet, which by then had become dominated by foreigners. 42  Although the 1893 
                                                 
38 Gavin Daws, Shoal of Time:  A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 
1968), 61-65; and Paul T. Burlin, Imperial Maine and Hawai’i:  Interpretive Essays in the History of 
Nineteenth-Century American Expansion (New York:  Lexington Books, 2006), 7-10.  
39 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, Foundation and Transformation, 266-268; and Osorio, 
Dismembering Lāhui, 29. 
40 In this study, foreigners refers to naturalized and non-naturalized aliens living in the Kingdom of 
Hawai’i.  Although naturalized foreigners swore allegiance to the Hawaiian monarch, they rarely held these 
oaths as sacred or inviolate.  To simplify, I refer to all non-indigenous persons living in the islands prior to 
1898 as foreigners.  After 1898, however, Hawaiians refers to both native and non-native citizens of the 
Territory of Hawai’i, while Native Hawaiian indicates only those who with Native Hawaiian ancestry. 
41 Dr. S. G. Tucker and Lorrin A. Thurston started the Hawaiian League in 1886.  It included W. A. 
Kinney, S. B. Dole, P. C. Jones, W. R. Castle, W. E. Rowell, C. W. Ashford, Major H. M. Benson, A. T. 
Atkinson, Dr. G. H. Martin, and Dr. N. B. Emerson.  According to Osorio and Kuykendall, it was an 
organization dominated by foreigners with a pro-annexationist views. 
42 Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 3, 1874-1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty  (Honolulu:  
University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 347, 368-370; and Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui, 238-241. 
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coup d’état toppled Lili’uokalani, the Bayonet Constitution was a pivotal moment in 
which the foreign element greatly curtailed the ability of Hawaiian monarchs to block 
growing American control, thereby creating the favorable conditions for 1893.  
 Comparing these two processes wherein sovereignty was taken from Kānaka and 
American Indians reveals a distinct difference in the way Native Hawaiians and Native 
Americans lost their sovereignty.  Native Americans faced pressures from external 
forces.  After the rulings of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, 
Native Americans became the wards of the federal government in the American legal 
system.  Legally perceived as domestic dependent nations, they held certain rights to their 
lands, yet the cases denied them their status as sovereign foreign nations.  Because of 
their status as domestic dependent nations, Congress could not dictate treaty terms to 
First Peoples, at least not until after 1871 when it unilaterally abrogated the treaty 
process.  The rulings and the desire to maintain a positive public image contributed to the 
United States’ reliance on a process of isolating indigenous peoples from major American 
settlements—in accordance with the trade and intercourse laws, Indian Removal, and the 
reservation system—and then used bribes, violence, or the threat of violence to wrest 
concessions from First Peoples. 
 Hawaiians, on the other hand, were colonized from within their political system.  
As foreigners increased in numbers, they also increased their political and economic 
power.  From 1820 to 1893, they slowly came to dominate the islands by influencing the 
structures of government and production.  They primarily desired conquest through an 
annexation agreement between the monarchy and the United States Congress.  It was not 
until Queen Lili’uokalani threatened to reconsolidate monarchical and Native Hawaiian 
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power through a new constitution that the foreign population used outright violence to 
topple the government. 
 Just as Native Hawaiians’ experiences differed from those of Native Americans, 
they were not the same as those of other insular territories.  Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 
trust territories43 came under American control as the result of negotiations between 
European nations and America.  Once the fighting ceased, the belligerent sides negotiated 
peace.  In the process, these islands became pieces of colonial property to be traded at 
whim.  Only two insular territories deviated from this pattern.  First, America secured an 
interest in Samoa after peaceful negotiations with Germany.  The second exception was 
the Philippines.  After the Treaty of Paris (1898), the U.S. gained control over the 
Philippines.  When it refused to relinquish control of the archipelago to the Filipinos, 
organized, armed resistance led by Emilio Aguinaldo erupted, preventing the Americans 
from simply laying claim to the territory.  From February 1899 to May 1902, Filipino 
independence fighters struggled to overthrow the new colonial government.  The 
resulting war was brutal.  Civilians were victims of the fighting.  Passing armies scorched 
the countryside.  The war also assumed racial dimensions as American troops often 
linked the killing of revolutionaries with the Native American guerilla fighters in the 
American West.44  At the cost of human lives, money, and materiel, the U.S. Army 
finally subdued the revolutionaries after three years of intense combat.  
                                                 
43 American Samoa is an exception.  It was the result of peaceful negotiations between Germany and the 
United States. 
44 Richard Drinnon, Facing West, 313-315; and H.W. Brands, Bound to Empire:  The United States and the 
Philippines (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 53-59.  See also Leon Wolff, Little Brown 
Brother:  How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn, 
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 There was never a Hawaiian version of Wounded Knee, Sand Creek, or the 
Philippine-American War.  Lili’uokalani chose diplomacy instead of leading her nation to 
war.  As her letter in Chapter One clearly stated, she surrendered her powers peacefully 
and under duress, because Hawaiians did not have a military comparable to the United 
States nor did she desire the death of her subjects.  In doing so, she fulfilled her primary 
role as mō’ī by preserving the lives of her subjects.  Afterwards, she continued adhering 
to this role by speaking publicly against annexation and pleading her case to the 
American public and Congress. 
 In the end, the queen and her people relied on words, ideas, and democratic 
processes rather than force to preserve their sovereignty.  From 1893 through the early 
1900s, Kānaka voiced opposition to annexation to the United States of America.  As Tom 
Coffman notes in The Island Edge of America:  A Political History of Hawai’i, groups 
loyal to the monarchy and a Hawai’i for Hawaiians coalesced in the Home Rule Party 
during the 1900 Territorial elections in order to counteract the efforts of Sanford Dole, 
W. O. Smith, Lorrin Thurston, and other pro-annexationists of American descent.  In 
addition to partisan politics within the American system, they would also rely on public 
protest.45 
This opposition has often been overlooked by previous historians throughout the 
twentieth century.  Ralph S. Kuykendall, a leading historian of Hawaiian history, wrote 
his monumental work, The Hawaiian Kingdom, composed of over one-thousand pages of 
text in three massive volumes; and although he painstakingly presented a political, 
economic, and cultural history of the islands, the author ceased his study with the year 
                                                 
45 Tom Coffman, The Island Edge of America:  A Political History of Hawai’i (Honolulu:  University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2003), 8-9. 
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1893.  His three-volume text includes information pertaining to early debates within the 
United States regarding the morality and legality of annexing the islands, but it focuses 
primarily on the plantation owners of Hawai’i and American politicians.46    
Conversely, the scope of Gavan Daws’ Shoal of Time extends beyond the year 
1893.  He presented a more detailed account on Kānaka resistance to the American 
conquest of their homeland.  Daws included information concerning the reports submitted 
by James H. Blount and John T. Morgan, detailing the overthrow of Lili’uokalani.  He 
described the changes in policy toward Hawai’i between the Cleveland and McKinley 
administrations, as well as the short-lived counterrevolution of 1894 by Lili’uokalani’s 
supporters.  Finally, he also provided a two-page summary of the Home Rule Party, 
without delving into any specific policies or platforms that they promoted.  His 
consideration of Kānaka reactions to the revolution and annexation, however, did not go 
into great detail.  His only analysis consists of one paragraph, leaving one with the 
impression that the Kānaka had accepted defeat long before the revolution occurred.47  
His final conclusion can be summed up in his own words. “Their resistance to all this was 
feeble.  It was almost as if they believed what the white man said about them, that they 
had only half learned the lessons of civilization.”48   
One must give these two men—Kuykendall and Daws—a modicum of credit.  
Compared to other works of the early to mid-twentieth century, their histories contain a 
good deal of information regarding Native Hawaiian perspectives.  For example of the 
opposite, Hawaii:  An Informal History, by Gerrit P. Judd IV, a descendant of Dr. Gerrit 
                                                 
46 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 3, 1874-1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty, 605-650. 
47 Daws, Shoal of Time:  A History of the Hawaiian Islands, 270-295. 
48 Daws, Shoal of Time:  A History of the Hawaiian Islands, 291. 
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P. Judd, failed to provide any significant information on this subject, leaving the reader to 
believe that the revolution was warmly greeted throughout the islands.49 
There is one notable Native Hawaiian figure who constantly appeared in twentieth 
century narratives of the conquest of Hawai’i—Lili’uokalani, the last mō’ī of Hawai’i.  
Her memoirs, Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s Queen, made it rather difficult for historians to 
overlook her opposition to annexation.  Her book first appeared in 1898.  Written as “a 
plea for justice,”50 the worked traced Lili’uokalani’s life from childhood to the end of her 
reign as queen.  While determining the extent of the impact that the book had on the 
American people or even the number of readers exposed to it is difficult, evidence exists 
proving that the public was aware of Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s Queen.  On February 
15, 1898, the Chicago Daily Tribune carried a review of her book.  Overall, the reviewer 
considered it “dignified, both in appearance and in contents.”51  Regarding 
Lili’uokalani’s “case” of the overthrow of her country, the writer claimed that “no scholar 
or lawyer could have state[d] it more effectively.”52  While her book received positive 
criticism, the article also considered some of her narrative as evidence “sufficient to 
condemn her at the bar of the Christian world.”53  Among the events in Lili’uokalani’s 
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53 Chicago Daily Tribune, “Liliuokalani Tells ‘Hawaii’s Story’ and Her own,” February 15, 1898  385 
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book, and subsequently her life, that the reviewer found offensive to his or her Christian 
morals were Lili’uokalani’s refusal to use the last name of her husband John Owen 
Dominis, her attempt to enact a new constitution, her licensing of the sale of opium, and 
permitting a lottery, as well as her refusal to pardon Lorrin Thurston and his associates 
for their rebellion.  While this review cannot be taken as the primary example of how 
Americans received Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s Queen, it is indicative of the fact that 
Lili’uokalani and her protestations against the 1893 rebellion reached the American 
public. 
Finally, in 2004, Noenoe K. Silva wrote Aloha Betrayed:  Native Hawaiian 
Resistance to American Colonialism, which traced the extent of anti-annexation 
sentiment among the Kānaka.  Essentially, Silva built on the growing interest in Native 
Hawaiian resistance to their incorporation into the growing American empire.  She noted 
that scholars Davianna McGregor-Alegado, Albertine Loomis, Nancy Morris, and Merze 
Tate made some efforts at uncovering the activities by Kānaka political and social groups 
to prevent the annexation of the islands to the United States of America.  Yet, she 
possessed the one element necessary to cover this movement in its entirety, a grasp of the 
Native Hawaiian language.  Overall, her book seeks to refute “the myth of passivity 
through documentation and study of the many forms of resistance by the Kanaka Maoli to 
political, economic, linguistic and cultural oppression, beginning with the arrival of 
Captain Cook until the struggle over ‘annexation,’ that is, the military occupation of 
Hawai’i by the United States in 1898.”54  While her historical study certainly 
                                                 
54 Noenoe K. Silva, Aloha Betrayed:  Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism (Durham:  
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accomplished this monumental task, Silva’s treatment of the anti-annexation movement 
among Native Hawaiians from 1893-1898 is most relevant. 
Examining the fourth chapter of Aloha Betrayed:  Native Hawaiian Resistance to 
American Colonialism, entitled “The Antiannexation Struggle,” one discerns two primary 
means of resistance employed by Kānakas.  The first was overt, armed struggle against 
the colonial government established by the Committee of Safety and headed by Sanford 
Dole.  In 1893, a revolution against the provisional government erupted on Oahu.  It 
lasted for a very short duration before fighters loyal to the new government suppressed 
the Royalists, as Queen Lili’uokalani called them in her book.  Afterwards, the 
provisional government used the incident as a means of completely erasing Honolulu and 
Iolani Palace of any vestiges of the indigenous, sovereign monarchy. They arrested 
supporters of Lili’uokalani, including Robert Wilcox, as well as the queen herself.  It was 
during this time that Queen Lili’uokalani received a demand from the provisional 
government to sign the statement of capitulation.55 
In addition to armed rebellion, Native Hawaiians formed political groups to 
oppose annexation and reclaim their sovereignty.  Just as the Cherokee Nation attempted 
in the mid-1830s, Kānaka men and women used democratic and political means to sway 
the votes of congressmen in a republic supposedly bound to democratic and anti-colonial 
ideology.  Unfortunately, just as the Cherokee Nation learned in 1838 as they marched 
along their Trail of Tears, Native Hawaiians came to realize that the American 
commitment to democracy, anti-colonialism, and the “inherent rights of man” only 
applied to those of white, Northern European descent.  Three principal parties served as 
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the leading organs for anti-annexationist sentiment, the Hui Aloha ‘Āina for Women, Hui 
Aloha ‘Āina for Men, and the Hui Kālai‘āina.  As Noenoe K. Silva stated, “The Kanaka 
Maoli strategy was to challenge the U.S. government to behave in accordance with its 
stated principles of justice and of government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people.  They hoped that once the U.S. president and members of Congress saw that the 
great majority of Kanaka Maoli opposed the annexation, the principles of fairness would 
prevail and Lili’uokalani’s government would be restored.”56  They generated public 
opposition to the Morgan Committee’s attempts to draw public support for annexation, 
wrote numerous articles and editorials against annexation, dispatched Native Hawaiian 
representatives to aid in the fight against annexation within the walls of the American 
Congress, and wrote a petition against annexation in 1897 that was endorsed by a 
significant majority of Kānaka citizens.57 
Unfortunately, the time during which the Kānaka worked feverishly to save their 
ancestral islands was very different from the modern, post-World War II world of 
permanent borders and an internationally-recognized right of all nations and peoples to 
self-determination.  As American settlers overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy, European 
nations intensified their efforts to expand their empires.  From 1880-1900, Africans 
witnessed the downfall of their kingdoms and tribal lands to European nations scrambling 
to gain access to new markets and exploitable, raw materials.  By 1885, the Berlin West 
Africa Conference had begun the process of a rationalized system among European 
nations to colonize the great continent with minimized conflict among the superpowers of 
the time.  Asian nations were also under increasing pressure from Europe and the United 
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States to open their borders to trade.  Americans, long believing themselves the great 
inheritors of the anti-colonial ideology and enlightened ideals of the Revolutionary War, 
fell under the sway of imperial ambition.  As men like Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred 
Thayer Mahan rose to political prominence, the concept of an overseas American empire 
and increased military might grew in intensity.  With the publication and growing 
popularity of Frederick Jackson Turner’s “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History,” the idea of a closing frontier and a decreasing area for expansion and 
development caused concern among Americans.  Increasingly, politicians looked 
overseas for new areas in which to expand, including Hawai’i. 
The Newlands Resolution (1898) concluded the debate over Hawaiian 
sovereignty.  Just as Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Guamanians, Samoans, Native Americans, 
and South Pacific islanders had learned, Americans never relinquish a territory once they 
gained it.  Even if the United States returned some limited political control over an area, 
post-World War II American neocolonialism economically bound developing former 
colonies to American will.  This is precisely the fate of the Philippine Islands following 
its independence in 1946.  The Newlands Resolution formally bound the Hawaiian 
Islands to the United States, but it said very little about the relationship between the 
Kānaka and the federal government.  Throughout the territorial history of Hawai’i, 
federal policies directed at Native Hawaiians sought to incorporate them into capitalistic, 
American society, yet federal officials also assumed a form different from indigenous 
programs on the continent. 
Had the U.S. followed historical precedents as established in the continental 
territories, Native Hawaiians would have received compensation for lost lands and the 
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Bureau of Indian Affairs would have started monitoring their progress.  But the Kānaka 
community remained absent from B.I.A. reports.  Also, the prominent institution of 
American Indian Policy—the reservation—never existed in the islands, regardless of the 
presence of an indigenous population.  Comparing the population of Native Hawaiians 
with Native Americans, one notices that though Native Hawaiians suffered devastating 
population losses after Cook’s arrival, they never were the smallest indigenous group in 
the United States.  In 1900, there were 39,656 Native Hawaiians, including Part-
Hawaiians.58  Two years earlier, 262,965 Native Americans lived in the continental U.S., 
excluding Alaska.  However, populations among separate nations varied dramatically.  
For example, while the Department of the Interior listed 32,161 Cherokees and 20,500 
Navajos, it also counted only 1,658 Nez Percés, 1,202 Omahas, and 1,553 Comanches.59  
In 1940, the combined population of Native Hawaiians and Part-Hawaiians grew to 
64,310.  Unfortunately, the Kānaka community experienced a significant loss of 15,424 
as their population dropped from 29,799 to 14,375.60  Though their numbers declined 
significantly, they remained one of the larger indigenous groups when compared to the 
populations of other indigenous nations and reservations in the Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1940.61  Providing these figures is not a simple 
exercise in statistics.  It reveals the significant presence of the Kānaka in the United 
States of America.  Regardless, the federal government ignored legitimate Native 
Hawaiian authorities in the annexation process and did not recognize indigenous claims 
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to land, property, funds, and sovereignty as provided for in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 
(1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832).  One could even make the point that a 
distinguishing difference between Native Hawaiians and Native Americans was the 
inapplicability of these monumental court cases to the Hawaiian nation. 
Native Hawaiians found themselves at the epicenter of a new American 
colonialism.  First, the islands themselves became floating reservations.  With limited 
economic opportunities at home and abroad, Kānaka had few sources of income.  As 
Table 1 illustrates, out of a population of 39, 260,62 7,791 taxpaying Native Hawaiians 
owned $15, 605, 117 worth of real and personal property.  This compared to 1,806 
corporations holding $185, 624, 595 in assets and 6, 811 Anglo-Saxons controlling $31, 
379, 464.  As in other colonized territories located in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, 
the settler society held most of the wealth in the territory, while the Native population had 
the least.  In the case of the Territory of Hawai’i, prior to annexation foreigners 
accumulated significant wealth at the expense of the indigenous population.  This wealth 
gave them effective control over the islands.  Throughout the territorial period, Native 
Hawaiians were left with few options in terms of work.  They could find work as laborers 
on plantations, in the shipping industry, or as dock hands, but white-collar professions 
remained dominated by white employees.  As the figures show, two decades after the 
conquest of the region, the Native Hawaiian population still only managed to control 6.23 
percent of the wealth in terms of property, whereas industries and American settlers 
possessed a combined total of 86.62 percent.63   
                                                 
62 U.S., House Committee on the Territories, Rehabilitation of Native Hawaiians, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1920, H. Rep. 839, 3. 
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These figures show that the Kānaka population already showed a familiarity with 
private enterprise and property.  Their political history under the monarchy and during 
the anti-annexation struggle proved that they already possessed experience with 
republican institutions and democratic processes.  With schools already established on the 
islands under the supervision of the missionaries and the monarchs, as well as the 
inability of most Kānaka to relocate to urban places with other employment 
opportunities, the Hawaiian Islands provided an isolated, compact territory in which 
colonial authorities could assert significant control. 
Table 2.  Property held by territorial citizens according tax returns filed in 1919. 
Taxpayers 
Number of 
taxpayers 
Valuation of 
real 
property 
Number of 
tax payers 
Valuation of 
personal 
property 
Total 
valuation 
Percentage 
Corporations, firms,    
      etc. 
783  $88,909,410  1,023  $96,715,185  $185,624,595   74.09 
Anglo‐Saxons  3,312  26,656,188  3,499  4,723,276  31,379,464  12.53 
Hawaiians  5,878  13,670,508  1,913  1,934,609  15,605,117  6.23 
Portuguese and  
      Spanish 
2,665  5,619,076  1,622  917,411  6,536,487  2.61 
Chinese  1,631  3,140,305  1,367  1,656,250  4,796,555  1.91 
Japanese  1,183  1,897,764  3,461  4,684,364  6,582,128  2.63 
Total  15,452  139,893,251  12,885  110,631,095  250,524,346  100.00 
Table taken from House Committee on the Territories, Rehabilitation of Native Hawaiians, 66th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1920, H. Rep. 839, 6. 
 
Though this is an intriguing way of viewing the archipelago, it has flaws.  The 
reservation system in the continental territories relied heavily on annuities and rations to 
supplement Native American incomes, ensure order, provide supplemental nourishment, 
promote assimilation, and provide compensation.  Although Native Hawaiians faced 
hardship and lost their homelands, colonial status offered them no annuities or 
compensation.  In many ways, the reservation system was designed to familiarize Native 
Americans with the capitalist economy.  That was not necessary in Hawai’i.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
the ali’i or came from native families that managed to benefit from the growth of the agricultural industry 
prior to 1898? 
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Hawaiian monarchy had promoted trade and commerce with other nations.  Industry was 
strongly encouraged in the islands, and until the influx of Asian immigration in the late 
1800s, Kānaka served as the primary workforce.  In addition, the missionaries 
successfully established an education system in the kingdom.  The schools and churches 
had already infused American culture into Native Hawaiian society by 1898.  Kānaka 
familiarity with American politics, economics, knowledge, and culture thus rendered the 
reservation system useless as a form of social control and assimilation. 
Second, the lack of a Hawaiian reservation system or laws targeting them 
suggests that the federal government inadvertently followed a policy of termination fifty-
five years before the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 108 in Congress.  Instead 
of the federal government assuming control over Kānaka affairs as it had done on the 
continent, the Newlands Resolution folded the Hawaiian indigenous community into the 
general population.  By neglecting to provide reparations for the illegal overthrow of the 
monarchy, seizing of public lands, and confiscating treasury funds, the U.S. never 
officially developed or recognized a federal-ward relationship with Native Hawaiians as 
it had done with Native Americans.64  One could retort that the development of Kānaka 
culture, politics, and economics set them apart from Native Americans in that they had 
already assimilated to the American culture prior to 1898.  Yet this line of reasoning does 
not withstand scrutiny.  During the congressional debates over the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act of 1920, an act designed to place Kānaka on homesteads, images of 
Native Hawaiians as part of a “dying race,” a “noble race,” or a people in need of 
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rehabilitation appear.65  These debates are indicative of the image Americans held of 
Native Hawaiians.  Regardless of their incorporation of western technology and learning, 
American perceptions of the Kānaka remained similar to that of other indigenous 
peoples.66 
 Although the federal government never subjected Native Hawaiians to the 
reservation, congressmen attempted to implement an indigenous homesteading act similar 
to the General Allotment Act of 1887 (also referred to as the Dawes Act).67  During his 
tenure as territorial delegate, Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana’ole raised the issue of providing 
Native Hawaiians with land in order to give them some form of economic stability.  
Kuhio, or Prince Kuhio as congressmen referred to him, succeeded Robert William 
Wilcox as the second territorial delegate to Congress.  A Native Hawaiian and relative of 
Queen Lili’uokalani, he used his affiliation with the Republican Party to gain concessions 
for his countrymen.  He considered the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920 as 
vital to securing Native Hawaiians a stake in the future agricultural industry of the 
Hawaiian Islands.   
 This legislation was very basic in its form.  Any person of “not less than one-half 
part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778” could 
apply for a land allotment in the islands.68  Applicants could then receive a ninety-nine 
                                                 
65U.S., Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 191920, 33, pt. 7:  7448. 
66 There is an interesting document in the Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana’ole Collection, M-40, Box 4, Folder 8, 
Hawai’i State Archives, entitled Hawai’i Territory, Statement by the Legislative Commission of Hawaii in 
Support of a Bill Providing for the setting Apart of Portions of the Public Lands for the Use by Hawaiian 
Citizens of Hawaiian Blood, dated January 1, 1920.  This document offers the support of the Hawaiian 
territorial legislature.  Its description of Native Hawaiians, however, is of importance here and depict 
Native Hawaiians as a non acquisitive people who need the guidance of the government in claiming a 
homestead in the islands.  The stereotypical picture of Native peoples as inept at functioning within a 
capitalist economy was not limited to the federal government or continental Americans. 
67 Also referred to as the Dawes Act, the Dawes Allotment Act, or the Dawes Severalty Act. 
68 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, Public Law 34, U.S. Statutes at Large 42 (1921), 108.   
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year lease on twenty to eighty acres of farmland, one hundred to five hundred acres of 
pasturage, or two hundred fifty to one-thousand acres of second class grazing land, a deal 
similar to the one Native Americans under the General Allotment Act.  Land in Hawai’i, 
however, was scarcer than on the continent.  Whereas the heads of continental indigenous 
families received a minimum of one-hundred sixty acres of land with the possibility of 
more for grazing purposes, insular allotments were significantly smaller.  Also, Native 
American allotments were held in trust by the federal government for twenty-five years, 
after which they received the title to the land in fee simple, whereas neither the federal 
government nor the Territory of Hawai’i—under whose care Congress entrusted the lands 
and their distribution—awarded lands to Native Hawaiians.  Instead, Kānaka 
homesteaders paid one dollar per year on a ninety-nine year lease.  While the lessee had 
the right to will the lease to his or her heirs, he or she never received full title.69 
 Both pieces of legislation also provided for the opening of lands not allocated to 
non-indigenous persons.  In the case of the Dawes Act, the federal government allotted 
lands from existing reservation to end the communal nature of indigenous cultures and 
force tribal members to become private, landowning citizens wedded to the American 
economy.  Everyone received an allotment regardless of whether or not they wanted one 
or supported the policy.  Once the land was distributed to all qualifying persons, the 
Department of the Interior purchased the remainder and opened them up to settlement.70  
In Hawai’i, Delegate Kuhio designed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act to provide 
public lands to Native Hawaiians thereby creating a Hawaiian land base.  Unlike the 
Dawes Act, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act did not specify that all Native 
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Hawaiians had to receive an allotment automatically.  It did, however, authorize the 
Commissioner of Public Lands to offer non-leased lands to non-indigenous persons or 
corporations.  The funds from these leases went to the Hawaiian Home Loan Fund 
established for the act to assist indigenous lessees in starting their farms.  Also, an 
amendment to the legislation removed restrictions on corporate land holdings.  During 
the drafting of the Hawaiian Territory Organic Act, congressmen were concerned over 
the massive landholdings of the various agribusinesses.  To stimulate homesteading and 
prevent a land monopoly, Congress restricted corporate landholdings to less than 100,000 
acres.  No doubt, the existence of this amendment received support from the Big Five and 
other political powerhouses in the islands.71 
 Representatives and senators on Capitol Hill responded favorably to Kuhio’s 
initiative, as did the territorial legislature.  Territorial legislators considered the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission a viable plan to move the indigenous residents of Honolulu tenement 
houses out of the “fatal conditions” in which they lived.72  Once transplanted to the 
“clean, healthful, and decent” environment of the Hawaiian countryside, Native 
Hawaiians would enter a new, economically viable life as “independent and contented 
tillers of the soil.”73  It is quite understandable that Congress readily accepted the bill, 
since their predecessors designed the Dawes Act thirty-three years earlier with similar 
goals in mind.  Yet, programs designed to return Native Hawaiians to the land have failed 
to meet expectations.  By 1956, Native Hawaiians leased only 68,000 acres.74  The 
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pattern continued into the late twentieth century as corporations, public entities, and non-
indigenous residents occupied 130,000 acres of reserved land, leaving just over 29,000 
acres for Native use.75 
 Land and economic independence are two crucial elements of indigenous 
sovereignty.  Land categorically represents Native sovereignty by providing a base for 
economic solvency, retaining ancestral territory, and possessing cultural importance.76  
For example, Canyon de Chelly is located deep in the heart of Dinétah, the homeland of 
the Diné (or Navajo) Nation.  Nestled within its steep walls is Spider Rock, a tall, 
beautiful landmark that dominates the valley floor.  It was the home of the mythical 
figure Spider Woman who taught the Diné the art of weaving.  Today, Dinés retain 
control over Canyon de Chelly.  With the promotion of tourism during the 1940s to 
1960s, the site became a popular stopping point for visitors to the Southwest.  Since then 
it has become a source of revenue for the Diné Nation while maintaining its spiritual 
significance.  This influx of visitors also opened a market for Navajo rugs and other 
weavings.  As Americans became more familiar with these high quality products, the 
price for Navajo-crafted rugs climbed as well.77   
 Not all indigenous peoples, however, retained their original homelands or their 
spiritual centers.  As Americans assaulted Native sovereignty during their expansion into 
the American West and Pacific Ocean, settler communities, industries, and the U.S. 
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military gained access to Native territory.  White miners secured the right to dig for gold 
in the Black Hills just as they had done in Cherokee lands in Georgia during the 1830s.  
Starting in 1830 with the Indian Removal Act, the United States removed First Peoples 
from lands containing rich ore deposits or quality top soil.  As white settler communities 
poured into the lands, the U.S. Army forced the previous inhabitants onto sub-marginal 
lands. 
 Returning to the Black Hills of South Dakota as an example, this region retains 
great importance to Siouan peoples of the northern Great Plains.  Unlike Spider Rock, 
this region lies outside of existing reservation borders of the Lakotas, but it remains not 
only a place where they conduct ceremonies, but also a place for personal spiritual 
journeys.  In 1920, Lakotas filed their first court case in an effort to have the land 
returned to their control.  After eighty-eight years and multiple lawsuits, the judicial 
system still refuses to return the land, though it recognizes that the United States illegally 
laid claim to the territory in the late 1800s.  In 1987, Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey 
and Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawai’i introduced S.R. 705 which authorized the return of 
the Black Hills to the Lakotas.  Needless to say, the bill failed and mining and tourism 
still continues in the region.  Regaining control of the Black Hills remains an important 
goal for the Lakota Nation, which continues to reject a monetary settlement for the loss of 
the sacred place.  Of course, this is but one example among many of the cultural and 
material losses that accompanied forced relocation and the ongoing struggles of Native 
Americans to reclaim lost territory.78 
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 For Native Hawaiians, land served as the catalyst for an eruption of vocal Kānaka 
activism.  It began in 1970 with two events.  First, Bishop Estate evicted residents of the 
Kalama Valley to allow construction of upper income housing by Kaiser-Aetna.  This 
protest movement initially included people that represented multiple ethnicities in the 
Hawaiian Islands.  The activism of “Kokua Kalama” took a twist as it merged with the 
cultural reawakening of Native Hawaiians that began in the 1960s to form “Kokua 
Hawai’i” (Save Hawai’i).  According to Haunani-Kay Trask, Norman Meller, and Anne 
Feder Lee, the Kalama Valley protest movement marked the beginning of Native 
Hawaiian activism of the twentieth century.79 
 Another major land battle of the 1970s had roots dating back to the territorial 
period.  In 1952, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the use of a seemingly 
barren island for naval bombardment practice.  To the president, this land held no 
intrinsic value.  It was simply another island in the Pacific Ocean.  But Native Hawaiians 
knew otherwise.  Kaho’olawe had deep cultural roots for the Kānaka.  The island once 
contained an ecosystem capable of sustaining life.  Western agricultural and pastoral 
practices, however, rendered the small island barren.  Regardless, it remained a part of 
Native Hawaiians’ cultural heritage and would serve as a major battleground in Kānaka 
attempts to reassert their right to Native Hawaiian culture and land.  Spurred on by the 
tactics used by Native Americans on Alcatraz Island, the cultural revitalization of the era, 
and a deep sense of aloha ‘aina (love for the land and desire to preserve it from western 
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exploitation), 80 Walter Ritte, Jr., Charley Maxwell, and other Native Hawaiians began 
their campaign to force the State of Hawai’i and federal government to relinquish the 
land.  On January 3, 1976, Walter Ritte, Jr., and eight other illegally landed on the island 
in an attempt to force the cessation of bombardment exercises and get the attention of 
policymakers.  Their fight for the land continued throughout the late 1970s, sometimes 
landing activists in prison for trespassing of federal lands.  Finally, in 1990, Congress 
suspended all naval exercises on the island and the beginning of extensive efforts to clean 
up the ecological damage caused by the U.S. Navy.81 
 In Hawai’i, the military provides employment for Natives and non-Natives, alike.  
Thousands of young marines, army soldiers, and naval personnel passed through the 
Hawaiian Islands on their way to the Pacific Theatre during World War II.  No doubt, 
these young men enjoyed the lovely vistas and relaxing beaches of the atoll.  Following 
the conclusion of the war, promoters, Hollywood, and writers increased the public 
perception of Hawai’i as a prime vacation site.  Needless to say, the Hawaiian tourist 
industry owes much to the military for its quick growth in the mid-twentieth century.  But 
as activists like Haunani-Kay Trask and Walter Ritte, Jr., the military came with a price 
for Native Hawaiians.  The bases, both army and navy, occupy land that could be used 
for Native Hawaiian homelands.  And there is the issue of artillery practice and 
Kaho’olawe.   
 Native Hawaiians were not the only indigenous group whose struggle for 
sovereignty was complicated by the increased importance placed on the military in post-
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World War II America.  The war greatly cost Americans, Europeans, Asians, and 
Africans.  As the world emerged from the ruins of such a catastrophic armed contest, one 
would have thought that mankind had tasted enough blood and horror to last a century.  
The year 1948 proved otherwise.  After World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United States of America briefly tried to preserve their wartime 
camaraderie; however, Joseph Stalin and Harry S Truman both knew that the modus 
vivendi could not last.  In 1948, the western world witnessed three critical events that 
dramatically affected life in Dinétah and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.  First, 
in May 1948, Stalin ordered all land routes to Berlin from Western Germany closed, 
bringing the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to the brink of war.  The possibility of armed conflict 
coincided with an ongoing reevaluation of American air power by General Curtis LeMay, 
USAF.  When he assumed command of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) on October 
19, 1948, the general found it unorganized and incapable of executing an accurate attack 
on its targets.  The Berlin Blockade stressed the need for LeMay to restructure and retrain 
SAC, as well as redefine its role in future conflicts.  By November 1948, he had devised a 
new purpose for SAC.  Since future wars would be quick, brutal affairs, United States 
armed forces would need to inflict massive casualties in the opening phases to emerge 
victorious.  With this in mind, LeMay devised a plan in which SAC would drop large 
amounts of nuclear ordnance on the Soviet Union during an air blitzkrieg, thus 
dramatically reducing the enemy’s ability to wage war early in the conflict.  This plan set 
the United States in a new direction regarding its strategy as nuclear weapons, and not 
conventional forces, would decide future conflicts.  With the adoption of National 
Security Council Report 68 in 1950 and the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
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in 1952, the preeminence of SAC in American defense strategy became a reality.  Finally, 
a less publicized event took place deep in the heart of Soviet territory.  After years of 
research and work, Soviet scientists finally discovered a means to increase the payload of 
a nuclear weapon without increasing its size.  The process of layering heavy and light 
nuclear elements, called “sugarization,” became the principle design of the first nuclear 
bomb produced by the Soviet Union, which it successfully detonated during their test, 
dubbed First Lightening, on August 28, 1949.82  
 The heightened tensions of the late 1940s and increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons and power suddenly transformed Dinétah from a reservation on marginal land to 
a valuable source of uranium.  Had uranium held value for Americans in the nineteenth 
century, they would have pressured the Diné to leave the Four Corners region and resettle 
in another part of the Southwest.  Afterwards, mining companies and speculative settlers 
would flood into the region in search of instant wealth.  But it was the mid-1900s and 
such behavior was no longer accepted.  The pogroms throughout Eastern Europe in the 
early 1900s and German concentration camps of World War II caused the leading 
western nations to reconsider their stance on human and indigenous rights.  For the first 
time, an international body, the United Nations, took a stand against genocide, forced 
removal, and inhumane governmental policies. 
 Nonetheless, there was radioactive gold in those mountains, and Uncle Sam 
thoroughly intended to dust off his mining equipment and strike out for pay dirt.  Instead 
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of relying on removal or warfare to gain access to this wealth, the federal government 
relied on private enterprise.  The Vanadium Corporation of America and the Kerr-McGee 
Corporation offered the Diné royalties for mining operations in Dinétah that eclipsed 
other revenue resources.  Uranium royalties alone could reach as high as $6.5 million.  
There were additional inducements for the Diné.  Aside from tourism and coal mining, 
few other economic opportunities existed in Dinétah.  Vanadium and Kerr-McGee were a 
solution to reservation unemployment, since their mining operations offered Diné men 
the chance to earn a paycheck.  Moreover, mining jobs were long-lasting, stable 
employment, since Vanadium and Kerr-McGee had long-term plans for the stores of 
uranium in the Navajo reservation.83  
 Unfortunately, uranium mining came with a steep price.  The corporations never 
warned Dinés of the hazards involved in working around uranium.  Diné miners were 
ignorant of its radioactive properties and their baleful effect on the human body.  
According to Peter Iverson, a thirsty miner “might scoop water from a dust-covered 
puddle on the mine floor.  He came home wearing clothing covered with material that 
endangered other family members.  Children played in and around the mines, coming 
into contact with the tailings.”84  To make matters worse, the companies failed to 
ventilate the shafts properly and left the detritus from uranium mining exposed to the 
wind or resting near water sources.  The effect on Navajo health was devastating.  “Of the 
150-odd Diné miners who worked underground at the Shiprock facility during the 
eighteen years of its operation, eighteen had died of radiation-induced lung cancer by 
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1975 (not the “oat cell” variety associated with cigarette smoking) and another twenty-
one were feared dying.  By 1980, twenty of these twenty-one were dead, and another 
ninety-five had contracted similar respiratory ailments and cancers.”85  As the United 
States benefitted militarily from the uranium of the Dinétah, Dinés faced growing 
physical and environmental problems.   
 In the large picture, nuclear warfare and the Cold War linked Dinétah, Hawai’i, 
and the South Pacific.  Uranium used to create nuclear weapons came from Dinétah, and 
Diné miners suffered potentially lethal exposure to radiation while extracting it.  From 
there, the weapons were transferred to the Hawaiian Islands, still the “Crossroads of the 
Pacific.”  In addition to serving as the naval command center for the entire Pacific Ocean, 
the islands also acted as a transportation hub and training center for the region.  But 
nuclear weapons did not stop there.  There were transferred to other areas of the Pacific.  
Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, many nuclear bombs found their way to the Trust 
Territories of the Pacific Islands where the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force conducted at 
least eight series of nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958. 
 Operation Crossroads was the first nuclear test conducted in the Trust Territories 
of the Pacific Islands.  In 1946, the U.S. military detonated two nuclear devices.  The 
USAF dropped the first weapon into a fleet of outdated Japanese, German, and American 
ships to examine the effectiveness of nuclear weapons on naval forces.  They followed 
the air test by detonating a submerged warhead.  The result was both devastating and 
awe-inspiring, not to mention environmentally catastrophic for the ecosystem as tons of 
contaminated sea water evaporated into a towering inferno of radioactive steam reaching 
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over 100,000 feet.  The nuclear fallout not only harmed the marine life, it also flooded the 
land and the islanders with radiation.86  Crossroads rendered the Bikini atoll utterly 
uninhabitable. With the indigenous population showing the signs of radiation sickness, 
the federal government had no other choice than to remove them to other atolls in the 
Pacific Island.87  The two explosions in Operation Crossroads initiated an assault on 
South Pacific Islanders’ homes that lasted over a decade and resembled the exploitation 
of indigenous lands in other American regions.  One could even argue that they suffered a 
similar process of removal as experienced by the Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, 
Seminoles, Sauks, Fox, Creeks, and countless other First Peoples. 
 Although Operations Crossroads (1946), Sandstone (1948), Greenhouse (1951), 
Ivy (1952), Castle (1954), Wigwam (1955), Redwing (1956), and Hardtack I (1958) all 
spread radiation and laid waste to islands in the South Pacific—primarily in the Bikini 
and Eniwetok atolls—Operation Ivy served as a turning point in the destructiveness of 
these experiments.  On November 1, 1952, the military detonated the first thermonuclear 
weapon during Operation Ivy Mike.  While this test is best remembered for enhancing 
tensions between the Soviets and the Americans, it had serious repercussions at the local 
level as well.  Over one thousand military and civilian spectators attested to the massive 
explosion caused by the hydrogen bomb.  It was said that the fireball resembled the sun.  
Its mushroom cloud climbed over 100,000 feet.   For the previous inhabitants of the 
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islands, Operation Ivy rearranged their landscape.  The resulting explosion was so intense 
that it erased Elugelab, the northern most island of the Eniwetok atoll, from existence.88 
 Residents of the TTPI refused to accept the destruction of their homes passively.  
Throughout the late 1940s and into the 1960s, they submitted resolutions, petitions, 
letters, and protests to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council.  Even non-indigenous citizens and organizations implored the 
Trusteeship Council to end nuclear tests by the United States in the Pacific Ocean.89  
Petitions from TTPI citizens focused on two primary issues.  First, they protested the 
continuation of nuclear tests and the inadequate protection of the inhabitants from 
radiation.  Representatives constantly reiterated the demand that “all nuclear experiments 
with lethal weapons in this area be immediately ceased”90 in their many petitions to the 
Trusteeship Council.  Yet, they tended to moderate this demand by describing the 
American tenure as the administering authority of the TTPI as benevolent and beneficial.  
Also, petitions sometimes moderated their demand for the cessation of nuclear tests by 
accepting those deemed essential for the protection of the free world.  Given the Cold 
War attitude of the United States towards weapons of mass destruction and their role as 
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the protectors of democracy, the administering authority could have read such phrases 
within the petitions as a blank check to continue lethal experiments.  In addition to 
demands to end nuclear detonations, these petitions pleaded for the administering 
authority to teach residents how to deal with radioactive fallout.  In 1954, the Marshallese 
people informed the Trusteeship Council that Rongelab were ignorant of the lethal nature 
of the radioactive dust that coated their island and contaminated their drinking waters.  
Their continued consumption of polluted waters aggravated already deteriorating health 
conditions on the island.  Worse still, another petition citing the same demands and 
concerns of the 1954 petition appeared in front of the Trusteeship Council two years 
later.  The reappearance of these demands and concerns in the midst of the multiple other 
documents and voiced protests by other council members revealed the disregard of the 
American military and territorial administrative bodies towards the welfare of the 
Marshallese and other islanders during these environmentally unsound experiments.91 
 Second, inhabitants of the Bikini, Eniwetok, and Kwajalein atolls engaged in 
negotiations with the federal government over compensation for the loss of land to 
nuclear tests and military bases.  The United States continuously attempted to secure 
agreements offering annuities to individuals displaced by radioactive fallout or the 
construction of military bases.  The method of payment resembled the old annuity system 
on American Indian reservations.  The federal government paid a set amount at the 
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signing of the agreement.  The remaining balance went into a trust account for the 
previous occupants to provide annual payments.  The islanders, however, preferred to 
remain on their land.  They knew better than anyone else the agricultural value of their 
homelands.  Unlike the American West, there were no deserts to irrigate in the Trust 
Territories of the Pacific Islands.  They could not engineer marginal acres for agriculture 
or grazing.  Losing land in the South Pacific meant the loss of one’s livelihood and 
independence.  Unable to produce their own food, the former residents would become 
dependent on the marketplace and the pitiful annuity system for their sustenance.92 
 Previously the continuity of the territorial system throughout the American West 
and into the Hawaiian Islands was discussed.  It did not, however, extend into the insular 
territories.  Although the Supreme Court grounded its decision that the constitution does 
not follow the flag93 in the history American continental expansion, the colonial 
governments erected in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Samoa, and the Trust 
Territories of the Pacific Islands differed dramatically from the territorial governments. 
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 Whereas the governance of the insular possessions differed from Hawai’i and the 
American West, the treatment of indigenous inhabitants did not.  American perceptions 
of “the other” originated in its relations with the Native nations of the North American 
continent.  American Indian policy emerged from the fires of the American Revolution 
with the clear purpose of subduing indigenous resistance while facilitating white 
expansion.  As the nation grew in size, wealth, and population, its treatment of First 
Peoples experienced a reciprocal process of degradation.    
 To conquer the Native peoples of North America, the United States relied on 
warfare and treaties, or to put it more candidly, Americans relied on violence or the threat 
of violence.  The loss of sovereignty developed somewhat differently in the Pacific 
Ocean.  The United States of America gained control over its insular possessions, except 
the Hawaiian Islands, through treaty negotiations and wars with other European powers.  
American Samoa was the product of negotiations with Germany.  Spain relinquished 
control over the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American War of 
1898.  Finally, the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands fell into American hands after 
World War II.  Hawai’i, on the other hand, came under American dominion as a result of 
intrigue from within, a process similar to that of Texas. 
 Within every American territory, incorporated or unincorporated, indigenous 
people struggled to retain their sovereignty.  Land always served as the principle object, 
the primary goal, of indigenous efforts to regain control over their own destinies.  Land is 
everything in decolonization movements.94  For Native Americans, their struggle lay in 
retaining control over the little territory left to them, and in some cases, retaining the right 
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to govern themselves.  Hawaiians fought throughout the early 1900s to reverse the coup 
d’état of 1893.  Unsuccessful in that endeavor, they began and continue to resist the 
incursion into their Native lands of tourist facilities, military bases, and immigrants 
(albeit American or foreigners).  Finally, Filipinos were the only Pacific Islanders to 
succeed in overthrowing American colonial rule.  Granted, the economic ties of neo-
colonialism keep the republic within the American orbit, but they remain the only 
successful decolonization movement in American History.  South Pacific Islanders, 
however, will continue to suffer the effects of American colonization so long as the 
radioactive fallout remains in their environment.  As the crater of Elugelab, the tailings of 
Dinétah, and the wasteland of Kaho’olawe can attest, the violence and destructiveness of 
American colonization has completely reshaped the world of the indigenous peoples of 
the American West and Pacific Ocean. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
HAWAIIAN BOOSTERISM AND STATEHOOD  
 
 On March 3, 1953, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs submitted 
House Report No. 109, Enabling the People of Hawaii to Form a Constitution and State 
Government and to be Admitted into the Union on an Equal Footing with the Original 
States, to the House.  It recommended acceptance of House Resolution 3575, yet another 
bill that attempted to set in motion the admittance of the Territory of Hawai’i as a state.  
Hawaiians had long since dreamed of this day.  Conquered by American settlers in 1893 
and annexed by the United States in 1898, Hawai’i and Alaska remained the last two 
incorporated territories in 1953.  Both territories contained sizeable white settlements 
culturally linked to the “lower 48 states” as well as diverse cultures, and both were eager 
to join the Union.  In the document, the committee members considered Hawaiian 
citizens fine products of American society who were ready and qualified to join the 
American Union as a state.  Although it reported favorably, territorial inhabitants would 
wait another six years before President Dwight D. Eisenhower would sign PL 86-3, 
formally accepting the atoll as an equal to the other American states.1 
  The report in and of itself was not remarkable.  It neither generated enough 
congressional support to pass H.R. 3575 nor was it the first of its kind.  Throughout the 
early to mid-twentieth century, congressmen had debated the merits of adding Hawai’i to 
the Union.  Congressmen and senators periodically visited the islands on fact-finding 
tours and had conducted congressional investigations throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 
1950s, usually returning with favorable impressions of life in the atolls.  Territorial 
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legislatures joined in the push to grant Hawaiians full participation in American society 
by presenting memorials to Congress requesting the passage of an enabling act at least 
fourteen times prior to 1959.  Needless to say, reports on the Territory of Hawai’i were 
commonplace by 1953.  So what was remarkable or noteworthy about this particular 
report?  The importance of H. Rep. 109 lies in the source of the information contained in 
its pages.  Reading through the document, the language and content resembled earlier 
reports, like House Report 194, passed March 27, 1947, in which members of the 
Committee on Public Lands provided reprints of historical documents, facts, figures, 
tables, and interviews, in addition to recommending favorable action on an enabling act 
for the territory.2  Starting on page fifty-five in the appendix of the latest in a series of 
reports, however, the authors included a summary of every congressional investigation of 
the atoll since 1935.  Following this section were tables, charts, lists, and other 
information on the territory, all credited to a nondescript organization, called the Hawaii 
Statehood Commission, located in Washington, D.C.3  From the text alone, congressional 
leaders or modern readers could simply assume that this was yet another non-profit 
organization or lobbyist group supplying Capitol Hill with information.  Such institutions 
were not uncommon to Washington, D.C.  Yet, this institution was novel to the territorial 
process.  It was an organization sponsored and funded by a territorial legislature for the 
sole purpose of advancing statehood through research, entertainment, advertisement, and 
mass communication. 
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 Commissioned in 1947, the Hawaii Statehood Commission was the predecessor to 
the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission.4  These two organizations served as the principle 
vehicles for the statehood movement in the mid 1900s.  Chartered in 1935 and revised in 
1937 and 1939, the Hawaiian Territorial Legislature charged the Hawaii Equal Rights 
Commission with the broad task of compiling information that supported the rights of the 
territory and its inhabitants from facing discriminatory legislation; compiling information 
that assisted territorial legislative goals; preventing, combating, and correcting 
misinformation about the islands and their inhabitants; assisting the territorial delegate, 
territorial legislature, and federal statesmen when drafting congressional legislation; and, 
finally, preparing biennial reports.  To aid the Commission with this monumental task, 
the Hawaiian Territorial Legislature authorized the opening of an office in Washington, 
D.C., and the appropriation of funds for a support staff.5  The duties attributed to the 
Hawaii Equal Rights Commission may have primarily emphasized ensuring equal 
treatment of the islands with the states,6 yet they also promoted the incorporated, insular 
territory as an American region capable of self-government and deserving of full 
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inclusion into the American political system.  When they created the Hawaii Statehood 
Commission to replace the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission in 1947, Hawaiian 
legislators dropped or subordinated the responsibility of ensuring equality.  Now, the 
primary focus of the Commission was gaining statehood.7 
 For twenty-five years, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, Hawaii Statehood 
Commission, territorial delegates, Hawaiian businesses, and private citizens waged an 
unrelenting campaign for Hawaiian statehood.  During this time, they utilized every 
legitimate means to achieve their goals.  Whether it was entertaining congressional 
dignitaries, or publishing material on Hawaiian culture and politics, pro-statehood forces 
blended modern advertising with political lobbying to sway public and congressional 
opinion.  
 Congress already had experience with territorial populations pressing for 
statehood.  After all, New Mexico and Arizona entered the union in 1912 after a 
protracted campaign that ran from the late 1890s into the early 1910s.  In 1896, Utah 
finally entered the Union as a state after overcoming numerous obstacles.  Their 
territorial duration also lasted a significant period of time, as they began moving towards 
statehood as early as 1849.  So how exactly does the Hawaiian campaign fit into the 
present paradigm for Western American History?  From roughly 1898 to 1959, Hawaiian 
citizens continuously pushed for statehood.  To aid their campaign for full political 
incorporation into the American Union, Hawaiians combined the tested tools used by 
politicians to advance statehood for the continental territories with advertising methods 
championed by boosters and railroads to draw settlers and tourists west.  Between 1935 
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and 1959, Hawaiians perfected their techniques which ultimately won them the public 
support in continental states needed to sway congressional votes in favor of statehood. 
 To understand fully the advertising innovations made during the Hawaiian 
statehood campaign, it is necessary to analyze the differences between more traditional 
statehood movements and western boosterism.  Although most major cities throughout 
the nation engaged in some form of place promotion in their history, this phenomenon 
occurred most extensively in the American West.  In the region west of the Mississippi 
River, the federal government possessed large tracts of land conquered from Native 
Americans and the Mexican Republic.  Selling these lands relied on drawing settlers from 
the eastern seaboard or Europe.  The federal government assisted in this process by 
passing legislation like the Homestead Act of 1862, which offered potential settlers 160 
acres of land in the West.  The offer applied to men, women, American citizens, and even 
foreigners.  To claim the land, the individual simply had to pay a filing fee and improve 
and live on the land for five years.  Later legislation added to the attractiveness of 
western lands by increasing the size of the land offered or extra benefits for planting 
trees.8  The federal government could pass any number of bills to entice settlers into 
leaving their homes, but such measures did not always prove effective in combating the 
negative imagery associated with the West. 
 Second, westerners faced the challenge of dispelling popular, negative images 
about the region.  Americans have long associated three characteristics with the 
American West:  treeless, flat, and arid.  Portions of California, Oregon, and Washington 
escaped this misleading imagery, but the Great Plains and the Southwest did not.  After 
                                                 
8 For more information on federal land legislation and incentives, see Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune 
and None of My Own”:  A New History of the American West (Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991), 1410-154. 
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all, American primers adopted Major Stephen Long’s description of the Great Plains as 
the Great American Desert until the late nineteenth century.  Although Americans may 
not have associated California and Oregon Country with these three images, they did 
associate most western regions as places void of or deficient in the modern amenities of 
urban life.  Potential migrants desired a fresh start, yet they also wanted access to schools, 
theatres, stores, and other institutions.9 
 Luring settlers and combating negative imagery challenged western statesmen, 
businessmen, and private citizens who wanted to see their territories and cities increase in 
agricultural production and population, respectively.  Accomplishing this goal required 
both individual and joint efforts.  Generally speaking, railroads were the principal agent 
of place promotion in the West.  Territorial governments also engaged in boosterism, yet 
budget restrictions limited their overall participation in the process.  Private individuals 
also joined in efforts to promote their homelands to other Americans.  Their motives 
ranged from possessing a deep passion for the land or recognizing the economic and 
social benefits of an increased population.  And though territorial governments and 
residents wrote and published literature favorable to the region, their ability to 
disseminate this information on a large scale over extended periods of time was limited.10 
                                                 
9 G. Malcolm Lewis, “Rhetoric of the Western Interior:  Modes of Environmental Description in American 
Promotional Literature of the Nineteenth Century,” in The Iconography of Landscape:  Essays on the 
symbolic representation, design, and use of past environments, Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds, 
Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography, eds. Alan R.H. Baker, J.B. Harley, and David Ward (New 
York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), 184; and David M. Emmons, Garden in the Grasslands:  
Boomer Literature of the Central Great Plains (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1971), ix. 
10 Emmons, Garden in the Grasslands, 47-56; David M. Wrobel, Promised Lands:  Promotion, Memory, 
and the Creation of the American West (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 2002), 72-73; and Earl 
Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, 1861-1890:  Studies in Colonial Administration (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 1947; Reprint, 1969), 22.  Pomeroy observed that territorial legislatures 
used their annual reports to the Department of the Interior to relay information to individuals curious about 
the territory.  This was one way territories could provide information to prospective settlers at a very low 
cost to their budgets. 
190 
 
 Railroads, on the other hand, had the means, the determination, and the financial 
incentive to sink significant funds into promotional schemes.  Constructing a 
transnational railroad linking the west coast to the east coast was a dream dreamt by the 
federal government prior to the American Civil War.  Following the defeat of the 
southern states in 1865 and the ascendancy of the Republican Party, little dissent stood in 
the way of realizing this lofty ambition.  To foster the spread of railroads throughout the 
western territories, congressmen turned to the railroad industry.  By offering significant 
tracts of land at discounted prices and giving railroads huge amounts of free real estate, 
Congress initiated a period of massive expansion of the national transit system 
throughout the region.  The mere presence of a transcontinental rail network 
automatically benefitted the nation. 
 While the railroad industry led commercial ventures in profit and wealth, their 
business was completely reliant on the presence of a populated countryside and thriving 
cities.  Owning trains and rail systems was not enough; railroads needed passengers and 
cargo to generate revenue which would not come without sufficient settlement in the 
territories and western states.  Boosterism provided an answer to this dilemma.  Railroad 
companies hired promoters to write tracts, gazettes, and other literature for distribution in 
the eastern states, as well as European nations.  They also created or used immigration 
bureaus as “disinterested” third parties to conduct transactions and sell their land.  Since 
these efforts brought settlers, and therefore taxpayers, to the territories and states, western 
legislatures sometimes assisted the railroads in their efforts.11 
                                                 
11 Emmons, Garden in the Grasslands, 17, 47-56; Wrobel, Promised Lands, 6; Lewis, “Rhetoric of the 
Western Interior,” 182. 
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 Promoters used a standard set of tactics to lure settlers to the land.  Often, they 
portrayed western lands as Edenic.  Instead of a flat, treeless, arid region, the Great Plains 
became a place in which the land was fertile, rain would follow the plow, and building 
supplies were easily found on the land or in local stores.  If an area had a sparse 
population, promoters twisted the truth to suggest a region in which the frontier stood to 
close soon, thus increasing the value of the land.  They described sparsely populated 
regions as areas quickly filling with industrious farmers and businessmen intent on 
developing schools, city infrastructure, and other creature comforts.  As David Wrobel 
notes, western promotion campaigns “were imaginative efforts to bring places into 
existence.”12  By glossing over the unattractive parts of the region and overemphasizing 
the pleasant or perceived, boosters sought to erase misperceptions or negative imagery to 
promote settlement, tourism, or investment.13 
 Historians of the American West usually separate boosterism from statehood 
efforts and for good reason.  Promotional literature targeted Europeans and eastern 
Americans for potential relocation to the region, or to increase the number of tourists 
visiting the region.  Boosterism, in other words, was a form of advertisement employed 
by railroads, businesses, territorial governments, and private citizens for very specific 
commercial purposes.  Territorial statehood drives, on the other hand, were political 
affairs that relied on networks forged between territorial residents and delegates with 
congressional representatives and senators.  Once a region met the minimum population 
quota as established by the precedent set by the Northwest Ordinance and developed the 
necessary social infrastructure—schools, churches, banks, businesses, state capitol, basic 
                                                 
12 Wrobel, Promised Lands, 3. 
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industry, railroads—the territorial legislature composed a memorial to Congress 
requesting statehood.  The territorial delegate then delivered this and used his political 
contacts to move it through the House of Representatives and the Senate.  Granted, this 
was the basic plan of attack.  Each territory had its own unique experience with this 
process.  This is not to say that statehood drives lacked a measure of advertisement or 
place promotion.  Territorial legislatures and delegates sometimes had to contend with 
congressmen’s preconceived notions of the fitness of a territory to enter the union.  The 
degree and tools used to overcome congressional opposition, however, were different 
than the tactics utilized by boosters. 
 For example, on February 2, 1848, the United States of America formally ratified 
the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which transferred lands claimed by the Republic of 
Mexico in the present-day Southwest to the American nation.  One year later, a religious 
group—the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints—living in the Great Basin region 
applied for admission into the Union.  Possessing a stable government, extensive public 
infrastructure, and a viable economy, the Mormons met the basic criteria for statehood 
according to their calculations.  Congress thought otherwise.  The Mormons practiced 
polygamy, which most Americans considered distasteful.  Also, Brigham Young and the 
church elders held absolute control over political, social, religious, and economic affairs 
in Deseret, a feature contradictory to the requirement established by the Northwest 
Ordinance for a republican government.  Throughout the mid-1800s, the inhabitants of 
Deseret continued to push their claims for statehood.  Unfortunately for them, the brief 
Mormon War of 1857-1858, the dominance of church leadership, and the presence of 
polygamy clashed with and complicated the issue.  Following the Civil War and the 
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ascension of the Republican Party, polygamy became the newest target for national 
reform.  In 1882, the Edmunds Bill attempted to end this practice by declaring polygamy 
illegal, punishable by $500 and up to 5 years in jail.14  
 Overcoming opposition to statehood was a product of political developments as 
opposed to an act of promotion.  In 1872, residents officially abandoned the Deseret 
constitution—and thereby the dream of a Mormon state—and drafted a new constitution 
for Utah Territory, which occurred towards the end of the one-party system within the 
region.  From 1865-1878, non-Mormon Utahans successfully organized a second party, 
the Liberty Party, to challenge the church leaders’ political hegemony.  With the opening 
of the Mormon economy to the Southwest and the growth of the “gentile” population, 
religious leaders realized that the territorial political system had to accommodate an 
increasing non-Mormon population.  Greater support for the Liberty Party was indicative 
of this development.  The next important political obstacle to fall was the Nauvoo 
Legion.  Established during their residence in Nauvoo, Illinois, in the 1840s, the militia 
protected the community from possible anti-Mormon violence.  Although the militia was 
a defensive unit, their Illinoisan neighbors perceived the paramilitary unit as a move by 
the Mormons to establish a military presence in their state.  Joseph Smith intensified their 
fears of the Nauvoo Legion when he used it to destroy an anti-Mormon newspaper press, 
the Nauvoo Expositor, in 1844.  These perceptions of the Nauvoo Legion followed the 
unit to Utah.  Through most of their territorial history, the Mormons kept the 
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controversial militia; however, in 1884, Utah leaders finally relented to external pressures 
and dismantled it.15  The final step in resolving the political barricades to statehood 
occurred on September 28, 1890, when the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
officially abandoned polygamy.  Afterwards, the move to statehood occurred with 
relative speed.  In November 1892, Congress passed an enabling act, and statehood 
followed two months later on January 4, 1896, when President Grover Cleveland signed 
the bill incorporating Utah into the United States.16 
 Opposition to Utah emphasized religious and political differences, while 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona faced political obstacles muddled by American 
racism.  All three potential states contained significant Latino populations.  Since they 
represented the earliest settlements in the territories, community infrastructure reflected 
their Spanish heritage.  In these three territories, parochial schools represented a large 
segment of the education system.  Given the prevalence of anti-Catholicism and 
xenophobia in the United States during the late 1800s and early 1900s, American 
statesmen were reluctant to admit territories with educational facilities dominated by a 
non-Protestant denomination.  In Colorado, statesmen overcame the racial and political 
obstacles by 1874.  The territories of New Mexico and Arizona, on the other hand, 
remained territories into the post-Spanish American War period, an era marked by 
increased American imperialism overseas.  As Howard Lamar noted in his study of 
southwestern territorial history,  many of the concerns over granting these territories 
statehood 
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 grew out of the Spanish-American War:  whether America should be an imperial  
nation with colonies or should accept the new possessions of Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines as an eventual part of the American Union. . . . More important for the 
Southwest was the fact that the war had been with Spain.  Thus the backward and 
underdeveloped colonies that the United States had acquired possessed a Spanish 
colonial culture, possessed also by the Arizona and New Mexico in varying 
proportions.17 
 
While territorial proximity to the other states and the source of potential white 
immigration helped these regions deny race-based anti-statehood arguments, political 
forces played a dominant role throughout the battle to achieve statehood.  Granted, there 
was a degree of pandering to leading political leaders.  The citizens of Central City, 
Colorado Territory, for example, gave President Ulysses S. Grant a royal treatment when 
he visited them, including the use of a silver-bricked walkway from his carriage to the 
hotel.  But these incidents were tangential to the political effort.18  Hawaiian politicians, 
on the other hand, found it necessary to combine political maneuvering with mass 
promotion to overcome anti-statehood forces.  New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, 
and other western territories had to show proof that they had successfully completed the 
requirements established by the Northwest Ordinance.  Hawai’i, on the other hand, first 
had to persuade the American public that they had the right to be considered for complete 
political union years after they met all requirements established for potential states. 
 Hawai’i also had to confront public misperceptions about race, geography, and 
republicanism in the territory before achieving statehood.  As previously noted in chapter 
four, statehood opponents throughout the nation focused on the noncontiguous 
geographical location of the atoll.  Separated by 2,300 miles of open water, the Hawaiian 
Islands appeared to be the most isolated of territories.  Politicians noted this fact about 
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Hawaiian geography during Congressional debates over annexation as well as statehood.  
After the conclusion of World War II, the issue continued to reappear.  As European 
colonies erupted in decolonization movements, Hawaii’s status as a non-self-governing 
territory separated by miles of ocean enhanced the arguments against statehood by 
compromising the image of America as a bastion of freedom, as well as raising questions 
regarding Americans’ legal and moral right to hold dominion over the former monarchy.  
During the Cold War, statehood proponents also countered noncontiguous arguments by 
illustrating that Hawaiian statehood would extend American borders deep into the Pacific 
Ocean, thereby projecting its military power into Asia.19 
 While Hawaiian statesmen and citizens reminded Americans of the equal isolation 
of California and the Oregon Country prior to 1869 as a quick counter to this issue, 
statehood proponents experienced more difficulty countering anti-statehood attacks on 
issues of race, geography, and communism in the Hawaiian Islands.20  For these three 
topics, islanders relied heavily on a new method of statehood promotion that combined 
both boosterism and past territorial politics from the continental American West.  In this 
process, the territorial legislature worked intimately with private citizens, federal 
organizations, state commissions and committees, and private citizens to advance the 
cause of statehood.  Although the statehood movement began as early as 1903—perhaps 
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even earlier if one includes the annexation debate of 1854—proponents perfected their 
new tactics of overcoming challenges to the Hawaiian right of entry into the American 
Union between 1935 and 1959. 
  Beginning with racial issues, eastern American migrants transplanted their 
attitudes towards ethnicity in the Hawaiian Islands, just as they had done in the American 
West.  Although some visitors and settlers considered race relations between Euro-
Americans, Japanese Americans, Native Hawaiians, Part-Hawaiians, Chinese Americans, 
and Filipino Americans as positive,21  negative stereotypes concerning the ethnic makeup 
of the island or news stories concerning conflict between Euro-Americans and non-Euro-
Americans had a more significant impact on the issue of statehood.  In fact, their 
influence affected the movement so significantly that the Hawaii Equal Rights 
Commission, Citizens’ Statehood Committee, Hawaii Statehood Commission, territorial 
representatives, and private statehood supporters continuously addressed the issue 
throughout the statehood process. 
 As shown in Table 3:  Population of Hawai’i, 1900-1960, the descendants of 
immigrants from Asian countries accounted for the majority of the population living in 
the Territory of Hawai’i, a population pattern that began under the Kamehameha dynasty.  
With European diseases devastating the Native Hawaiian population, Hawaiian monarchs 
looked abroad for a new labor source.  In 1850, Kauikeaouli passed the Act for the 
Government of Masters and Servants establishing the rules for immigrant labor to the 
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islands.22  As the Native Hawaiian population continued to diminish and sugar 
production increased in economic importance, plantation owners continued to pres
more labor
s for 
ers.   
Table 3:  Population of Hawai'i, 1900-1960 
 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1945 1950 1960 
All Groups 154,001 191,909 255,912 368,336 423,330  499,769 632,772 
Hawaiian 29,799 26,041 23,723 22,636 14,375 10,988 12,245 11,294 
Part 
Hawaiian 9,857 12,506 18,027 28,224 49,935 61,422 73,845 91,109 
Caucasian 26,819 44,048 54,742 80,373 112,087 172,583 124,344 202,230 
Portuguese 18,272 22,301 27,002 27,588     
Puerto Rican  4,890 5,602 6,671 8,296 9,090 9,551  
Spanish  1,990 2,430 1,219     
Other 
Caucasian 8,547 14,867 19,708 44,895 103,791  114,793  
Chinese 25,767 21,674 23,507 27,179 28,774 30,005 32,376 38,197 
Filipino  2,361 21,031 63,052 52,569 46,464 61,062 69,070 
Japanese 61111 79,675 109,274 139,631 157,905 163,300 184,598 203,455 
Korean  4,533 4,950 6,461 6,851 7,042 7,030  
African 
American 233 695 348 563 255  2,651 4,943 
Native 
American        472 
All Others 415 376 310 217 579  1,618 12,002 
 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1945 1950 1960 
All Groups 154,001 191,909 255,912 368,336 423,330  499,769 632,772 
Hawaiian 29,799 26,041 23,723 22,636 14,375 10,988 12,245 11,294 
Statistics taken from Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii (Honolulu:  University of 
Hawaii Press, 1977), 25; and Citizens’ Statehood Committee, Statehood for Hawaii (Honolulu) 35, 39-
40, box 11, fo. 534, Joseph Rider Farrington Papers, M-473, Hawai’i State Archives, 27. 
 
 The Reciprocity Treaty of 1876 further stimulated planters’ desire for Asian 
laborers.  Though they repeatedly tried luring white agricultural laborers to the islands, 
this ethnic group showed great reluctance to travel to the Hawaiian Islands to serve as 
manual laborers in a tropical climate.  Asian laborers, however, readily accepted the 
opportunity to earn money for their families.  As Ralph Kuykendall noted in The 
Kalakaua Dynasty, in 1876 only 55,000 people lived in the atoll, out of which only 2,500 
were Chinese.  The Reciprocity Treaty and the subsequent increase in immigration 
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forever changed this as more immigrant laborers from China, Korea, Japan, and the 
Philippine Islands arrived each year.23 
 Throughout the territorial period, Japanese Americans represented the largest 
ethnicity in Hawai’i.  In 1900, out of 154,001 residents in the islands, 61,111, or 39.6%, 
were of Japanese descent.  One year after statehood, their numbers increased to 184,598 
out of 499,769, although this group declined in total proportion of island ethnicities to 
36.9%.  The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 and Immigration Act of 1924 contributed 
significantly to the stabilization of the Japanese American population.  When the United 
States annexed the islands, congressmen applied the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to 
the islands in response to western anti-Chinese agitation.24  When restrictions to Chinese 
immigration were extended to the islands, plantation owners showed a degree of 
reluctance to accept these measures.  They anticipated unrest and labor shortages.  Strikes 
by Japanese American plantation laborers and the increased economic success of this 
ethnic group soured the opinions held by businessmen towards this group.  Then in 1920 
Japanese Americans and Filipino Americans engaged in two strikes, separated by 
ethnicity, for increased wages and better working conditions.  These strikes were among 
the earliest significant labor movements in Hawai’i that threatened to upset plantation-
owner hegemony.  By resisting poor labor conditions in the islands and showing a desire 
for self-improvement, Japanese Americans cast off the racial stereotype of docile workers 
in the islands.25 
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 Japanese Americans were not the only non-European immigrant group in the 
islands.  Critics of Hawai’i pointed to the general “imbalance” between Euro-American 
settlers and “the other.”  Here was a classic instance in which a colonizing group, 
dependent on the economic and political benefits derived from its position as the 
colonizer, attempted to maintain its power by demonizing the subaltern ethnicities.  In 
their own view, white settlers of the Hawaiian Islands were the civilizing, industrious 
force in the region, but their status as the minority group threatened the advancements 
made in colonial infrastructure and prevented any possibility of inclusion into the 
American political union, at least until 1958.  As seen in the chart, white settlers 
represented 26,819, or 17.4%, of the population in 1900.  By 1960, their numbers 
increased to 202,230, or 31.9%, of the population; however, as a group, they were still a 
minority, whereas the white population in the continental territories overshadowed non-
European American, South American, Central American, African American, and Native 
American groups. 
 Conflicts between European Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans 
further enhanced the negative image of the Hawaiian Islands ethnic makeup.  The Massie 
case is exemplary of the effect conflicts between these ethnicities could have on 
continental Americans’ perceptions of the Hawaiian Islands.  On September 12, 1931, 
Thalia Massie, the young bride of Lieutenant Thomas H. Massie, US Navy, left a party 
early after growing bored.  She departed from the Ala Wai Inn, Waikiki district, 
Honolulu, at 11:30 p.m.  Three young men, whom Thalia Massie later identified as 
Joseph Kahahawai, Chang, and Ahakuelo, purportedly abducted, robbed, and raped the 
young woman on her return to the hotel.  After hearing testimony from Mrs. Massie, the 
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Honolulu Police Department detained Kahahawai, Chang, and Ahakuelo.  The case went 
to court with the first legal battle ending in a mistrial.  The prosecutors and defense 
attorneys were preparing for a second trial, when on January 8, 1932, Lt. Massie and two 
enlisted men, E.J. Lord and A.G. Jones, drove to the courthouse and lured Joseph 
Kahahawai into their vehicle.  They then took Kahahawai to the home of Mrs. Granville 
Fortescue, Thalia Massie’s mother.  There, Lt. Massie shot the unarmed Kahahawai in an 
act of vigilante murder.  Events that were less than three months in the making would 
fixate the attention of the continental United States for the next five months as the US 
Navy, Territory of Hawai’i, and American population debated over the nature of the 
murder, the effectiveness of the Hawaiian legal system, and race relations on the 
islands.26 
 Following the arrest of Mrs. Granville Fortescue, Massie, Lord, and Jones, major 
national newspapers erupted in a chorus of controversy.  The popularity of the young 
Massie couple, Lt. Massie’s prominent Kentucky roots, and the alleged assault of a white 
female by Native Hawaiian “thugs” further exacerbated an already intense situation.  
Rumors circulated on military bases located in Hawai’i of potential racial conflict.  Rear-
Admiral Yates Stirling, Jr., commanding officer of forces stationed in Hawai’i, publicly 
denounced the situation, saying crime in Honolulu was “intolerable.”27  Rallying around 
their comrades, the US Navy issued a statement announcing its intentions to boycott 
Honolulu by visiting other Hawaiian harbors.  The furor also spilled over to the mainland.  
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Americans read of the Massie murders in major newspaper publications.  The U.S. 
Attorney-General even visited the islands to investigate rumors of rampant crime and an 
incompetent judicial system in the region.28   
 After five months, the Massie case ended with the four suspects’ conviction of 
second-degree murder.  Hawai’i Territory Governor Lawrence M. Judd, however, 
commuted their sentences after one hour.  In the end, public pressures and tensions 
among Hawaiian Islanders, the federal government, and the U.S. populace won out over 
justice.  Rather than run the risk of alienating the mainland, Gov. Judd decided to release 
the prisoners and return them to the states.29  It appears that even Hawai’i, Paradise of the 
Pacific, melting pot of all races, was not immune to vigilante justice.   
 Governor Judd’s decision to commute Massie, Fortescue, Lord, and Jones’s 
sentences may have preserved the peace, but sixteen years later feelings of injustice 
planted by the Massie case would return to the islands in the Major-Palakiko case.  In 
March 1948, authorities discovered the body of a wealthy haole woman murdered in her 
home.  After an investigation, they charged two Kānaka escapees from the Oahu prison 
with the crime.  Found guilty, they were sentenced to die by hanging.  Unlike the guilty 
parties in the Massie trial, appealing to the governor failed to keep the men from their 
appointed execution dates.  In a study of the Major-Palakiko case five years later, 
Bernhard L Hormann discovered that the case became “a symbol to various component 
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population elements in Hawaii.”30  Reflecting on past trials and experiences of the 
Hawaiian judicial system, persons of Japanese, Hawaiian, Chinese, and “other non-Haole 
groups” perceived injustice in the way the legal system gave white residents special 
treatment.  Hawaiian law, it seemed to them, was two-sided.  Swift, hard justice 
descended on non-white suspects and criminals, while whites received lighter sentences, 
or in the case of Massie and his accomplices, no punishment at all.31 
 Massie’s vigilantism and the skewed justice system of the Major-Palakiko case 
were symptomatic of American racial views at the time.  Throughout the southern states, 
justice for white Americans was not the same “justice” experienced by African 
Americans.  Regional violence and community vigilantism were present in the American 
West.  Western communities resorted to vigilante justice when social trends diverted 
from the accepted norm or when local law enforcement proved ineffectual.  Granted, 
Hawaiian history does not reveal any large social vigilante movements.32  Yet, the 
slanted judicial system was symptomatic of the West as a whole.  Throughout the regio
law enforcement agents or vigilante groups often terrorized Mexican, Chinese, and 
Japanese immigrants.  In many western courtrooms, judges permitted the exclusion of 
testimonies by Chinese Americans, Native Americans, South Americans, and Central 
Americans on the grounds that they could not understand the oath required to testi
even in instances of religious or cultural differences.  White violence toward these 
generally originated from cultural differences or cyclical downturns in the economy; 
however, historical developments generated mob and law violence, as well.  In the case 
n, 
fy, or 
groups 
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of the Texas Rangers, border conflicts begun during the Texas Revolution and U.S.-
Mexico War continued throughout the late 1800s and into the early 1900s.33  One could 
say that western legal culture embraced the racial prejudices of society. 
 During the rising tensions of the 1930s between the United States and the 
Japanese, as well as the horrors and turmoil of World War II, Americans considered the 
Japanese American population on the mainland and the Hawaiian Islands as a threat, a 
subversive element in society that threatened to sabotage the war effort.  The Roosevelt 
Administration responded to this perceived threat with Executive Order 9066 in February 
1942 authorizing the removal of the Nisei and Issei to concentration camps situated in the 
interior of the nation.  This was not the first instance where the nation overreacted to a 
perceived threat within its borders.  During the Red Scare of 1919, federal policies 
targeted socialists, communists, and leftists in an attempt to silence subversive political 
ideologies.  Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans considered Native Americans 
as the largest internal threat.  Their response ranged from the Indian Removal Act of 
1830 and the reservation system to genocidal campaigns like that of Sand Creek in 1864.  
Hawaiian minorities and labor leaders suffered civil oppression as well during the 1940s 
and 1950s.  Whereas the Japanese American population was the source of fear throughout 
World War II, labor leaders and suspected communists became the hidden enemy during 
the post-World War II statehood movement.  The result was the same as their political 
rights were sacrificed in the name of a greater good. 
 By the 1940s, labor unions evolved into the major source of opposition to the 
entrenched powers in the Hawaiian Islands.  But this did not happen overnight.  The 
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Hawaiian labor movement developed with each new generation of workers.  Labor 
unions and strikes of the 1920s and 1930s were different in composition than those of the 
post-World War II era.  As Moon-Kie Jung noted in “No Whites, No Asians:  Race, 
Marxism, and Hawai’i’s Preemergent Working Class,” pre-World War II labor was 
ethnically fragmented.  Plantation owners knowingly divided their workforce according 
to race to prevent unionization and strikes.  It was not uncommon to see a Japanese or 
Kānaka luna34overseeing a work gang of Chinese or Filipino laborers.  By providing 
low-level supervisory and managerial positions to certain ethnicities while closing them
to others, plantation owners successfully fomented animosity among their laborers.  Th
different ethnic groups also added to this process through their own action and 
preconceived racial views.  The living arrangements mirrored the views of ethnic 
minorities towards each other with plantation housing segregated throughout the early 
1900s.  When the Immigration Act of 1924 completely barred the importation of 
Japanese and Chinese laborers into the Territory of Hawai’i, business owners turned to 
the Philippine Islands as a source of imported labor.  To the more established ethnicities, 
the word Filipino became associated with cheap labor.  The division was not confined 
only to racial and class perceptions.  Ethnic blocks conducted the strikes of the 1920s and 
1930s.  To illustrate this point, Jung highlights the plantation strikes of 1920 in which 
Filipino laborers and Japanese laborers conducted separate, simultaneous labor stoppages 
for roughly the same terms.
 
e 
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34 The Hawaiian word luna refers to a foreman, manager, or field boss. 
35 Jung, “No Whites, No Asians:  Race, Marxism, and Hawai’i’s Preemergent Working Class,” 357-393.  
See also, Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time:  A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii 
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 Ethnic separation slowly deteriorated during the late 1930s and throughout the 
1940s.  By the conclusion of World War II, the International Longshoremen and 
Warehousemen’s Union emerged as the preeminent union in the islands uniting workers 
of all racial groups present in the territory.  While this new form of collective bargaining 
successfully bridged cultural gaps, its radicalism antagonized conservative elements in 
the Hawaiian Islands.  After the conclusion of World War II, a battle erupted between 
labor and business.  With the advent of McCarthyism, wealthy Hawaiians delivered a 
major blow to the working class by successfully branding the union as a communist 
organization.  Ironically, their actions hampered the statehood cause for almost fifteen 
years. 
 The ILWU had its roots in the 1934 strike located on the West Coast.  That year, 
the International Longshoremen Association (ILA) began a strike in California that 
quickly spread to other parts of the shipping industry, resulting in the absolute shutdown 
of transportation along the docks.  After a compromise between the ILA and business 
leaders, Harry Bridges and other non-compromising union members bolted the 
organization and established the ILWU.  Bridges established the union on the principle 
that he would never compromise or back down during a strike.36  Hawaiian laborers 
needed a union headed by leaders adamant about securing recognition of the workers’ 
voices to break the stranglehold businessmen had on society.  The only thing left to find 
was an energetic leader capable of organizing the masses.   
 Manning the picket lines during the California strikes was a young man named 
Jack Hall.  Introduced early into union life, the young man displayed the qualities 
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necessary to lead the fight in the islands.  His dedication to the union and the cause of the 
laborer later helped him become a driving force in the Hawaiian ILWU chapters.  
Unfortunately, his association with radical labor ideas and the U.S. Communist Party 
during the 1930s would plague Hall and the Hawaiian ILWU during the 1940s and 
1950s.  Hall had joined the party in 1935.37   
 Radical ideas among the working class were not unheard of during the Great 
Depression.  Even the Great Plains, heartland of America and modern home of 
conservatism, witnessed a surge in leftist movements and radical agrarianism.  In 
northeast Montana, Charles E. Taylor established a communist newspaper, Producers 
News, in which he published leftist articles covering the farmers’ plight during the Great 
Depression.  Throughout the Northern Great Plains, non-socialist farmers engaged in 
farm strikes, vigilante action, penny auctions, and protest movements to vent their 
frustration and force politicians to listen to their demands.38 
 Although the federal government recognized the existence of Great Plains 
radicalism, opposition to such movements tended to occur primarily at the local level.  
This radicalism is understandable given the upheaval caused by the financial crisis, dust 
storms, and international events of the 1930s.  America after 1945 was a different story.  
In a world characterized as a battleground between the opposing ideologies of capitalism 
and communism, Americans were less apt to excuse leftist movements or challenges to 
the status quo as the venting of frustration over a broken system.  For laborers in the 
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Territory of Hawai’i, the revival and expansion of organized labor was the rational result 
of the economic stranglehold by the Big Five, Republican Party, and wealthy citizens 
over the islands.39  Hawaiian employers argued that they compensated their workers with 
decent paychecks and ample employment opportunities.  From the perspective of the 
laborer, it was exactly the opposite.  Wages were low, and employment was sporadic.  
Moreover, education and advancement opportunities were limited, at best.  Unionization 
presented the only viable solution to economic slavery.40 
 Naturally, Hawaiian industrial and agribusiness leaders abhorred collective 
bargaining and unionization in any form or fashion.  Having reigned over the economic 
life of the atolls for almost a century, they were loath to relinquish any power to the 
worker.  To combat the growing power of the ILWU, they collectively worked to portray 
labor as a communist-infested segment of Hawaiian society.  In an interview with 
Michaelyn Chou in 1978 ex-territorial delegate Elizabeth Pruitt Farrington dismissed the 
charges of communism.  She said, “But [my husband] Joe41 did say this:  that the trouble 
with the Big Five—then, (there’s no such thing as the real Big Five, but what we refer to 
as the big business interests)—he said, ‘The trouble was that whenever it was an 
economic issue, when the unions wanted the new contract with more money, then the Big 
                                                 
39 Islanders and mainlanders referred to American Factors, Theo. H. Davies, Alexander & Baldwin, Castle 
& Cooke, and C. Brewer—the dominant industrial, agricultural, and commercial business interest in the 
islands—as the Big Five.  Their wealth, landholdings, and political connections gave hegemony over all 
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40 Albert Maunakea, “Looking Things Over,” The ILWU Reporter 1, no. 5, April 19, 1959, 1, 4, University 
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Five yelled “communism” to them when it wasn’t at all.  Then if it was really 
communism, they stayed quiet because the contract was going all right.’  See what I 
mean?”42  Compared to the average laborer, the Farringtons were members of the 
established class.  Joseph Rider Farrington came from a distinguished family, and he was 
part owner of the principle newpaper, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.  When he passed away 
in 1954, Republican Party leaders in the islands offered Elizabeth Farrington the position 
of territorial delegate.  Regardless, reality did not prevent business leaders from charging 
the ILWU and union members as having an association with the Communist Party, 
thereby effectively undermining the ability of labor to wrest political and economic 
power from the Hawaiian old guard. 
 Ironically, the plan devised by businessmen, conservative politicians, and affluent 
citizens to undermine the labor movement provided the anti-Hawai’i statehood opposition 
on the continent and in the isles with ammunition.  Hawaiian statehood posed a threat to 
Southern Democrats in Congress.  The incorporation of a state with a predominately 
Asian population boded ill for their campaign to preserve segregation throughout the 
southern states.  Hoping to preserve the relative balance in Congress, they did not want 
another Republican state with pro-civil rights sympathies to take a seat on Capitol Hill.  
Such a development could tip the balance in favor of social reform.  Since President 
Harry Truman tied Hawaiian statehood to his civil rights program, they continuously 
raised the issue of the presence of a white minority in congressional debates over 
statehood.  While this gained them some support among the American population, it was 
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not enough to guarantee the continued exclusion of the islands from full participation in 
the American democratic process.  The possibility of communism, however, gave them 
the opportunity to ally their cause with other senators and congressmen dedicated to 
winning the Cold War.  From 1946 onward, pro-statehood forces found themselves 
fighting a two-front battle for incorporation.  They not only needed to soothe American 
fears over including an atoll with a population that was 75% non-white,43 but they had to 
confront serious charges of being a home for communists.44 
 Although Southern Democrats eagerly exploited accusations of Hawaiian 
communism to oppose the passage of an enabling act, they were not the only senators to 
block pro-Hawaiian legislation in Congress for this reason.  Throughout the early 1950s, 
Senator Hugh Alfred Butler of Nebraska (Republican) acted as a leading critic of Hawai’i 
statehood because of the alleged presence of communism.  He diligently gathered 
information regarding the supposed communist conspiracy in Hawai’i.  Republicans 
fearing Hawaiian communism found themselves allied with Southern Democrats to 
prevent the incorporation of a traditionally Republican territory into the Union. 
 Groups within Hawai’i further complicated the task of winning statehood for the 
territory.  First, in late 1951 and early 1952, a famous court case against Jack W. Hall, 
Koji Ariyoshi, Jack Denichi Kimoto, Charles Kazuyuki Fujimoto, Eileen Toshko 
                                                 
43 Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 1977), 25; and 
Citizens’ Statehood Committee, Statehood for Hawaii (Honolulu) 35, 39-40, box 11, fo. 534, Joseph Rider 
Farrington Papers, M-473, Hawai’i State Archives, 27.  The statistics are based off of the 1950 census.  In 
their calculations, the two sources included Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, 
African American, and Native American as non “Caucasian,” as well as an ambiguous category, entitled 
“All Others.”  The sources also listed Portuguese, Puerto Rican, and Spanish as white/Caucasion, although 
recent historical findings indicate that these nationalities were not always considered white by American 
society and law.  For more information on “whiteness” in the twentieth-century United States, see Matthew 
Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color:  European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race 
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2000). 
44 Rober Bell, Last Among Equals, 91, 123-139; and “Hawaii Seen Cutting Power of Southern Bloc in 
Senate,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, April 14, 1959, A-36, B-16. 
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Fujimoto, Dwight James Freeman, and John E. Reinecke ended in a guilty verdict.  The 
famous “Trial of Seven” received national press as leading leftists and union organizers 
were tried before a federal judge for violating the Smith Act.  Arrested at the end of 1951, 
the trial took over one year before a jury found all seven defendants guilty in June 
1953.45  The male defendants all received a sentence of five years in prison and a $5,0
fine, while the only female defendant, Eileen Fujimoto, received a lighter sentence of 3 
years and $2,00
00 
0.46   
                                                
 The Trial of Seven received national press coverage since it included prominent 
labor and leftist leaders in the islands.  Moreover, in 1947, Ichiro Izuka named all seven 
defendants as communist leaders, even listing their roles in propagating communism 
throughout the islands, in his pamphlet, The Truth about Communism in Hawaii.47  
Written by a self-professed Whitaker Chambers-like communist who assisted with 
HUAC investigations after admitting his involvement with communist members, this 
publication was a sensation as it provided statehood critics and curious Americans with a 
purportedly accurate narrative of the workings of the Communist Party in Hawai’i.   
 To add to the negative publicity, the Equal Rights Commission, Hawaii Statehood 
Commission, and Citizens’ Statehood Committee faced a determined foe in the form of 
IMUA.  The Hawaii Residents’ Association, Inc., also known as IMUA, was created in 
 
45 “Hawaii’s Docks Boss Convicted with 6 Others,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 20, 1953, 3; Available on 
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1949.  Its stated purpose was threefold:  “1)  Combat Communism and all Un-American 
subversive activities.  2) Live and work together in racial harmony.  3) Demonstrate and 
maintain the American Way of Life.”48  In order to fulfill these goals, the Hawaii 
Residents’ Association recruited prominent, established members of Hawaiian society.  
Former Governor Lawrence M. Judd served as its president in 1955.  Its membership also 
included T.G. Singlehurst of the Bishop Trust Co., Mrs. Walter F. Dillingham,49 retired 
Brigadier General K. J. Fielder, and a number of physicians.50 
 The Hawaii Residents’ Association was very active in its struggle to eliminate 
communism in Hawai’i.  Unfortunately for territorial residents in favor of statehood, their 
relentless crusade damaged the image of Hawai’i throughout the nation.  Its publications, 
speeches, fundraisers, and activities not only proclaimed that a great conspiracy existed in 
the islands to overthrow republicanism and replace it with a Marxist state, but they also 
reached the mainland.  They tracked alleged communists and communist organizations in 
the islands with a fervor reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition. 
 Labor unions were their primary target.  Reviewing their literature, IMUA 
focused their attacks on the ILWU and the United Public Workers’ Union (UPW).  
Reminiscent of the McCarthy hearings before the House Un-American Activities 
Commission (HUAC), IMUA publicly denounced and proclaimed that members of 
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ILWA and UPW, as well as individuals associated with the University of Hawai’i, 
Honolulu schools, and liberal organizations, actively sought to undermine American 
society in the islands.  Americans brought before HUAC risked losing their jobs and 
community standing.  Likewise, members of organizations targeted by IMUA faced the 
possibility of public embarrassment and worse.  Radio programs broadcast throughout the 
islands were a favorite tool of IMUA, and their shows often included segments in which 
the narrator would name suspected communists on the air.  Worse still, they included 
their place of employment and their supposed connection to other communists and the 
ILWU.51  In addition to denouncing these organizations and their members, they also 
targeted members of the Democratic Party.  After the conclusion of World War II, 
working class veterans like Daniel Inouye and Daniel Aoki returned to the islands intent 
on breaking the grip that the Republican Party held on Hawaiian politics.  Allying 
themselves with John Burns, they worked to transform the Democratic Party into a viable 
political organization.  By championing workers’ rights, education, and social programs, 
they quickly captured the attention of working class Hawaiians, as well as the unions.  
This combination, between the unions and the Democrats, placed the party as a threat to 
the American society championed by members of IMUA.52 
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 IMUA inflated the numbers and danger of Hawaiian communists.  There never 
was a large presence of Marxists in the islands.  HUAC teams dispatched to Honolulu 
never uncovered more than 130 members.  Most of these were active in the Communist 
Party throughout the 1930s and 1940s.  J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI operatives reported only 
small groups of communists, not the overarching network of subversives as portrayed by 
IMUA.53  This followed a time of radicalism in the United States of America.  American 
workers lived with an enormous amount of stress throughout the Great Depression.  
Given the uncertainties of the market, the dearth of job opportunities, and the apparent 
failure of capitalism, Americans experimented with leftist ideologies and radical 
programs to fix the system; however, American society in the 1950s wanted an end to 
viable leftist groups.  This allowed them to tolerate such groups as IMUA whose tactics 
would most likely land them in a modern courthouse for slander and libel. 
 Regardless, news of the anti-communist campaign conducted by IMUA and other 
conservatives reached the mainland where it provided Southern Democrats and statehood 
critics with more ammunition.  The task of combating this negative publicity even 
penetrated popular culture as images of a viable, strong, threatening communist presence 
in the islands appeared in movie theatres throughout the states.  In 1952, John Wayne 
starred as HUAC investigator dispatched to the Territory of Hawai’i to find red commies 
in Big Jim McLain.  Assisting McLain in his search for subversives is Mal Baxter, a 
Marine Corps veteran who served in Korea and lost a brother in the Japanese 
bombardment of the U.S.S. Arizona.  In Hawai’i, McLain uncovers a horrendous 
communist plot.  Apparently, Moscow dispatched a shady operative, called Sturak, to 
organize operatives who are members of the local unions.  Although the movie script 
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never directly states the names of the unions, it is easy to identify them as the ILWU and 
UPW.  With the local labor unions and a bacteriologist at his disposal, Sturak plans to 
create a work stoppage at piers throughout Hawai’i to prevent supplies from reaching 
cities.  Simultaneously, the bacteriologist will unleash a deadly disease into the 
population.  With communications cut off, shipping halted, and an infected populace, the 
Hawaiian people will easily fall to the communist cells planted throughout the atoll.  To 
make matters worse, Sturak has no intentions of rewarding his commie stooges.  They, 
too, will fall since they are expendable pawns in the great Cold War chess game.  Luckily 
for America, Big Jim, enraged at the murder of his partner Mal, discovers a secret 
meeting of the last cell in time to arrive, pummels them silly with his manly fists, and 
then lectures them on how Americans “don’t hit the little guy” since they “believe in fair 
play and all that sort of thing.”54 
 For territories in the continental American West, gaining full political 
membership was primarily a political process.  Entertaining visiting federal 
representatives could prove helpful.  At other times, territorial legislatures pressured 
Congress into acting swiftly by drafting and adopting a state constitution prior to the 
passage of an enabling act.  Regardless of the tactic, scholars in the American West have 
highlighted the federal-territorial relationship as the main avenue to statehood. 
 The issue of Hawai’i, on the other hand, was more complex.  When contemplating 
full incorporation of the territory, Americans’ attention turned immediately to the issues 
of non-contiguity, race, and communism.  New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado also 
confronted congressional opposition because of the presence of a significant Mexican-
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American community within their borders, but they also expected the white population to 
increase rapidly with settlement.  Hawaiian attempts to lure European and American 
settlers to the islands always met with failure.  Regardless of their efforts, the racial 
composition in the islands promised to remain mixed.  
 Hawaiians confronted a novel challenge overcoming the negative publicity 
generated by charges of communism during their fight for statehood.  Radical ideologies 
and labor movements were an established fact in the West.  The Knights of Labor 
successfully made inroads in Kansas City politics during the 1880s, even allying 
themselves with the Republicans.55  In 1877, Lampasas County, Texas, residents banded 
together to form the Knights of Reliance, which later became known as the Farmers’ 
Alliance.  Initially a non-political organizations that stressed cooperatives and education, 
the Farmers’ Alliance served as the core for the Populist Movement, a national 
organization of American farmers that peaked after backing William Jennings Bryan 
during the election of 1896.56 Of all the unions and agrarian organizations in the West, 
none matched the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).  While the IWW provided 
members with social activities, its greatest impacts on the region came in the form of 
strikes.  By mobilizing all workers, including migrant laborers, the Wobblies were 
capable of disrupting commerce across large areas.  Their radicalism even went so far as 
to condone sabotaging industrial machinery. While western communities learned to 
accommodate the Populists, Knights of Labor, and other movements, they never accepted 
the radicalism of the IWW.  During the Red Scare that followed World War I, western 
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cities and states utilized public opinion, law enforcement, and state government to crush 
the union.57 
 As shown, labor radicalism was not a new development in the West by the time 
Hawai’i earnestly began its statehood campaign; yet, the charges of communism leveled 
at the territory assumed a new significance during the Cold War.  Following the 
development of nuclear weapons in Russia, the victory of the communist forces in the 
Chinese Civil War, and the advent of McCarthyism in the United States, the rise of the 
ILWU, UPW, and anti-Republican groups suddenly appeared as a significant threat to 
Hawaiian conservatives and mainlanders, creating negative publicity that was vastly 
different from the images of aridity and barrenness plaguing boosters and statehood 
proponents in western territories.  To overcome effectively the challenges posed by race, 
non-contiguity, and communism, Hawaiian statehood promoters had to blend the tactics 
of older western statehood movements with the advertising skills and techniques 
employed by western boosters. 
 Just as place promotion and statehood required the cooperation of state, business, 
and private entities and the use of multiple media, promoting Hawaiian incorporation was 
a massive undertaking.  Private citizens, the territorial legislature, business interests, and 
nonprofit organizations engaged in collective and individual campaign efforts to highlight 
the most attractive features of Hawaiian politics, economics, and culture.  Since their 
opponents successfully associated the Territory of Hawai’i with “un-American” 
characteristics by exaggerating the threats posed by race and communism, statehood 
promoters could not rely on simply presenting Hawai’i in real terms.  To accomplish their 
goal, they, too, would need to exaggerate the beauties of the islands by promoting 
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tourism, monitoring the national press, hosting congressional dignitaries, writing articles 
and editorials, advertising the islands, lobbying Congress, and ensuring a positive 
portrayal of Hawai’i in the national media. 
 On May 3, 1957, Honolulu resident Ray Jerome Baker wrote to his friends, Dr. 
and Mrs. Richard Blum, regarding events occurring around the city.  A renowned local 
photographer, Baker maintained a rather significant correspondence network with friends 
scattered across the nation.  While most of his letters covered topics ranging from his trip 
across Soviet Russia to his views on the foreign policy of “Mr. Dull-ass” (he was an 
ardent critic of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles), his attention through much of 1956 
and 1957 returned to hotel construction along Waikiki by Henry Kaiser, a major 
industrialist who had been visiting the islands since the 1930s.  Recognizing the potential 
profits of Hawaiian tourism, he began constructing hotels after World War II.  By May 3, 
Kaiser had completed another project, a large convention center that Baker called “a huge 
bowl turned upside down; built in such a way that there are no struts, braces or supports 
inside.”58  This building was designed to serve as a convention center for the growing 
number of business tourists arriving in the islands.  Since the conclusion of World War II, 
Baker and other Honolulu residents recognized a growing trend in Honolulu.  Each year, 
more tourists arrived to attend hula dances and luaus, surf the waves at Waikiki, and even 
haunt the dim bars near the hotels.  Prior to World War II, annual tourism hovered around 
25,000 people per annum.  Since the end of the war, these numbers grew swiftly.  In 1958 
alone, 183, 610 visitors arrived in Honolulu, bringing with them $88 million dollars in 
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revenue.  As Baker well observed, the trend was here to stay and forward-thinking 
investors like Henry Kaiser and Conrad Hilton wanted in on the business early.59 
 The tourist industry was important to western continental territories and states, as 
well as Hawai’i, as it generated revenue, encouraged settlement, and dispelled 
misperceptions of the region.  As a promotional tool, it was perfect.  It offered familiarity 
through fun.  Railroad owners and operators recognized that they could earn money 
selling extra land faster if the territory had a sizeable population and strong infrastructure.  
In trying to promote western territories, their interests intersected with those of local 
communities, as well as territorial and state legislatures.  Local western communities 
were expanding and diversifying their economies as the nineteenth century concluded 
and the twentieth century began.  They needed investors, middle class professionals, and 
wealthy entrepreneurs to supplement the largely agrarian population.  They hoped that 
some of their bourgeois visitors would fall in love with the states and decide to establish 
roots there, or at least invest in new business ventures.60 
 Likewise, the interests of the nascent tourist industry coincided with those of the 
territory.  Although the conclusion of the Second World War brought with it record 
numbers of visitors from the mainland (see Table 3), experts predicted that statehood 
would greatly increase these numbers.  It would make people more willing to visit the 
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islands and also increase investment in hotels and other recreational companies.61  
Tourism, in turn, helped statehood proponents counter the negative publicity caused by 
their antagonists by giving the territory a chance to show visitors the better side of island 
life and culture and increasing the industrial base of the Hawaiian economy.  Hawaiian 
businessmen recognized the potential of the tourist industry to make generous profits as 
early as 1902.  In that year civic and economic leaders created the Hawaii Promotion 
Committee, which became the Hawaii Tourist Bureau in 1917.  Funded by the territorial 
legislature and private enterprise, this institution oversaw promotional activities to 
increase the flow of visitors to the islands.  The Hawaii Tourist Bureau focused its efforts 
on disseminating information and creating a tourist infrastructure throughout the 
islands.62  It published Tourfax, a pocket guidebook started in 1920, in addition to maps, 
brochures, posters, and other literature.  Tourfax contained a virtual cornucopia of 
information for island visitors.  It described the geography of the islands, local events, 
and Hawaiian culture.  The publishers also included a hotel guide in the pocket 
encyclopedia with complete information on the amenities provided at establishments.  
Finally, the Hawaii Tourist Bureau remembered to acquaint visitors with territorial and 
local laws governing marriage, customs, immigration, health, and other important 
issues.63 
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Table 4:  Tourists visiting the Territory of Hawai'i from 1922 to 1958, selected years 
Year  Through passengers Tourist arrivals 
1922  18,202 9,676
1923  19,492 12,021
1924  19,103 12,468
1925  19,201 15,193
1926  19,478 16,762
1927  19,657 17,451
1928  20,793 19,980
1929  22,262 22,190
1930  21,585 18,651
1931  19,268 15,780
1932  16,662 10,370
1933  17,173 10,111
1934  25,110 16,161
1935  25,992 19,933
1936  27,942 22,199
1937  31,951 21,987
1938  27,132 23,043
1939  41,156 24,381
June 1939‐June 1940  32,215 25,007
1958  n/a 183,610
Statistics taken from James H. Shoemaker, Labor in the Territory of Hawaii, 1939, 76th Cong., 3rd 
sess., H. Doc 848, 131; Memo to John Snell from the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, November 13, 1940, 
Handbook on Hawaii, COM 16-1, Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, Hawai’i State Archives; and 
“Statehood Seen Bringing Record Flow of Tourists,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, April 14, 1959, C-9 
 
 Businesses throughout the island added to the advertising campaign of the Hawaii 
Tourist Bureau by running their own colorful ads in magazines, newspapers, and tourist 
bureaus throughout the nation.  Castle and Cooke, Matson Navigation Company, Inter-
Island Airways, the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the Association of Hawaiian Pineapple 
Canners, Coca-Cola, and other companies utilized Hawaiian imagery to sell their producs 
or lure potential customers to the Pacific retreat.  Their advertisements provided 
picturesque scenes of island attractions.  In these pictures, outrigger canoes manned by 
Kānaka oarsmen broke the still, deep blue waters lining the beaches where happy tourists 
sunbathed.  Well-dressed diners danced to the music of jazz bands under a canopy of 
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palm trees and stars.  Every picture and every image relayed to the observer a paradise 
available to travelers.64 
 In his work on visual Hawaiian promotion material, DeSoto Brown traced the 
career of four artists responsible for the imagery viewed by Americans.  Don Blanding, 
Ruth Taylor White, Frank McIntosh, and Eugene Savage were pioneers of Hawaiian 
iconography associated with mid-1900s advertising.  White’s work featured the Native 
Hawaiian hula dancer image most often identified with the islands.  Frank McIntosh and 
Eugene Savage both drew menu designs for the Matson Navigation Company.  Since 
oceanic travel served as the primary form of transit to the islands before the 
commercialization of air travel, most tourists arrived aboard a Matson ocean liner.  
Imagery found on Matson menus became so popular that the company began selling them 
as a souvenir item.  More important to this study is the accuracy of the imagery.  
According to Brown, these men used an exaggerated style to portray the islands.  
Reminiscent of the promotional images used by railroads, boosters, and territorial 
legislatures in the nineteenth-century West, the designs drawn by Blanding, White, 
McIntosh, and Savage portrayed an almost Edenic land to lure people west.65 
 Pictures, menus, postcards, and magazine pages were a great platform to promote 
the territory, but the arrival of moving pictures and radio vastly increased the potentials 
of advertising, and the pro-statehood faction quickly recognized this.  The Hawaii Tourist 
Bureau staged motion pictures throughout the islands at the peak of tourist season.  
Utilizing the latest cinematographic innovations in color and sound, the movies captured 
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the most attractive aspects of the islands to show in movie theatres throughout the United 
States.  With the growing popularity of motion pictures, the bureau realized that it could 
reach mass audiences with an advertising medium that captured the imagination with 
doctored images.  Moreover, the Hawaii Tourist Bureau was adept in producing these 
films.  In 1939, their movie, Hawaii, U.S.A., proved rather popular as it drew in large 
audiences at the Golden Gate International Exposition.66 
 Filmed in 1938, Hawaii, U.S.A. was a masterpiece of promotional material.  
Throughout the film, the audience was treated to picturesque panoramas of the landscape.  
The film celebrated Hawaiian diversity by flashing images of beautiful beaches, majestic 
mountains, clean Honolulu streets, happy residents, and lei-bearing Kānaka before the 
audience.  Hawaii, U.S.A. captured more than scenes of popular tourist sites.  The 
director made sure to include the economic and military importance of the territory.  The 
dialogue described the Hawaiian sugar industry as “American agriculture at its best.”  
Workers appeared in the movie.  The narration covered how they received rent-free 
homes, gymnasiums, hospitals, and clean recreation areas.  The Honolulu business center, 
“typically American,” was an economic hub where over $100,000,000 in manufactured 
goods were bought and sold.  As for non-contiguity, wireless radio, telephones, and 
modern transportation linked Hawaiian cities together and kept the islands in close 
contact with the mainland.  Finally, American viewers enjoyed scenes depicting the 
presence of the powerful U.S. Army and Navy throughout the islands.  Pearl Harbor 
Naval Base, the “most important offshore base” of any nation in the world, not only 
protected Americans living in the Territory of Hawai’i, it also projected American 
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democracy and freedom throughout the Pacific Ocean.67  This film would have made the 
promoters of nineteenth-century Omaha, Denver, and Sacramento Valley proud as it 
carried on their tradition of selling Edenic dreams and vistas to the American public. 
 The Hawaii Tourist Bureau and territorial businesses performed remarkably in 
their efforts to promote Hawaiian tourism.  By the 1960s, the islands had been 
transformed from a sugar- and pineapple-producing colony into a major tourist 
destination in the United States.  Clear proof of this came in the form of a film 
celebrating the tourist scene of Waikiki.  Released in 1962, Blue Hawaii starred Elvis 
Presley as young Chadwick “Chad” Gates.  As a young soldier returning from peacetime 
duty in the armed forces, Chad must decide on a career path and marriage partner.  His 
parents want him to follow his father’s example.  Mr. Gates works as the vice-president 
at the Great Southern Hawai’i Fruit Company.  As a leading Honolulu businessman, 
Gates can afford to house his southern belle wife in a comfortable home, complete with 
an Asian-American butler named Ping Pong.  As a spouse and mother, Sarah Lee Gates 
wants Chad to marry well.  Unfortunately for her, Chad is in love with Maile, played by 
Joan Blackman, a young lady with a Native Hawaiian grandmother, who is “below his 
class.”  Worse still, Chad has no intention of having his career handed to him.  According 
to Chad, the G.I. Bill promised him that he could do anything he wanted in life.  In 
Chad’s case, he wants to live in a beach shack where he can surf, swim, practice Judo, 
and play music with his Native Hawaiian friends.68   
 Throughout the mainland, such a youth would be considered lazy and a drain on 
society, but in Hawai’i, Chad can turn his dream into a reality.  The rest of the film 
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follows Presley’s character as he enters the tourist industry.  After experiencing a few 
setbacks, young Mr. Gates successfully lands a client in his new tourist business.  In 
addition, he teams up with Maile, who finally accepts his marriage proposal.  Of course, 
the dialogue must reconcile Chad and his parents.  This occurs when Chad makes an 
agreement with his father’s friend and business partner to act as a liaison for conferences 
attended by malihinis (mainlanders, strangers).69 
 Blue Hawaii portrayed a Hawai’i completely different from that of Big Jim 
McLain.  Instead of a territory rife with communism, the island society as depicted was 
youthful, racially tolerant, and completely Americanized.  Chad’s parents reflected the 
old society.  They were well-off, white Hawaiians with ties to the mainland.  Chad and 
Maile, on the other hand, were rooted in the land.  They used Hawaiian terminology, like 
aloha, mahalo, and wikiwiki, and they attended hukilaus with their Native Hawaiian 
friends.   
 The film also suggested that the younger generation was contributing to the 
erosion of racial barriers.  The marriage between Maile and Chad shows a blending of the 
white settler and indigenous population, but director Hal Kanter limited the mingling of 
the races.  Although Chad can mingle socially with Kānaka, they are never his complete 
equal.  The film cast included Native Hawaiians, but they never appeared in major roles.  
From the film, one would assume that Kānaka lived to serve in Hawai’i.  Throughout the 
movie, they performed hula dances, served beverages, tended bar, played music, gave 
beachside massages, paddled outrigger canoes, and conducted hukilaus.  There was no 
shortage of the sensual, exotic wahine (woman) either.  Numerous times attractive Native 
Hawaiian women appeared in the stereotypical grass skirt that revealed a toned body.  In 
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one particular scene, a tourist from Oklahoma made bawdy remarks to a hula dancer.  
Instead of offering resistance or showing displeasure, she simply smiled and excused 
herself.  Five minutes later, however, Chad ended the scene in a fist fight with the same 
tourist for making a pass at one of the underage teens for whom Chad was serving as a 
tour guide. 
 Finally, the importance of tourism was not lost on the federal government.  
Congressional reports often highlighted the profitability of the industry.  Visiting the 
islands in 1939 for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, James H. Shoemaker discovered 
that 24,381 tourists arrived in 1939, an increase of over one thousand persons from 1938.  
This increase reflected a trend in Hawaiian tourism.  With each passing year, more 
mainlanders arrived (see Table 3).  Foreign tourists were also visiting the territory with 
growing frequency.  More important still, in 1939 tourists spent approximately $11-12 
million.  With pineapple and sugar exports to the U.S. accounting for only $3-4 million in 
revenue, it was clear that the tourist industry was one of the most lucrative sources of 
business on the islands.  Tourism also offered diverse employment opportunities as 
hotels, restaurants, taxis, buses, curios, clothing stores, and other businesses expanded.70 
 For the federal government, Hawaiian tourism only added to the profitability of 
keeping the islands.  In the American system, territorial legislatures could rely on the 
federal government for a few things, taxation being one of them.  Unfortunately, the 
colonial apparatus guaranteed little else.  When congressmen voted to appropriate funds, 
for instance, they did not always include the territories as recipients, especially during 
times of need.  During their fight for statehood, islanders constantly reminded 
congressional dignitaries, newspaper editors, and the American public that funds 
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generated by sugar, pineapples, and tourism fed the national coffers.  From 1942-1952, 
Hawaiian residents paid $1,200,000,000 in federal taxes, which, they happily noted, was 
more money than ten states contributed.71  By 1957, tax revenue further increased to over 
$267 million.72  If nothing else, Hawaiian commerce greatly benefited Americans 
economically; and with the annual increases in tourism, the islands’ value would only 
increase. 
 Congressional visits were another means of promoting statehood and overcoming 
negative publicity.  Hosting and entertaining congressional delegations offered islanders 
a way to dazzle Washington officials with island life.  Throughout the early 1900s, 
multiple parties of senators and representatives, not to mention lesser bureaucrats, 
traveled across 2,300 miles of open sea on fact-finding tours.  From 1907 to 1940, at least 
six official teams of congressmen came to the Hawaiian Islands.  To ensure that their 
visitors enjoyed their stay and left with a favorable impression, the territorial legislature 
appropriated funds for entertainment.  The amount of money varied with each year.  In 
1907, legislators set aside $15,000 for such purposes, while reserving $5,000 for 1940.73 
 Congressional visits also afforded elected leaders with opportunities to promote 
internal improvements in addition to statehood.  In spring of 1915, a delegation of 
representatives and senators arrived in Hawai’i.  Initially, the legislature allocated 
$15,000 for their visits; however, territorial delegate Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana’ole 
urged them to increase the amount to $30,000.  Kalaniana’ole was an active delegate who 
generally enjoyed success in prompting Congress to include Hawai’i in appropriations, 
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yet 1915 was a tough year as a number of bills favorable to the atoll had stalled.  These 
included acts allocating money for harbor improvements, a national park at Kilauea, 
transit programs, roads, a fish hatchery, coffee industry subsidies, and education funds.  
He hoped that the 1915 delegation to Hawai’i would report on these bills favorably if 
they saw firsthand the benefits they would offer to the islands.  The legislature concurred 
with Delegate Kalaniana’ole and voted immediately for the extra funds.74 
 The creation of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and Hawaii Statehood 
Commission allowed the legislature to extend their promotion-through-entertainment 
efforts to Washington, D.C.  To do so, the legislature authorized staff members to use 
funds for social gatherings.  Territorial delegates added to the Commissions’ efforts by 
using their dinner parties and other events to press the case for statehood.  According to 
his widow Elizabeth Pruitt Farrington, Delegate Joseph Rider Farrington accrued 
$200,000 in debts from entertainment bills amassed during his time in the capitol.75   
 Although a very effective tool, the promotion-through-entertainment tactic briefly 
made the statehood effort vulnerable to attacks by its critics.  Alice Kamokila Campbell 
was an outspoken critic of statehood.  A part-Hawaiian descendant of ali’i blood whose 
family had close ties with Queen Lili’uokalani, Campbell represented a portion of Native 
Hawaiian society that absolutely opposed statehood.  Although the majority of Native 
Hawaiians supported statehood, twenty-seven percent maintained a desire for 
independence.  While a portion of this group based their position on the events of 1893, 
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Campbell’s main reason for opposing statehood was race.  She distrusted the Japanese-
American population and urged the national government to delay statehood so long as 
this ethnicity represented the majority of all islanders.76   
 Most of Alice Campbell’s anti-statehood activity involved writing editorials, 
testifying before congressional hearings, and speaking against the movement as a 
territorial senator.  In 1948, she attempted to cripple the statehood movement through the 
judicial system.  At 9:19 a.m., January 17, 1948, Campbell filed a suit against Governor 
Ingram M. Stainback, Territorial Senator Walter D. Ackerman, Jr., Territorial Treasurer 
William B. Brown, Auditor Joseph Dickson, and several members of the Hawaii 
Statehood Commission.  Initially, the lawsuit charged the illegal use of territorial funds 
for “liquor, luaus, dinners, entertainment, and other purposes.”77  Realizing that these 
were not sufficient grounds for a court case, she later expanded her suit to include using 
the $200,000 appropriated by the territorial legislature “for the purpose of 
propagandizing, subsidizing and otherwise advancing the cause of statehood for 
Hawaii.”78   
 Campbell did not win the case, but she succeeded in hampering the promotional 
activities of the territory.  By 1948, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and Hawaii 
Statehood Commission became the primary vehicles for statehood promotional activity.  
In Alice Kamokila Campbell v. Ingram M. Stainback, et al. (1948), the Supreme Court of 
the Territory of Hawai’i invalidated the section of Act 115 that authorized the Hawaii 
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Statehood Commission to promote statehood throughout the nation.  Although the court 
recognized the right of a territory to petition Congress, the presiding justices ruled that 
such petitions must be for the general welfare of the people.  In the case of Act 115, the 
territorial legislature created the Hawaii Statehood Commission for the express purpose 
of advocating a specific political position not held by everyone in the territory.  While the 
Commission could legally entertain congressmen, collect information, disseminate data, 
protect Hawaiians’ rights, and petition Congress, the Hawaiian Statehood Commission 
could no longer actively promote and advertise statehood following Alice Kamokila 
Campbell v. Ingram M. Stainback, et al.79 
 Members of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, however, refused to allow this 
setback to interfere with their work.  Following the decision, Executive Secretary George 
H. McLane contacted the law office of Edward R. Burke.  After reviewing all materials 
pertaining to the court case, Burke wrote McLane with an interpretation of Peters’ 
opinion.  According to his letter, Alice Kamokila Campbell v. Ingram M. Stainback, et al. 
invalidated the ability of the Hawaii Statehood Commission to conduct “national and 
sectional advertising and publicity” to sway congressional members to vote in favor of 
Hawaiian statehood, but it recognized the right of the Commission to maintain an office 
in Washington, to prepare “documentary material for study and use by members of 
Congress,” to comply with “specific requests by members of Congress that information 
on statehood be sent to designated constituents,” and to fulfill “requests direct to the 
statehood office from individual citizens or organizations requesting information on 
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statehood.”80  In other words, Burke told McLane that it was absolutely necessary for the 
Commission to “comply meticulously with the decision,” but the language was broad, 
thereby allowing the Hawaii Statehood Commission to continue its work under the guise 
of providing information.81 
 Newspapers and printed material remained a critical tool in promoting the 
territory to the nation.  Delegates, territorial commissions, and private citizens involved 
in the statehood movement meticulously tracked articles and editorials on Hawaiian 
statehood.  For example, in July 1958, Riley H. Allen, editor of the Honolulu Star-
Bulletin, tracked at least fifty-eight editorials and articles in papers scattered throughout 
the nation.  The locales varied.  He found articles in major urban centers—Salt Lake, 
Washington D.C., Philadelphia—as well as smaller, less known towns—Havre, Montana; 
Alpena, Michigan; Tyler, Texas.82  Even local newspapers were monitored for content.  
From summer of 1939 to July 1940, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission collected 
political cartoons printed in Hawaii Hochi, an Honolulu-based newspaper catering to 
Japanese Americans.83  Tracking this information provided statehood advocates with a 
way to gauge the perspectives Americans held toward Hawai’i, in addition to views and 
opinions expressed in mainland communities.  Tracking popular opinions on Hawaiian 
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society aided their development of advertising campaigns.  Also, the commissions and 
delegates sometimes responded to outrageous articles or publications.   
 The Hawaii Statehood Commission, Citizens’ Statehood Commission, Hawaii 
Equal Rights Commission, territorial delegates, and others also wrote numerous 
speeches, articles, and other material countering the charges pertaining to race and non-
contiguity; however, answering critics’ charges of communism proved more difficult.  
First, little could be done to silence or counter southerners’ charges that Hawaiian 
congressmen would ally themselves to liberals on issues of race.  Very rarely did they 
even attempt to address negative comments about the ratio of Japanese Americans to 
European Americans.  Instead, they highlighted the Americanism of the Hawaiian 
population.  As proof of their loyalty to the nation, statehood proponents often used the 
heroics of the 100th Infantry—a World War II unit composed completely of Japanese 
Americans from Hawai’i—and the patient endurance of Hawaiians under four years of 
martial law to illustrate this.84   
 Second, modern transportation provided a ready counterargument to complaints 
of non-contiguity.  When challenged by the statement that the Territory sat 2,300 miles 
from the California coast, statehood defenders quickly dismissed this as immaterial.  
Perhaps it may have mattered in the nineteenth century, when the nation relied on wind-
powered ships for transoceanic trips, but air travel and petroleum driven naval vessels 
dramatically reduced travel time between the islands and Washington, D.C.   Comparing 
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modern travel times with the California trail often served as a favorite tactic used to 
dismiss charges of non-contiguity. As noted, the overland distance was roughly the 
same as the space separating Honolulu from California.  A wagon train crossing that 
distance required months worth of traveling before the transcontinental railroad.  Taking 
a boat to California meant covering more miles, over 13,000 nautical miles to be precise.  
In the 1950s, air travel had reduced the time to one day.  Finally, they illustrated the 
strategic importance of the islands.  Because they lay some distance from the coastline, 
the nation would benefit from the ability to project its military might even farther.  No 
doubt, this was a weighty argument during the early stages of the Cold War.85 
 While proponents readily addressed doubts about the wisdom of incorporating the 
Hawaiian territory based on its geography and ethnic population, they had more difficulty 
confronting their antagonists’ accusations that the islands were home to a large 
communist faction.  Newspapers both inside of Honolulu and on the mainland tracked the 
progress of investigations into a possible communist presence in the islands by HUAC 
and the FBI.  The International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union bore the 
brunt of these investigations.  Since the ILWU sought to break the economic, political, 
and social power of Hawaiian business, conservative islanders considered them a threat 
to the stability of society.  Only one newspaper unquestionably supported the ILWU, 
UPW, and workers.  The Honolulu Record ran articles depicting Hawaiian businessmen 
as willing to use any force—economic, political, or physical—to break the workers’ will 
to resist.  Their opposition was so strident that they even targeted the Honolulu Star-
Bulletin, the principle newspaper of the islands run by Riley Allen and partially owned by 
                                                 
85 A. Gram Robinson, ed., Congressional Digest, 7, 20; Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, H. Rep. 
109, 68-69; and Statehood for Hawaii booklet, Statehood for Hawaii newsletters in fo. 534, Box 11 Joseph 
Rider Farrington Papers, M-473, Hawai’i State Archives. 
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Joseph Rider Farrington, as a mouthpiece for conservative, established interests on the 
islands.86  Of course, it did not help that its editor, Koji Ariyoshi, a major supporter the 
ILWU, was one of the defendants in the infamous Trial of Seven, a sensational court case 
in which all were found guilty of violating the Smith Act.87 
 For statehood advocates, time and cooperation conquered accusations of rampant 
communism.  Through the full participation of its citizens, law enforcement, and 
territorial officials, the Territory of Hawai’i appeared as eager as HUAC and FBI to rid 
the islands of communism.  The arrest and sentencing of Jack Hall and other communist 
leaders appeared in newspapers as the dismantling of the communist leadership in 
Hawai’i.  Although IMUA, Senator Butler, and southern senators resorted to this issue 
when debating the incorporation of the territory, this issue subsided with the rest of the 
McCarthy hysteria by the late 1950s. 
 In their struggle for statehood, Hawaiians faced some opposition that earlier 
territories had to confront.  The most notable example of this is in the matter of race.  
New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and even Texas, all brought sizeable South and Central 
American populations into the Union with them.  For California, Oregon, and 
Washington prior to 1869, geography complicated territoriality and statehood as 
                                                 
86 The majority of the articles run by the Honolulu Record were ardently pro-labor, pro-civil rights, and 
anti-Big Five.  For examples of their content, see “‘Radical As Any Union,’ Star-Bull Bosses Tell 
Newsmen about Guild,” Honolulu Record 9, no. 3, August 16, 1956, 1, 7; “‘Bloody Monday’ Observed by 
Hilo Dockers after 18Years,” Honolulu Record 9, no. 5, August 30, 1956, 31; “Candidates Flock to Greet, 
Meet with ILSU; Old Fears Forgotten,” Honolulu Record 9, no. 7, 1.  The Honolulu Record was first 
published in August 1948 and ran until July 1958.  It was one of many alternate news sources, few of 
which showed the resilience of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.  The Hawaiian Collections at the University of 
Hawai’i—Mānoa has records of these periodicals that include their dates of publication, language, and 
political/social position, i.e. pro-labor, Filipino paper, plantation newsletter, military newspaper, etc. 
87 “Six Smith Act Defendants Earlier Jailed,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 4, 1953, 1; “Hawaii’s Docks 
Boss Convicted with 6 Others,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 20, 2953, 3; “6 Hawaii Reds Each Sentenced 
to 5 Years; Fined $5,000,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 4, 1953, 1; and Committee on Un-American 
Activities, Report on Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee, a Communist Front, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, H. 
Rep. 2986, 1, 7, 10-13, 20.  See also Ichiro Izuka, The Truth About Communism, 6-9, 13-16, 18, 22, Box 9, 
fo. 358, John Burns Papers, M-481, Hawai’i State Archives. 
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communication and travel proved burdensome.  Yet, their proximity to the United States 
helped them overcome these obstacles.  Since it was expected that their populations 
would eventually have a white majority and that railroads would connect their cities with 
the rest of the country, these territories successfully conducted statehood campaigns 
through the established political channels. 
 Hawaiian statehood advocates also used the old political tools to their fullest 
extent.  Their territorial delegates and legislatures constantly pressed Congress to pass an 
enabling act.  Hawaiians even tried the old technique of sending a petition to Washington, 
D.C., complete with a revised draft of an enabling act.88  By 1953, a new plan developed 
that would tie the Alaskan and Hawaiian statehood movements together.  Since Alaska 
was a Democratic region and Hawai’i was traditionally Republican, proponents of this 
plan believed it would overcome southern opposition by maintaining the Democrat-
Republican balance in the Senate.  Finally, Alaskans and Hawaiians even dusted off old 
techniques, like the Tennessee Plan in which a “Territory of Tennessee” drafted a state 
constitution as a way of prodding Congress into action.89 
 Unfortunately for the residents of the islands, the United States changed 
dramatically since the annexation of Hawai’i in 1898, making the older techniques used 
by continental territories outdated.  Assuming more international concerns following the 
Spanish-American War and World War I, Americans had to consider issues other than 
                                                 
88 Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, “House Joint Resolution No. 1 (1931)”,  House Concurrent 
Resolution No. 29 (1931) Amended”, “House Concurrent Resolution No. 3 (1935)”,  and “Senate Report 
on H.C.R. no. 103(1935)”  in Legislative Action Relating to Statehood and Equal Rights for Hawaii 
Sessions 1903-1937,  fo. “Legislative Action,” Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, COM 16-1, Hawai’i 
State Archives, 63-68, 82-89, 90-99, 100-111. 
89 John S. Whitehead, Competing the Union:  Alaska, Hawai’i, and the Battle for Statehood, Histories of 
the American Frontier, ed. Howard Lamar (Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 232, 
253.  Although Roger Bell’s Last Among Equals is perhaps the most detailed account of the Hawaiian 
statehood movement, Whitehead’s work is an excellent reference for the political techniques used by 
Alaska and Hawai’i to gain admittance to the Union. 
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their national desires when annexing or incorporating territories.  Hawaiian society and 
geography were also different from those found in previous territories.  In the Old West, 
the federal government used war, removal, and assimilation to empty the territories of 
Native Americans and other ethnicities.  But this was the New West.  The national image 
would not withstand the international and domestic reaction should policies used to 
conquer the Old West reappear in overseas American territories.  
 Recognizing that the path to statehood had changed, territorial authorities merged 
and transformed the techniques utilized by the continental territories in their quest for 
statehood.  Instead of focusing their energy on Congress, the legislature, Hawaii 
Statehood Commission, Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, and private citizens 
conducted a long-term, national advertising campaign to sway public opinion in favor of 
statehood.  By combining the political tools used by earlier state legislatures with the 
spirit and techniques of western boosters, Hawaiians changed the nature of the territorial 
statehood drive, winning them full participation with the states in 1959.   
CHAPTER 7   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 On May 20, 1959, Evangeline Keale Kamakawiwo’ole and Henry “Tiny” 
Kaleialoha Naniwa Kamakawiwo’ole welcomed their third child into the world.1  Named 
Israel Ka’ano’i Kamakawiwo’ole, he would grow up amidst the sights and sounds of 
Honolulu life in Kaimukī and Pālolo Valley.  As a child and teenager, his mind rested on 
eating sweet breads, learning the ‘ukulele, and playing with friends.2  At age 14, Israel’s 
family moved to Māhaka, an impoverished village populated by Kānaka Maoli.  
Although he resisted the move from Honolulu, his experiences there would radically alter 
the course of Israel’s life as the people, family, landscape, and social life of Māhaka 
introduced the young man to the traditional cultural practices of Kānakas that the settler 
society of the Hawaiian Islands had labored hard to suppress since 1820.3  
 From Mākaha, events took Israel Kamakawiwo’ole from a young man who found 
himself in trouble on a number of occasions to the musical voice embodying the 
independence movement of the Kānaka Maoli.  Initially, Native Hawaiian sovereignty 
meant little to him; however, his brother, Henry “Skippy” Kaleialoha Naniwa 
Kamakawiwo’ole, was passionate about the subject.  As their band, Mākaha Sons of 
Ni’ihau, matured in popularity and musical style, Skippy Kamakawiwo’ole began writing 
songs celebrating Kānaka culture and sovereignty, including the famous “Hawaii ‘78” 
which Israel Kamakawiwo’ole biographer Rick Carroll dubbed, “the signature anthem for 
                                                 
1 Rick Carroll, IZ:  Voice of the People, foreword by Marlene Ku’upua Kamakawiwo’ole (Honolulu:  Bess 
Press, 2006), 8. 
2 Carroll, 11-15. 
3 Carroll, 26-29. 
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the Mākaha Sons, Israel, and a whole generation of Hawaiian activists.”4  After Skippy’s 
death in 1982, Israel emerged as the lead man of the Mākaha Sons of Ni’ihau.  Having 
learned the value of Kānaka Maoli culture from his older brother, Israel slowly 
transformed into a leading voice for Native Hawaiian culture and sovereignty through the 
1980s and 1990s.  Unfortunately, his morbid obesity destroyed his health, finally killing 
him on June 26, 1997 at the age of 38.5 
 Born shortly before the passage of PL 86-3, Israel Kamakawiwo’ole witnessed the 
rebirth of the Kānaka Maoli sovereignty movement which paralleled indigenous 
movements in the continental states.  The 1960s and 1970s witnessed an explosion in 
civil rights movements throughout the United States.  As African Americans engaged in 
nonviolent demonstrations and formed militant black power groups, teenagers of South 
and Central American descent demanded access to equal education opportunities in 
California schools.  Likewise, Native Americans banded together in opposition to the 
legacy of imperialism in the U.S.  Abandoning negotiation with the federal government 
as useless, Native American youth embraced activism in the name of indigenous 
sovereignty.  In 1968, the American Indian Movement formed.  In 1969, a group of 
young Native Americans seized Alcatraz Island outside of San Francisco capturing public 
attention.   
 Events 2,300 miles across the Pacific Ocean took a similar turn almost ten years 
later as Native Hawaiian activists briefly seized Kaho’olawe.  From the perspective of an 
outsider observer, Israel’s music may not have carried great significance.  In the eyes of 
Native Hawaiians, however, he was the embodiment of Kānaka culture and a voice of the 
                                                 
4 Carroll, 61. 
5 Carroll, 44, 48-65, 74, 82-85105108, 123, 135. 
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movement.  Just as the Kānaka Maoli witnessed a cultural revitalization during the post-
statehood period, Israel himself began a long journey towards self-discovery.  His voice 
and political ideals matured with the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement.  With the 
signing of the famous Apology Resolution in 1993 by President William Clinton, in 
which the United States formally recognized the illegality of the 1893 overthrow, 
Kamakawiwo’ole emerged as a symbol for continued Hawaiian resistance to U.S. 
imperialism. 
 The movement for indigenous rights was not limited to the United States.  As 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith noted in Decolonizing Methodologies:  Research and Indigenous 
Peoples, the Maoris of New Zealand experienced European imperialism over their 
economy, land, culture, and knowledge.  As Europeans expanded throughout the globe 
following Christopher Columbus’s voyage to the Americas, they reshaped indigenous 
politics, economies, lives, religion, and land.  The 1960s not only fostered indigenous 
protest movements in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, it nurtured 
the development of a transnational indigenous sovereignty movement.  As indigenous 
peoples labored to revitalize their cultures, they moved away from domestic activism to 
international activism.6 
 These recent happenings signify the connection between events in American 
imperial history, i.e. the history of the American West, and developments in European 
colonies and dominions throughout the world.  As the field of the American West 
continues to mature and develop from the Turnerian days in which scholars believed that 
there existed an orderly process of frontier development by Americans of European 
                                                 
6 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies:  Research and Indigenous Peoples (New York:  Zed 
Books, 1999), 20-25, 110-115. 
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descent, Western historians continue looking beyond the traditional borders of the 
American West.  Recognizing similar developments in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
and trans-Mississippi America, the idea of a neatly compartmentalized and unique West 
no longer withstands scrutiny.   
 Hawai’i is inextricably connected to the American West, just as the American 
West is intimately connected to global issues in imperialism and colonialism.  If 
historians continue accepting the archaic frontier thesis that has been used indirectly to 
exclude Hawai’i from the American West, then the American West as a region becomes 
static and not a region with a rich history with the passing of the frontier.  On the other 
hand, embracing a refined definition of the American West as all of western North 
America and the Pacific Ocean incorporated territories conquered, subdued, annexed, and 
admitted into the Union in which American imperialism reshaped all facets of human life 
and the environment expands scholars’ understanding of the West.  In this context, 
Western historians cannot separate Hawai’i from the region as American imperialism 
completely transformed the culture, economy, political system, and environment of the 
islands, while integrating them into the capitalist economy.  Moreover, the inclusion of 
the Hawaiian Islands forces Western historians to take into consideration all territorial 
history and not just continental territorial history since the study of territorial 
governments is at the core of the history of the American West.  Given the commonalities 
between Hawai’i with other insular territories, scholars in the field must also 
acknowledge the role these U.S. possessions played in the continuing legacy of the 
Northwest Ordinance and other expansionist policies as the nation transformed itself 
from a purely imperial state to a colonial power. 
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  Hawaiians and Kānaka Maoli witnessed American imperialism in their islands 
since 1820.  Although the first missionaries fervently believed that they were only 
fulfilling their religious duties, their activities in the islands placed new pressures on 
traditional Kānaka culture and prepared indigenous society, economy, and government 
for succeeding waves of colonists.  In fact, missionaries served as the first agents of 
imperialism through their education programs and involvement in the economic and 
political life of the islands.  From 1820 to 1893, the incorporation of American and 
European political ideas and culture slowly eroded Native Hawaiian sovereignty.  
Representative government seemingly refined monarchy and gave Europeans something 
to which they could relate; however, it also separated the ali’i and mō’ī from the people 
and reoriented the political power to American and European settlers.  As the nineteenth 
century progressed, the American settler society expanded their political and economic 
hold using their roles as advisors to the king, representatives in government, and 
positions in Hawaiian schools, finally culminating in the 1893 overthrow. 
 In 1898 the United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands inaugurating a new era in 
Hawaiian history.  Prior to the passage of the Newlands Resolution, the Hawaiian 
Kingdom existed as a small, sovereign state trying to preserve its independence during an 
era in which European nations slowly accumulated territories and colonies throughout the 
world.  As Polynesian peoples throughout the Pacific Ocean tried to ward off conquest 
and colonization, the American empire-nation steadily incorporated new continental 
territories through wars, treaties, purchase, and settlement.  In 1898, the U.S. succeeded 
where England and France failed when they made the islands an incorporated territory of 
the United States.  For the next sixty-two years, Hawaiians experienced American 
242 
 
imperialism first-hand as they lived under a territorial government that had roots 
extending back to 1787.   
 Under territorial government, American settlers experienced the politics of 
exclusion characteristic of an imperial or colonial power.  They produced raw materials 
for the metropole, lived under American sovereignty, were subject to its laws, adhered to 
the cultural values of the dominant power, and they held little to no political power.  
Territorial residents elected representatives to the territorial legislature, yet Congress had 
plenary power over the region.  They elected congressional delegates who had no voting 
rights on Capitol Hill.  Furthermore, the president nominated the governor, secretary, and 
justices.  Viewing territorial history from this perspective, statehood movements were not 
symbolic rites of passage.  Instead, they were battles fought by territorial residents for full 
inclusion into the empire-state, a process that made American imperialism unique.  
Whereas the British Empire recognized self-government in the Dominions of Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand with the Statute of Westminster, they were never fully 
incorporated into Great Britain.  They remained apart.  Emerging from the Revolutionary 
War, the framers of the Northwest Ordinance intentionally devised a system whereby 
American incorporated colonies had the guarantee of complete political inclusion into the 
empire-state, a process that gives the United States empire its paradoxical nature.  
 The acquisition of insular territories in 1898 threw this system into disarray.  
Conflicted over the colonial path that the war between Spain and the U.S. propelled the 
nation into, diplomats, intellectuals, and citizens debated federal policy towards Puerto 
Rico, the Philippine Islands, Hawai’i, and Guam.  Could the United States govern 
colonies in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean?  Did the Constitution permit colonialism?  
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More importantly, should they have the right to request full participation in American 
politics?  The Insular Cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court largely helped answer 
this question.  By relying on precedents established in the development of continental 
territories, the justices determined that unincorporated territories did not hold the same 
position in the American system as incorporated territories.  While the Northwest 
Ordinance and other policies gave incorporated possessions the right of inclusion into the 
Union, unincorporated territories were guaranteed little else than the protection of their 
basic rights.  In essence, Congress held plenary power over them.  Without directly 
referring to colonialism, the Supreme Court helped legitimize American colonialism with 
its rulings on incorporated versus unincorporated territories.  Since Hawai’i was both an 
insular possession and an incorporated territory, residents there would experience a 
slightly modified form of the territorial process though it remained a region of American 
imperialism with characteristics similar to U.S. colonies. 
 The material presented in this dissertation illustrates the connectivity of Hawai’i 
to Western continental incorporated territories during this process.  Just as territorial 
governmental structures and settler responses to the federal-territorial relationship 
originated on the mainland and continued into the Pacific, policies toward Native 
Hawaiian sovereignty began with the interaction between the federal government and 
Native Americans.  Although Congress did not include Kānaka Maoli in Native 
American policy during the post-annexation, historians can see commonalities in the 
policies.  For example, with the Hawaiian Organic Act and Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act of 1920, Congress relinquished its responsibility toward Native 
Hawaiians to the state.  Following World War II and the Hoover Commission Report, 
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federal lawmakers attempted a similar policy throughout the continental states.  Also, the 
links in American usage of Native lands is clearly visible in the post-World War II era.  
As the example of the links between nuclear tests in the South Pacific and uranium 
mining in Dinétah illustrates, indigenous peoples often suffered from the Cold War 
military mentality as they lacked the basic protections enjoyed by citizens living in the 
metropole. 
 Moreover, these linkages between Hawai’i and the West demand the inclusion of 
the islands in scholars’ work on the American West.  Accepting postmodern geographical 
ideas of fluid borders determined by economic, cultural, religious, and other social 
factors as opposed to arbitrary political lines permits Western historians to accept place 
without rigidity.  Under the older views of the American West, the region had to lie in the 
continent, exist within certain political boundaries, contain specific environmental and 
geological characteristics, and rely on extractive industries.  New Western Historians 
challenged these views.  Rejecting the frontier thesis and the 1890 census as marking the 
end of the frontier, these scholars extended the American West into the twentieth century, 
adopted postcolonial and postmodern theories, engaged in comparative historical studies, 
and largely advanced the body of cultural studies.  Unfortunately, the definition and the 
models for understanding the West remained somewhat static.  Although they accepted 
conquest as a defining feature of the West, political borders and geographical borders 
remained wedded to the paradigm.  By expanding the definition of the American West to 
include imperialism as a primary characteristic, Western historians will liberate the field, 
shatter the rigid borders, and have the mobility to account for all American territorial 
imperialism, even in regions lying outside the continental United States. 
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 Israel Kamakawiwo’ole did not start his career as an activist for Native 
Hawaiians.  Instead, his understanding of the culture and history of his people slowly 
changed as his exposure to the struggle increased.  The people and communities around 
him broadened his views.  Accepting the challenge to fight for Kānaka sovereignty, he 
was transformed from one of many Native Hawaiian singers to a leading voice for his 
time.  Likewise, Western historians must remain open to new ideas surrounding the 
American West.  Incorporating new theories, refining old definitions, and abandoning the 
notion of a contiguous West will not only make scholars more aware of the region’s role 
in global imperial and colonial history, but it will also provide them with a new model 
capable of including all insular territories in the discourse on the American West. 
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